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Figure 1. Map of Indonesia. Map by Ratih Prebatasari.

Figure 2. Map of Maluku. Map by Ratih Prebatasari.

Introduction
Violence, Visuality, and Appearance

It is only shallow people who do not judge by appearances. The true
mystery of the world is the visible, not the invisible.
—Oscar Wilde, The Picture of Dorian Gray
A great haze envelopes the city. Shadowy figures stalk the streets and fire the
imagination. Lurking at the edge of vision, they inspire terror, incite rumors,
and provoke conspiracy theories. Cries of “Halleluyah” or “Allahu akbar” echo
from the embattled streets, piercing the pervasive unseeing that cloaks the
city and striking fear into those who hear them. Afflicted by the uncertainty
of the situation, familiar forms of the everyday suddenly loom large, appearing
treacherous, even grotesque. In such charged circumstances, the most familiar
things provoke terror: the well-known face of a neighbor possibly masking
something else, a strange lack of clarity clouding habitual surroundings, or
the intense horror instilled by objects as they shed their usual shapes, gushing
blood or casting shadows that dance eerily on the walls of the intimate spaces
of home, religion, and community. In this dense fog of war, huge pictures
unexpectedly rise up, bearing faces that tower over the city’s barricaded streets
and the debris of battle. Shiny, bright, and assertive, they emerge littered
among war’s ruins as points of clarity in the all-encompassing gloom. Haunting perception, especially during crisis when everyday appearances can no
longer be assumed, this chiaroscuro terrain between visible and invisible is
the fraught space where the forms of the world are figured and come about.
But it is also where they can be fatefully undone. Much of what I have to say
in this book originates there.
* * *
1
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Figure 3. Map of Ambon City. Map by Ratih Prebatasari.

Ambon, 2005 (Figure 3). When I arrived in the Central Malukan provincial
capital in the wake of the interreligious violence that wracked the city at the
turn of the last century, the first thing I did was to go for a walk, setting out
from my hotel facing the Maranatha church, the seat of the colonial-derived
Protestant Church of the Moluccas (I. Gereja Protestan Maluku, or GPM).1
Having landed shortly after daybreak on a night flight from Jakarta, it was already midmorning when I started along the once-elegant Pattimura Raya
Avenue, named for a nineteenth-century national hero from Maluku who famously stood off the Dutch colonizers in this eastern part of Indonesia. The
trees that had always cast a welcome shadow on the hot pavement were still
there, some new banks had arisen in the place of older ones, and a bigger, more
ostentatious cathedral appeared under construction, its front lot strewn with
building materials and its imposing entrance boarded shut. The city’s large
telecommunications office stood across from the post office as it always had.
And I was relieved to find the Rumphius Library—commemorating the
seventeenth-century German botanist employed by the Dutch East India
Company and author of writings on the region, such as the Herbarium
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Amboinense and Amboina Curiosity Cabinet—in the Catholic diocese’s complex, newly located in more spacious surroundings. Like the statue of Saint
Francis Xavier next to the old cathedral with a crab clutching a cross between
its claws at his feet, the library was a familiar landmark where I always stopped
on my many trips to Ambon, beginning in 1984 when I passed through the city
en route to the Aru Islands in Southeast Maluku for an initial visit before beginning fieldwork there for my doctoral dissertation.
But there was also much that had changed. Traffic congested the formerly
quiet thoroughfare where previously only pedicabs and the occasional minibus
traveled, while pedestrians and street vendors peddling an array of snacks and
colorful drinks claimed the sidewalks. Pedicabs still cycled slowly down the
avenue but now hugged the side of the street, avoiding the minibuses, whose
numbers had multiplied, the new Toyota Kijang vans transporting army staff,
government officials, representatives of humanitarian organizations, and the
place’s more prosperous citizens, and the motorbikes that darted in and out of
the cars. Mindful of the traffic, I joined the crowd of people walking and
strolling in the street: women returning from their morning errands, boisterous
schoolchildren dressed in the red, navy, and gray uniforms that indicated their
level of schooling, civil servants in their characteristic khaki attire, and other
passersby. With them I wove my way around the makeshift shacks and numerous stalls that had mushroomed along the avenue and on sidewalks after the
city’s main market burned down in January 1999 in the first days of the religiously inflected conflict between Muslims and Christians. A few food stalls
with a handful of customers stood between the vendors of newspapers and
magazines, computer rental stalls, shacks advertising photocopy services or a
haircut, and others with racks displaying music CDs and video compact discs
(VCDs), divided into sections marked Western, Pop, and Religious.
If you were looking for Muslim music or sermons, however, you would
search in vain, for in this central part of town—dominated historically by Christians, especially Protestants, who formed the majority of Ambon’s civil bureaucracy and its largely uncontested elite until the 1990s—religious was a gloss for
Protestant. To purchase Muslim CDs and VCDs, one would head to the Muslim
areas of town, where a wide range of retail and wholesale shops and vendors
crowded the streets adjacent to Ambon’s busy harbor. Although the town has
been largely segregated along religious and ethnic lines since colonial times,
the religious conflict hardened these divisions as territories claimed by either
side displaced populations who no longer belonged and further homogenized
neighborhoods into Christian and Muslim enclaves. After the war, people were
acutely attuned to this georeligious topography and were often wary when
passing from one part of town to another. Like so much else in the postwar city,
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even the name for the jumble of shacks that had sprung up on Pattimura Avenue, along with others like it elsewhere, pasar kaget—literally, a market that
had been “shocked” into existence—seemed to evoke the conflict. While used
for informal markets throughout Indonesia, in Ambon the name appeared to
echo the excessive violence that overtook the city from 1999 until the early
2000s, as I discuss below.
At the end of the avenue, I veered left, continuing until I arrived at a street
leading into the hills above the city where many of the middle-class Christians
live. Turning the corner, it was a shock to find myself looking up into the face
of Jesus Christ. On what had once been a commercial billboard, a close-up of
Christ’s anguished face blown up to monumental proportions overlooked the
street. Several letters from the phrase “King of the Jews” in Latin could be seen
extending behind his head on the cross. Other enlarged scenes unfolded on
an adjacent wall—Christ in prayer, twigs of holly and bells, another Christ face
framed by a star. In a city known for its Dutch-derived Calvinist Protestantism
where such public displays of Christian piety had previously been absent, the
discovery of the gigantic street pictures was all the more surprising.
None of my trips during the previous two decades had prepared me for this
startling encounter, not even the short visit I made two years before, in 2003,
when I spotted a large Jesus portrait in front of the Maranatha church and
caught glimpses of a crudely rendered Santa Claus and some Romans crowding
around Christ on the walls of a Christian neighborhood. Far less strident than
this huge street-corner Jesus flanked by Christian scenes, those images had
struck me at the time as incidental. Although my short walk up Pattimura
Avenue and my taxi ride earlier that morning had taken me past numerous
mosques and churches, this demonstrative religious presence was unlike anything I had seen before.
In retrospect, this was one of those serendipitous yet preconditioned encounters to which the anthropological method, one of intimate ethnographic
engagement with everyday life over extended periods of time, makes us especially susceptible.2 Well before I had seen Christ at large in Ambon, I had already described the city’s wartime conditions as a pervasive unseeing or
blindness akin to a thick fog blanketing the place and triggering forms of extreme perception among its inhabitants, or the challenging atmospherics of
conflict that I conjured at the opening of this book. When I happened upon
the street corner embellished with Christian scenes, I immediately sensed their
importance. But I wondered what I was to make of these images. Might they
manifest a new way of seeing—one, to be sure, that announced itself assertively?
Had those weary of war’s uncertainty and gloom thrown up pictures as points of
defiance, solace, and religious identification in the midst of the city’s devastation?
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Throughout this book, I move back and forth between the figuring impulse
that compelled some Christians to paint Christianity in Ambon’s streets and
the disfiguring momentum of violence as many of the city’s everyday rhythms
and familiar texture were undone by war, a dynamic that, over time, I came to
see as significant.
The description of the conflict and my analysis of the fog of war and its
enfolding within the conflict’s violence are the subject of Chapter 1. It especially
draws on several months of fieldwork in 2000 and 2001 in Manado, the Christian majority capital of North Sulawesi province. During my time there, I
divided my attention among the swelling numbers of primarily Christian refugees fleeing the violence in Maluku, journalists from the city’s print media
institutions, representatives of religious organizations and churches, and a
handful of NGOs who worked in the camps. Equally important was my reading
of the initial reports and analyses about Ambon and other parts of Indonesia
where numerous incidents, large and small, of ethnically and religiously inflected violence occurred around the country in 1998 and soon thereafter,
following the collapse of the authoritarian regime of Indonesia’s president,
Suharto.3
The formal announcement on May 21, 1998, of Suharto’s momentous decision to step down from the presidency after more than thirty-t wo years in power
fell on National Awakening Day. Much could be read into the coincidence of
the resignation with this holiday, which commemorates the 1908 birth of a
national student movement, dedicated to achieving independence from Dutch
colonial rule. Far less recognized was the resignation’s coincidence with a
second holiday, the Ascension of Jesus Christ, which in 1998 also fell on May
21. I only became aware of this second holiday as I began to write the Introduction of this book, but in light of much that follows, it is hard not to discern
some poetic truth in the concurrence of the regime’s collapse and the ascent
of Jesus Christ.4
From my first startled encounter with Christ’s immense face on a public
street through the weeks and months thereafter in which I came to know
Ambon in its new postwar circumstances, I encountered a city crowded with
such pictures. Along highways, at important crossroads, or facing outward from
the gateways of Christian neighborhoods, huge Jesus faces towered over the
passersby and traffic moving below, while murals showing Christian martyrdom
or emblems snatched from Christmas cards formed attention-grabbing backdrops to the urban congestion of pedicabs, motorbikes, pedestrians, minibuses,
and Toyota Kijang vans. In 2005, I began fieldwork in the Malukan capital by
pursuing the pictures, following them to different locations around the city,
up into the hills where many Christians live, and into churches where, arresting
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and unprecedented, figures of Jesus had recently appeared behind some Protestant altars. Over time, I discovered more new pictures tucked away in Christian homes, whose well-to-do owners had commissioned small painted rooms
set aside for prayer or Christian-themed walls, and an enormous triptych,
prophesizing the apocalypse, hidden out of sight in a warehouse only a short
drive outside of Ambon.
During the years in which I visited and carried out fieldwork in the city, the
magnitude, number, and heterogeneity of these images never ceased to amaze
me: from the tormented Jesus face with a crown of thorns and huge eyes upturned to heaven on a billboard along the highway from the airport into Ambon,
or another brilliantly blue-eyed billboard Christ acclaimed by many of the city’s
Christians, to scenes of Jesus surrounded by Roman soldiers stretching out on
city walls or his head hovering above an urban battlefield where tiny, white-clad
jihadis clashed with Indonesian army soldiers. Some, like the cameo Jesus portraits with painted serrated edges, stood out even more than others, their cut-out
distinctiveness recalling the Indonesian citizen identity card’s requisite photograph. Striking, too, was the indigenous brown Christ in Ambonese attire from
a Protestant minister’s drawing that he fantasized blown-up and on display in
the national library in the capital Jakarta. There was also the more regal Christ
dating from a later moment, emanating authority and protection from behind
Protestant church altars in Ambon and across the Malukan islands.
Orphaned Landscapes asks why the image of Christ has moved center stage
and, more broadly, why images are being publicly monumentalized at this
historically and politically fraught juncture in Indonesia. It analyzes their affective charge in Ambon as a new medium, one capable of offering some
comfort to the city’s Christians during the conflict that engulfed the city in
intermittent violence for three years starting mid-January 1999, with tension
and disturbances continuing for some time thereafter. On the eve of the so-
called Malino II Peace Agreement in early 2002,5 the conflict left a city divided
into Christian and Muslim territories, with up to ten thousand persons killed.
When one includes those fleeing violence, close to seven hundred thousand
were displaced, a number equaling one-third of a total Malukan population
of 2.1 million, comprising also those on neighboring islands.6 Beyond their
significance in Ambon’s war or its aftermath, the book also attends to how these
pictures, in the first place, were something to be seen, admired, and gazed at
by Christians, offensive to or ignored by Muslims, catching the eyes of passersby, interrupting the flow of traffic, or marshaled as a backdrop in wartime
for photographs of young Christian men brandishing weapons or other poses
caught on camera. Potent material presences standing on sidewalks and along
streets in the wartime and postwar urban environment, these images had the
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capacity for some to imaginatively transport them beyond any specific context,
even something as dire and encompassing as the deep disturbance and brutality
of war. If any image necessarily establishes its own “force field,” this ethnographic study examines the forces that coalesced around and animated these
pictures.7 Besides those outlined below, the force emanating from the material
presence of the pictures themselves, as they sprung up and claimed a place in
the city, was palpable.
In what follows, I single out for attention the most important among the
histories, discourses, imaginations, and affective dispositions that fed the dynamic, mutable environment in which the Christian pictures proliferated. I
also consider questions of power, including the waning of the social, political,
and economic power of Protestants in Ambon and Central Maluku, and the
regional and national politics that are relevant to understanding the transformation of the city and its appearance. Although I separate them for clarity’s
sake, what concerns me most is how these different forces came together, creating a mobile field around the street pictures where they interacted with each
other. Also, how these convergences helped to determine how the pictures
mattered or did not matter to the myriad people who saw them, whether those
comprising Ambon’s diverse urban population or others who came to the city,
for a host of reasons, during and after the war. Although I will have occasion
to mention others in this book, the most relevant forces include the legacies
of Dutch colonialism in Maluku, especially the relative visibility and privileging
of Protestant Ambonese versus the exclusion and invisibility of Muslims, and
the erosion of this long-standing difference with Indonesia’s greening or Islamicization from the early 1990s on. Of overriding importance for understanding
the pictures’ raison d’être are also the enormous repercussions around Indonesia, with particular implications in Ambon, of the unraveling of the Suharto
regime. These include the profound uncertainties but also possibilities unleashed by the dissemination of the discourses of the student-led Reformasi
(political reform) movement that brought Suharto’s so-called New Order
government down as these reverberated at a far remove from Jakarta in Ambon.
The conflict also intensified the spread and eager embrace of new visual and
audiovisual technologies that were already underway due to the liberalization
of media in Indonesia during the late Suharto years and the lifting of draconian
media and censorship laws by his successor, Habibie. It is no coincidence that
the Christian paintings took off at precisely the time a surge in new visual and
audiovisual technologies helped shape diverse modalities of communication
and experience. Apart from participating in a wider attunement to visual experience and media characteristic of the time in Indonesia, some of the street
pictures and the discourse around them explicitly evidence the impact of media
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technologies and practice. For instance, a billboard of Christ looking down on
a globe turned to Ambon and the neighboring islands recalls the establishing
shot of national prime-time news as it homes in on a newsworthy location.
In the sections below, I introduce the analytical vocabulary and theoretical
stakes of the book centered on questions of images, visuality, and appearance.
An introduction to Ambon follows, in which I highlight the skewed history of
visibility between Christians and Muslims. I then provide an overview of the
crises and month-long protests that culminated in the Suharto regime’s collapse
and its consequences in the Central Malukan capital, and the effects of the
deployment of new media technologies in Ambon’s conflict. As I discuss briefly
below and at greater length in Chapter 1, the war itself, and especially the vast
unseeing that characterized it, was another factor that helped foster the street
pictures and influenced the forms they took. This general blindness or challenge to seeing served, generally, to enhance the critical role of seeing among
the urban population as it also precipitated forms of extreme perception that
aimed to pierce the uncertainties and treacherous realities that prevailed in
the embattled city. All of these forces abetted and helped to consolidate an
acute attunement to and valorization of visual artifacts, technologies, experiences, and knowledge during the fraught years of Ambon’s conflict, resulting
in a particular constitution of what I understand as the terrain of the visual.
One of the most remarkable aspects of the conflict was the way in which people’s
enhanced affective and material investment in visual phenomena, broadly
conceived, consolidated and extended their impact in the life of the city. This
is also what makes the violence of Ambon’s war and its aftermath such a fertile
site for exploring the contribution of visual phenomena to social and political
life more generally, especially today.

Image, Appearance, Figuration
If, as Oscar Wilde claims, “the true mystery of the world is the visible,” then it
is worth lingering over the evanescent appearances through which it is known
rather than simply bypassing or dismissing them. Under ordinary circumstances,
the surface appearances of persons, objects, behavioral patterns, and visual
habits; the arrangement of things and physical structures in space; and the
patterning of the urban environment form part of what the French political
philosopher Jacques Rancière calls the distribution of the sensible upheld by
a given sociopolitical order.8 In his understanding, this system of self-evident
facts of sense perception consists of a delimitation of spaces and times, of the
visible and the invisible, of speech and noise and thereby, too, of the particular
place and stakes where politics unfold. In identifying the inherently political
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determination of the experiential conditions that enable and privilege particular forms of sensory perception, thought, and action while foreclosing others,
the theory posits an intimate connection between aesthetics and politics. By
the same token, it is a connection sustained and mediated by the specific sensible forms, material structures, and practices that describe a given historically
situated distribution of the sensible.
In singling out the visual dimension of the distribution of the sensible, my
approach is more circumscribed than that of Rancière.9 In this respect, I am
especially interested in two interrelated processes. The first I call the work on
appearances—my main example being the deliberate interventions on the part
of Protestants in the urban visual environment through the production of
Christian-themed pictures. If this process is especially sociological, the second,
or the work of appearances, is more phenomenological. Through the latter, I
aim to understand, for instance, how elusive if palpable phenomena like the
fog of war or the more concrete yet fleeting images of Christ that loomed over
urban space left their mark and helped to shape experience, thought, and action in the wartime and postwar city of Ambon. Orphaned Landscapes focuses
ethnographically on the forces and dynamics operative in producing a particular
visible environment and the perceptions thereof, as opposed, for example, to
the aural or linguistic aspects of a distribution of the sensible. In doing so, I
home in on moments of instability when, no longer taken for granted, the
sensible begins to change, contributing, however incrementally and diffusely,
to disruptions and alterations in the ways this was experienced before.
In the ethnographic material at the heart of this book, images and, more
broadly, the work on and of appearances offer a privileged vantage onto how a
particular social world, especially that of Ambon’s traditional Protestants, refigures itself and moves on in the wake of profound social and political change,
traumatic events, and crisis. Images, the work on and of appearances, and figuration and disfiguration are the terms I use to distinguish different dimensions
of these far-reaching transformations. Image here covers a range of predominantly visual media10—in the first place, the Jesus portraits and murals that
arose in Ambon’s streets and the globalized Christian print capitalism upon
which, for the most part, they depended. It also comprises other mediations of
war and peace, like the antiviolence public service announcements aired on
television, but also graffiti and the drawings of paired mosques and churches
produced by children in peace and reconciliation programs that are the subject
of Chapter 5. In an explicit fashion, such images demonstrate the wider work
on appearances through which Ambonese and others—both intentionally and
unintentionally—aimed to manage and make sense of a wartime environment
that often defied their understanding in startling and disturbing ways. Somewhat
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differently, the work of appearances foregrounds the more diffuse effects on
people of the devastation of the war, such as the zoning and mass displacements
that turned Ambon into an increasingly unfamiliar place for many over time.
Like the work on appearances, the work of appearances includes novel experiences, such as the encounter with the huge Christian pictures that, impossible
to avoid, filled the sight of pedestrians and other passersby “by force.”11
The twinned forces of figuration and disfiguration intrinsic to processes of
world-making and—crucially, too—world-unmaking are another aspect of
Ambon’s wartime visual environment to which I pay close attention.12 I see the
energetic forces of figuration and disfiguration tracked in the coming pages
not as opposed but as propelling one another within the larger disruption and
redefinition of the aesthetic and affective forms that influence what presents
itself to sense experience. In the most straightforward sense, figuration describes
the act of creating or intervening in the appearance of the world in an artistic
manner as through a drawing, graffiti, or painted billboard. More broadly,
figuration in this book designates a world-making capacity that emerges in
dynamic relation to the devastation or disfiguration of the environment in
which the Christian street art appeared. A third aspect of figuration that I attend
to are particular imaginary and social types or figures that became endowed
with newfound significance in the context of the Suharto regime’s unraveling
and Ambon’s war and were widely disseminated in diverse media of the time.
Specifically, I am interested in how the figure of Ambon’s painted Christ aims
to bring into view and conjure some version of community for Protestant Ambonese by providing them with a face at a time when, as many Christians saw
it, their very existence in Indonesia was under erasure. Or how the ubiquity of
the child witness to violence in diverse media around the country, including
Ambon, aimed to secure the nation’s integrity and futurity via this image of
uncontaminated innocence that surfaced insistently in the turmoil accompanying Indonesia’s 1998 regime change. As these examples suggest, I will especially track figures and processes of figuration emergent within situations of
pronounced disfiguration—whether the precarity of Ambon’s Protestants in
the context of the city’s war and the country’s mounting Islamicization or the
downfall of the Suharto regime and the fears it unleashed regarding the prospects of Indonesia as a nation-state. Both, if differently, offer an entry into
understanding the particular ideological formations of the time and, by extension, even the distinct texture of the epoch.13 If the figure of Christ and that of
the child in violence surfaced in the charged circumstances of Indonesia at
the turn of the last century, they continued to be informed by their prior use
and conventional circulatory forms in addition to their specific affective and
historical genealogies.14 Before addressing these wider circumstances and figures,
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I turn now to Ambon and its complicated history of religiously differentiated
visibilities.

A Christian Town
To all appearances, Ambon was a Christian town through at least the 1980s.
This, at any rate, was a pervasive stereotype in Indonesia that only began to
lose force with the onset of Muslim-Christian violence in early 1999. In the
1980s, when I spent short periods of time in the provincial capital on official
business and waiting for boats leaving for Southeast Maluku, but also on a
return visit in 1994, the administrative and political center of the city where
the public offices, banks, post office, a number of schools, and the GPM Maranatha church and large Catholic cathedral were located had a decidedly
Christian look about it. Apart from the pedicab drivers from South Sulawesi,
Muslims, by and large, kept to the coastal areas of the city. The majority of
Muslims I encountered back then were Arabs and non-Ambonese who populated the market stalls and shops clustered around the harbor where I would
stock up on reams of tobacco, flashlights, mosquito nets, sarongs, and other
valued commodities before heading to Aru. Unless one ventured beyond the
town into the Muslim villages scattered along the coast of Ambon Island and
on the neighboring Lease Islands (Saparua, Haruku, Nusa Laut, and uninhabited Molana), one might easily have been left with the impression that there
were no Muslim Ambonese at all.15 Strikingly, in contrast to most other parts
of Indonesia, Muslims in Ambon and the adjacent islands had over time been
rendered largely invisible. This pattern of marked Christian visibility and Muslim invisibility has a long history in Ambon and the Lease Islands, composing
today’s Central Malukan province, that dates to the arrival of the Dutch in the
seventeenth century and the imposition by the Dutch East India Company
(D. Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, or VOC) of a monopoly on the coveted spices for which Maluku by then was widely known.
The town of Ambon, on the island of the same name (strictly speaking, not
reckoned among the original Malukan spice islands),16 developed around a
Portuguese fort that was taken over by the VOC in the early seventeenth century. The town rapidly became the epicenter of the highly lucrative spice trade
(especially cloves, but also nutmeg and mace), a site of aggressive competition
between different European and Asian traders, and, by the end of the seventeenth century, a cosmopolitan colonial city populated largely by migrants.17
Already early on, the establishment of the draconically enforced VOC monopoly
on clove cultivation on Ambon and the surrounding islands, the imposition of
corvée labor to support the company’s political and military infrastructure, the
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destruction of the Muslim polities and traditional federations together with
the continuation of the Christianization begun under the Portuguese, and the
establishment of the seat of VOC power on the Christian Leitimor peninsula
of Ambon Island set the general pattern of community relations that was to
characterize Ambonese colonial society until the late nineteenth century.18
With the bankruptcy of the VOC at the very end of the eighteenth century
and a flagging world market in cloves, Ambon entered a period of economic
decline. Against this background, but especially in light of Dutch imperial
ambitions around the archipelago, education in Christian communities was
reformed and extended and the mass recruitment of Christian youth for the
colonial army (D. Koninklijk Nederlands Indische Leger, or KNIL) and bureaucracy began.
Considered loyal, these Black Dutchmen, as Ambonese came to be known
elsewhere in the archipelago, enjoyed special privileges over the other indigenous peoples of the Netherlands East Indies, were a significant presence in
the KNIL and the lower ranks of the civil administration, and often worked
and lived far from Ambon in military barracks and émigré communities in
Java and elsewhere. This meant that the Ambonese encountered by other Indonesians outside of Ambon—in Java, Sumatra, and elsewhere in the colony—
were almost always Christian, reinforcing the impression that Ambon and, by
extension, its alleged Christianness covered all Malukans.19 Another factor that
encouraged this view was the separatist movement of the Republic of the South
Moluccas (I. Republik Maluku Selatan, or RMS) that sided with the Dutch
against the new Indonesian nation when it declared independence on August
17, 1945, following the capitulation of the Japanese Imperial Army. In 1949,
after a protracted colonial war that the Dutch, to this day, disingenuously call
“police actions,” they were forced to relinquish their claims to the colony.20 In
the context of competing visions regarding the governmental form of an independent Indonesia, Malukans who feared domination by Jakarta declared the
Republic of the South Moluccas in Ambon on April 25, 1950. Indonesia’s first
president and revolutionary leader Sukarno sent troops to the islands that subdued Ambon in 1950, although fighting continued in other parts of Maluku
through the early part of that decade.21
As late as 1980, the Australian historian Richard Chauvel wrote an article
about the history of the Muslim population of Ambon and the Lease Islands that
he called “Ambon’s Other Half.” Although not made explicit, the title recalls
Jacob Riis’s 1890 photographic study of New York’s poor that aimed to explore
the unseen misery in which this portion of the urban population lived.22 As in
Riis’s study, emphasizing the role of the visual as a component in the creation
and consolidation of inequality is warranted here. Beyond the appearance of
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Ambon town, Christians are highly visible in Dutch archives and in photographs
dating from the mid-nineteenth century until the Japanese occupation of the
Netherlands East Indies in 1942. Conversely, Ambon’s Muslims, much less an
object of direct colonial intervention, maintained customary forms and practices
and local language use to a much greater degree than was the case for Christians
and to an extent that remains noticeable today.23 Indeed, the early suppression
of Ambonese connections with other Muslim centers of trade and learning in
the archipelago largely cut them off from the mainstream of Islamic thought
until the end of the nineteenth century.24 For an extended period of time, Muslims were simply out of the picture—not just politically and historically but also
visually.
“Few, if any, early-t wentieth century images of Ambonese Muslim women
[or, by extension, men] have been captured,” writes Marianne Hulsbosch, the
author of a fine history on Malukan dress, with some frustration. “[Colonial
officers] like Riedel and Sachse did not even consider Muslim dress although
they left descriptive notes on Christian and native appearances. For them the
Muslims were invisible—a sad statement considering that at the end of the
nineteenth century they made up 28.3% of the population [in Ambon town].
On the main island of Ambon, the Muslim population even topped 38%. This
ignorance says much about the colonial regard for the Muslim [as opposed to
Christian] population.”25 Occasionally, one sees an exception to this general
rule. In his report to the colonial administration upon leaving his post, a Dutch
colonial officer countered the pervasive stereotype of the island’s peoples by
evoking another Ambonese world that was Muslim while he also described
Christian villages where the inhabitants were neither soldiers nor clerks but
did manual labor and expressed themselves quietly or, in other words, did not
conform to the stereotype.26
Despite the rare exception, the general disregard of the Muslim half of
Ambon’s population on the part of the authorities did not end with decolonization. The skewed and in part, but only in part, bifurcated colonial experience
that privileged Christians over Muslims, especially locally in Maluku but also
nationally, was continued in some respects under the quasi-secularist, nationalist politics of presidents Sukarno and Suharto. If nationally both Protestants
and Catholics enjoyed some prominence, a connection facilitated linguistically
by the Indonesian designation of Protestants and Catholics alike as Christian,
hegemony in Central Maluku remained solidly in the hands of Protestant
Ambonese. This perpetuated their dominance beginning with the early conversions under the Dutch East India Company of parts of the population to
Protestantism. It was only in the late nineteenth century, moreover, that Catholic missionaries were allowed to proselytize in Maluku, with their activities
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restricted to the southeastern islands. Under Suharto, representations of Ambonese culture continued to be Protestant Christian, from the bridal couples
featured on government posters representing the country’s different provinces
to Ambonese songs, based on church choirs and Western harmonics and orchestration and sung by schoolchildren across the nation.27 Likewise, Ambonese
contributions to national historiography celebrated—until very recently—Protestant Christian uprisings and resistance leaders like Martha Tiahahu and
Pattimura, whose statues occupy prominent positions in the town, the first
overlooking Ambon and its bay from the spot conventionally said to offer the
most scenic view, the second dominating Independence Square with a fearsome
look and raised machete. By comparison, Muslim Ambonese presence in both
national and regional history has been remarkably silent.28 This is because,
with only a few exceptions, Christians authored the regional histories and
controlled Ambon’s large civil bureaucracy, including its top positions, like the
regional Ministry of Culture and Education and the provincial Pattimura
University.29 Tellingly, an anthropologist who did fieldwork in a Muslim village
in Central Maluku in the mid-1990s reports that the people whom she studied
felt that the nation-state ignored their identity as Muslims.30
The Christian hegemony in Ambon and Central Maluku underwrites the
long-standing sense of entitlement and superiority conveyed by the eager appropriation of the expression Black Dutchmen. In my experience, Protestant
Ambonese would invoke this phrase to designate their special status and perceived kinship with the former colonizer, if privately and less frequently after
the conflict. Yet even as this claim was seldom voiced, the white Christ that
proliferated on city walls during the conflict may be understood as a graphic
rendition of the colonial-derived connection. Along with other factors, this
general attitude on the part of the Protestants helps to explain the growing
awareness and pride among Muslim Ambonese in their history of resistance
to the Dutch and their noninvolvement in the colonial project. It also fuels the
circulation of covert counterhistories that question Christian contributions and
celebrate Muslim importance in regional and national history—including the
claim that the renowned war captain Pattimura was in fact a Muslim.31 If confided cautiously to an anthropologist in the 1990s, the Muslim man who drove
my husband and me around Ambon Island in 2005 spoke to us with no hesitation about the secret history that allegedly proved Pattimura’s Muslim identity.
Confirming just how much the conflict had changed the relations between
Muslims and Christians, our driver’s disclosure spoke to the waning of Christian hegemony in the city and Central Malukan province that began in the
1990s with Suharto’s promotion of Indonesia’s Islamicization and was further
consolidated during the war.
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Not surprisingly, the longue durée of Christian visibility versus Muslim invisibility became refracted in the dynamics of Ambon’s conflict, as was the
partial reversal of this relationship as Muslims not only gained power nationally
but assertively and visibly profiled themselves as Muslims to a much greater
extent than before. In Maluku, this meant that Muslims began to occupy key
government positions that had long been claimed by Christians or Muslims
from outside Maluku, especially Javanese. One way of understanding the appearance of the Christian street pictures is precisely as a response to the new
situation—the increasing displacement of Christians from the civil bureaucracy
in Central Maluku and the perceptible change in Ambon’s urban environment
as it began to lose its characteristically Christian look. The dynamics I have
outlined here, but especially the historic hegemony of Christians in the region,
meant that the feelings of abandonment by authority that were pervasive in
Indonesia following Suharto’s downfall were especially pronounced among
Christian Ambonese. At the same time, the repercussions of the national crisis
in the country’s eastern outskirts were attenuated by distance and the long
history of difference that characterized the relationship of Maluku to Indonesia’s political and demographic center on Java.32 This meant that the evacuation
of authority with Suharto’s departure arrived in Ambon imbued with a sense
of possibility that manifested itself in various ways. Most pertinent for the purposes of this book is the decidedly religious character of the Protestants’ turn
to picturing. This move marked a difference vis-à-vis Muslim majority Indonesia
and partook of the energies emanating from the capital during the upheavals
of Reformasi. I turn now to this tumultuous time surrounding Suharto’s downfall and to the Reformasi movement’s discourse of transparency and desire to
bring things hitherto hidden into public view, something that also animated
Ambon’s street pictures, if less explicitly.

The Appearance of Crisis
After more than thirty-t wo years in power, the spectacular end of the Suharto
regime caught many Indonesians and long-time Indonesia watchers, whether
journalists, academics, foreign diplomats, or NGO activists, by surprise. Engineered by Suharto, the authoritarian regime emerged from the 1965–1966
massacres of between five hundred thousand and a million people in a U.S.-
supported anticommunist purge. The mass killings followed an alleged coup
attempt on the part of leftist army officers that was subsequently dubbed the
September 30 Movement (I. Gerakan 30 September) and became codified under
Suharto in national historiography, monuments, and a film screened annually
on national television and in schools. While exceptionally brutal, the regime
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managed throughout much of its extended rule to generate an “appearance of
order” sustained by a carefully orchestrated diversity that relied on a cultural
policy and discourse that was itself violently coercive and authoritarian.33 As
late as the 1990s, this apparent bastion of order and strategic anticommunist
positioning at the heart of Southeast Asia was celebrated by the World Bank
as one of Asia’s miracle economies, boasting an impressive record of national
development, a broad-based increase in people’s living standards, and a rise in
the proportion of the population with some schooling, among other standard
measures of success.34 Even during its last decade, when Suharto’s New Order
initiated a policy of carefully controlled openness, it remained exceedingly
“difficult to imagine political change.”35
When change did finally come, it came first as a full-blown financial crisis,
“the strange and sudden death” of one of Southeast Asia’s economic tigers triggered by the free fall of the Indonesian rupiah and the flight of capital, following
closely on the heels of the Thai baht’s collapse in July 1997 and its reverberations
around the region.36 A series of cascading crises and events, all tellingly bearing
their own name, rapidly overtook Indonesia, starting with Krismon, the 1998
monetary crisis, giving way to Kristal, or total crisis, through the heady spring
of protests inaugurating the period of student-led Reformasi, and the horrific
riots and gang rapes of May 13–14 in Jakarta that targeted Indonesians of ethnic
Chinese descent and precipitated Suharto’s resignation on May 21.
For many Indonesians, the first real confirmation of the national crisis was
visual. It arrived in the form of a photojournalistic image of President Suharto
signing an International Monetary Fund (IMF) memorandum of economic
and financial policies on January 16, 1998, as Michel Camdessus, the IMF’s
director at the time, looks down on the strong leader’s highly mediated public
humiliation with folded arms.37 In the ensuing months, the time of Reformasi
and its aftermath were remarkable, generally, for the heightened awareness of
visibility in the country as many Indonesians felt that the eye of the international community was upon them (I. di mata internasional) while visual metaphors proliferated as an expression of this perception, among other factors.38
Less than six months after the May riots, the term transparency, hijacked from
IMF discourse, had come to describe “the desirability of not just economic
institutions but also political events being open to view.”39 Almost two years
after this observation in 2001, the term came up at a refugee camp meeting
that I attended in Bitung, North Sulawesi, where refugees who had fled the
fighting in Maluku complained that the source of their Supermie noodle ration
was “insufficiently transparent” or, in other words, that they did not know when
or how much they would receive. If more colloquial in this setting than in Jakarta’s streets in 1998, the term still conveyed the sense of transparency’s “possible
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antonym KKN, short for kolusi, korupsi, nepotisme in Indonesian (collusion,
corruption, nepotism),” and the more general assumption that what was hidden
from view had to be brought forth and subjected to public scrutiny.40
At the nation’s center but also beyond, transparency and its related vocabulary captured both the desire and the possibilities of seeing beyond the Suharto
regime and especially through its sordid history of corruption, crony capitalism,
endless abuses, obfuscations of truth, and violently repressed secrets. Other terms
and expressions characteristic of the discourse came similarly charged with a
strong moral and political connotation of exposing the New Order’s crimes,
bearing witness to violence, and uncovering the mass killings of 1965–1966 or
the perpetrators behind the disappearance of more than a dozen young male
activists in the early days of protest.41 Notwithstanding the euphoria of Reformasi, the desire to make public what had long been concealed was often accompanied by trepidation and even dread vis-à-vis what was imagined as
transparency’s full potential.42 For instance, the genre of horror films popular
at the time participated affectively in the political project of transparency as
viewers were enjoined to look, again and again, for the dreadful secrets of
power.43 Language was another site where some people objected in mainstream
media to the excesses of a more explicit vocabulary that began to substitute
the euphemisms common under Suharto—for instance, saying that a person
had been arrested rather than “made safe” or “secured.”
Stepping in amid the drama and chaos of Reformasi, Suharto’s successor,
B. J. Habibie, aiming to take distance from the previous regime and establish
his reform credentials, began to lift and replace some of the most widely criticized and draconian of the laws and regulations instituted by the New Order.44
These included freeing restrictions on the press, curtailing the military’s political power, introducing electoral reforms like lifting the limitations on the
number of political parties, calling for democratic elections, and redressing
the extreme political and economic imbalance between the center and the
regions through a radical program of decentralization.45 Passed by the legislation in early 1999, even before the country held its first relatively free general
elections since 1955, but implemented at the start of 2001, the country’s regional
autonomy program was of such scale and ambition that the World Bank called
it the Big Bang.46 Along with processes of demilitarization and democratization,
this program had profound effects on the national political, economic, and
social order, if unevenly and by no means everywhere with the same results.
Not surprisingly, decentralization’s far-reaching political and social interventions also had profound effects on the perceptions of this order, giving rise to
the fears, pervasive insecurity, and psychosocial adjustments that often accompany profound change. Indonesia’s appearance of crisis, sudden and startling
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as it was for many both within and outside of the country, was no single event
but rather a multilayered constellation of shifting forces and adjustments that
played themselves out in different ways in Ambon and elsewhere in the country
over an extended period of time.

Matters of Perception
A key factor in the expansion and increased attunement to the powers of the
visual in Indonesia in the early 2000s was the liberalization and spread of media
technologies. This includes the internet and, more importantly at the time in
provincial settings like Ambon, the relatively cheap, easy to use, consumer-
oriented video, VCD, and cell phone technologies. These became available
with the liberalization of the media in the late Suharto years of the 1990s but
took off especially with the Reformasi movement. Whether or not the downfall
of the New Order may be rightly understood as the result of an internet revolution, as some claim, is not the issue here.47 But certainly the role of these
relatively new media technologies in the reporting and witnessing of the events
of Reformasi by journalists, student activists, humanitarian workers, protagonists,
and ordinary citizens, and in the work of the new emergent generation of Indonesian filmmakers, cannot be overstated.48 Further afield in Ambon, where there
is inevitably a lag in the adoption of trends and commodities from the capital,
it is no coincidence that the impact of the communications revolution, media’s
liberalization, and the spread of visual and audiovisual technologies only really
registered when the circumstances of war provided this impact with an undeniable local impulse.
Along with the mobilization of media technologies within the conflict,
Ambon City also became a recurrent focus of media attention. During the war
and the immediate years that followed, a diverse population of organizations
and their representatives arrived in the city from the transnational humanitarian operation that, after the regime’s collapse, drove an entire industry focused
on conflict and violence in Indonesia. Besides introducing conflict intervention
mechanisms and methods for ending violence and securing peace, these organizations disseminated their own media to counter violence and promote
reconciliation.49 The heightened media attention also occasioned an influx of
national and international media practitioners, the production of public service
announcements (PSA) and pro-peace documentaries but also provocative
Muslim and Christian VCDs, and the local bolstering of the national television
station, along with the expansion of Jakarta-based stations into the area. These
include, for instance, a pro-peace PSA that went awry in Ambon’s war and
those produced by an international organization to foster awareness of violence
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against children that I discuss in Chapters 1 and 5, respectively. With Ambon
as a focus of acute media attention and the spread of image-based and other
media technologies came the novel commodified value attached to the audiovisual testimony of the war and documentation of human suffering and urban
destruction. Another novelty was that of seeing one’s own locality relayed back
in the form of national and international news via, say, Australia’s ABC channel
or through the provocative VCDs that spun off the conflict.50
It is a central argument of this book that the arrival to Ambon of the monumental Christian pictures and their insistent public visibility may be understood as but one expression of a momentous turn to the visual—discursively,
politically, technologically, and affectively—that accompanied the unraveling
of the Suharto regime. If anything, due to the chronic sense of unseeing occasioned by Ambon’s war, such a turn was more pronounced there than elsewhere in Indonesia. Put otherwise, if transparency or the aim to see through
the regime’s corruption and crimes was a rallying cry of Reformasi, Ambon’s
own turn to the visual, while inflected by these national circumstances, must
also be understood against the backdrop of blindness specific to the war. Acknowledging the impact of the chiaroscuro terrain of violence suspended between visibility and invisibility helps to explain the emergence of forms of
extreme perception as those caught in its midst aimed to pierce the treacherous
uncertainty and lack of clarity that reigned in the city, as I discuss in Chapter
1. It also helped to push the production of the paintings erected by Protestants
around Ambon as a medium through which to make themselves seen. Relevant,
also, to the city’s visual turn is the Malukan history of Christian visibility and
Muslim invisibility and the spread and uptake of new media technologies, among
other factors.
Orphaned Landscapes is not just a history of the visual as it emerged under
especially stark conditions in Ambon. Rather, the book presents what is through
and through a material history of the visual. A central part of this history involves attending to the sensuous, embodied, and affectively powerful aesthetics
that shaped how people—all kinds of people in Ambon in the early to mid-
2000s—apprehended and experienced the pictures and appearances that I
analyze in the coming pages. Aesthetics in this book embraces the double sense
of how something looks or appears, such as the way a traditional landscape
painting or billboard might look or the appearance of a person of one’s acquaintance or a stranger, and the particular modalities of looking and seeing through
which a given aesthetic form or appearance is engaged, whether wittingly or
unwittingly. It involves the particular qualities of an object and the semiotic
potential of materials and materiality, or how the way an object looks is inseparable from how it is looked at and apprehended, as well as the locations and
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modalities of its use.51 In Ambon during the war, this relationship between
seeing, sensing, materiality, and semiotics mediated everything from the rough
textures and shiny surfaces of painted city walls or the bullet-marked buildings
lining the main avenues of the besieged city to the newfound importance of
the material contents of pockets in the clothing of corpses that were ransacked
by victors on urban battlefields. An especially noteworthy aspect of this sensory
environment was scale, insofar as Ambon’s street pictures were all about monumentality—meant to provoke the gaze while refusing the passing glance or
casual dismissal.

Orphaning the Nation
In 2003, as I boarded a plane headed for Padang, West Sumatra, en route to a
conference, the paper folder holding my Garuda airline ticket caught my eye.
Beseeching me from its shiny surface was the stricken, wide-eyed face of a child
framed against a fiery red background and captioned with an appeal to adults
traveling around the country to envision the threatened future of Indonesia’s
youngest citizens and, through them, that of the nation itself. This was only
one of many images of the child in violence that confronted me on successive
visits to different parts of Indonesia in the early 2000s, including Jakarta, Central
Java, West Sumatra, North Sulawesi, and Ambon. While novel in certain respects, the child figure was indebted to older forms of state governmentality
where children served as the authenticating source of state genres: as the authors
of the Letters to the President, published in national and regional newspapers
and compiled in state-endorsed collections, in drawing contests where they
produced codified images of Javanese landscapes boasting rice paddies and the
requisite volcano, and as props in national holidays and ceremonies like flag
raisings.52 Nor was the witnessing of violence new to Indonesia’s children. Under
Suharto, children, along with adult Indonesians, were subjected to enforced
modes of viewing violence produced and authorized by the regime to spread
its version of history and terror.53 Foremost among these was the film that all
Indonesians were enjoined to watch, year after year, in obligatory school screenings and on national television, The September 30, 1965, Movement/Communist
Treason, “which set the terms for legitimate public fantasy and discussion for
much of the New Order period.”54 Equally important, the film and its material
iteration in the Sacred Pancasila Monument, the focus of numerous school
trips, were visual tools of the state that initiated citizens into adulthood and
national citizenship while also conveying a sense of the nation’s fragility should
it be bereft of the strong paternal figure of its head, Suharto.55
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For many Indonesians, Reformasi was a time of enhanced visibility that
would allegedly have left behind such forced witnessing. Intan Paramaditha,
an Indonesian novelist and film critic, went so far as to suggest in 2011 that post-
Reformasi, everything had been laid bare “before our eyes,” ending the crisis
of visibility that plagued the corrupt Suharto regime where the ability to see
was a luxury. At the same time, she wondered whether the spectrality of information (and violence) characteristic of life under the New Order was, indeed,
a thing of the past.56 Notwithstanding these doubts, what stands out is the investment in the ability to see characteristic of the Reformasi movement and
how Paramaditha’s claim resonates with several key figures who at the time were
credited with almost sacrosanct powers of witnessing and pure vision. These
are the student activists who spearheaded the mass demonstrations that rocked
Indonesia’s capital and other cities during the Reformasi spring, whose youth,
opposition to the regime, and ascribed purity placed these “witnesses of history”
in direct genealogical relation to the nation’s storied pemuda or revolutionary
youth.57 While the child figure is akin to that of the student activist in her purity
and embodiment of nationally sanctified vision, her role is in relation not to
national history but rather to its violence.
Marshaled as a privileged bystander to violence in media productions, the
child’s mere presence often serves as a sentimental antidote to violence. Occasionally, children’s faces and drawings serve as a kind of cordon sanitaire or
container of violence. For instance, in the opening of a documentary on Ambon’s conflict, Peace Song from 2001, children’s drawings successively fill the
screen while stills of children’s faces come in at the film’s end to frame footage
excerpted from national news broadcasts showing Muslim migrants frantically
scaling departing boats as they are driven out of Ambon and the destruction
of the city’s markets during the first days of the war.58 Repeatedly in different
media productions, the child stands apart from violence, witnessing brutality
and national destruction yet safeguarding the nation’s integrity through her
position as a “vacillating outsider,” wavering between belonging to the nation,
on the one hand, and a detachment from authority and position beyond it, on
the other.59
Exemplary in this regard is the fiction film Viva Indonesia! An Anthology
of Letters to God from 2001, a so-called omnibus comprising five minifilms
launched in the same year that the country’s ambitious program of decentralization went into effect.60 Registering the view from the national center, the
film captures the nagging sense of an absence at Indonesia’s core. Against the
backdrop of the sounds of the national radio broadcasting the serial crises afflicting the country, each of the film’s five vignettes singles out a child from one
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of Indonesia’s exoticized regions who sends a letter to God detailing her particular plight and seeking his solace and attention.61 Uncertainty accompanies
the dispatch of any letter.62 Yet those sent in the film miraculously survive
church bombings and other catastrophes symptomatic of Indonesia’s fraught
democratic transition, as if to confirm Lacan’s dictum that a letter always arrives
at its destination.63 Trickling in from around the archipelago in what amounts
to a seamlessly composed ideological scene, all the letters fatefully arrive to a
Javanese post office where God appears absent and a childless postman stands
in as deus ex machina. The film concludes with one final posting: early one
morning the postman finds a box left in front of the post office door. It holds
a toy, a few blankets, a newborn infant, and a note that reads, “God, I send this
to you because adults no longer think of us.”
The child’s abandonment—and miraculous rescue—that constitutes the
affective subtext of the film visually condenses the orphaning of the Indonesian
nation bereft of the paternal force that for long had held it together, if violently.
Yet, if the national predicament finds some resolution in the film when the
Javanese subject at the other end of the mailbox steps in as father and pretends
to be God, the pure innocence of the child standing in for the nation and the
uncertainty of communication with authority intimates how she is always already at risk. Rather than opposites, the child’s innocence evokes its violation.64
In the immediate years after Suharto, the pornographic spectacle of all-
encompassing violence hovered in the background of depictions of the child’s
body, face, and voice. If on-screen this looming violence could be held at bay,
its presence intimated the possibility that it might eventually overwhelm her.
Off-screen, not surprisingly, things were different.
Orphaned Landscapes tacks back and forth between the distinct mediations
on Indonesia’s eastern outskirts of the national predicament characterizing the
period after Suharto’s withdrawal—from the nation’s orphaning or precarity
of citizen-subjects bereft of the paternal force that had previously authorized
their place, granted them recognition, and orchestrated everyday national
appearances, to the painted urban gallery of Jesus portraits and Christian scenes
authored by Protestants connected to Ambon’s colonial-derived church, the
GPM. In this city, not only were children victims of the conflict, but quite a
number of them became implicated as participants in various ways. Nor was
what was seen on-screen there immune to the brutality and prejudices of the
war. In what became an infamous incident, the innocent child figure broadcast
around Indonesia after Suharto’s downfall became enfolded within Ambon’s
violence. As I describe more fully in the next chapter, the names of a Muslim
boy and a Christian boy, bosom friends at the center of a pro-peace television
ad set in wartime Ambon, were hijacked from the PSA early on in the conflict
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to designate its religiously marked enmities. Throughout the war and for some
time thereafter, the names of the Muslim Acang and the Christian Obet circulated profusely on both sides as Ambonese spoke of Acang’s versus Obet’s
territory and how Obet or Acang had launched an attack, committed atrocities,
or been driven out of a neighborhood.
And although no one in Ambon ever mentioned the film Viva Indonesia!
An Anthology of Letters to God to me, it is possible to see the Christian street
gallery as, among other things, an anthology of pictures for God. A crucial part
of my argument, developed in Chapters 3 and 4, explores the import and implications of the embrace by Ambon’s traditional Protestants of a new visual
medium. In painting Christianity in city streets, these Protestants not only
brought the Christian God into vision but, in doing so, brought themselves
into view as they creatively retooled visual imagination in new directions.
Within Calvinist tradition, their unprecedented acts of picturing in public
space launched an innovative, potentially controversial mediation of transcendence. In making the Christian God visible and material in the city’s war-torn
environment, he became inserted in unexpected ways in the world around
him and exposed—via his image—to its contingencies and risks. Foremost
among these was the critical appraisal of fellow Christians and others, the
possibility of violence and defacement, but also, over time, such phenomena
as the wear and tear of tropical downpour and blazing sun, or even neglect.

Orphaned Landscapes
The book’s title serves as a gloss that draws different strands of the argument
together—both ethnographically and theoretically. Ethnographically, Orphaned
Landscapes evokes the general predicament of uncertainty, crisis, and rupture,
or the orphaned landscapes that issued in the wake of the Suharto regime’s
collapse and the withdrawal of a leader who styled himself the father of the
nation, Indonesia, by extension, as one big family, and addressed even his
cabinet ministers as children.65 In the capital Jakarta, a sense of “ ‘looseness’ at
the center” afflicted city residents with feelings of insecurity, vulnerability, and
general disorientation.66 While this situation provides a significant if distant
backdrop to the events in Ambon, the book homes in on the Christian men
and women who identified with the city’s oldest church and their sense of
waning privilege and abandonment by authority within the violence that inflected the national situation at the eastern end of the archipelago, or another
sense of orphaned landscape. One of the main foci in the coming pages is how
these Protestant Ambonese responded to and attempted to shape these circumstances discursively, performatively, and especially through the street pictures.
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At odds with—indeed, a form of graphic protest within—the environment in
which they emerged, the Christian street pictures may themselves be seen as
a kind of orphaned landscape, an argument I develop in Chapter 3.
Theoretically, Orphaned Landscapes returns repeatedly to the relationship
between images and the circumstances in which they emerge to problematize
and complicate a connection that all too often is disregarded or understood
only in expressive terms. All images necessarily enjoy certain autonomy and
excess with respect to their surroundings. They cannot simply be seamlessly
inserted into or made to speak unproblematically to the sociological or political reality of a given historical moment or to what presents itself as the most
compelling context around.67 To be sure, the immense energy with which the
Christian pictures surfaced in Ambon and clamored to be seen had everything
to do with the devastating conflict in which they came to be. Yet, even as crucial connections exist, the pictures neither reflect nor express the war carried
out in religion’s name. By the same token, the war’s blindness or pervasive
unseeing is itself an enabling, scene-setting dimension of violence that needs
to be understood as generated rather than merely assumed. When it comes to
images, the transitory, delicate nature of the associations between any given
social reality and the image-world to which it is provisionally conjoined must
be recognized as such—that is, as provisional, and therefore as something that
requires explanation.68 This is even more the case when pictures aim so overtly
to intervene in the world as they do in Ambon.
A nuanced history of images—including the figuring scenes within which
they emerge—cannot fall back on notions like “cultural context,” “style,” or
“genre.”69 While such notions are undoubtedly helpful, they risk foreclosing
other ways of understanding the complexity and power of images and the myriad
ways they have impact in the world. Faced with what might be “the most fundamental problem of visual representation,”70 that of the relationship between
image and reality, I take distance from sociological theories that epistemologically assume a given ground or context as the point of departure for analysis,
focusing on the status quo and its normative institutions, identities, and the
other determinations held to sustain a given social world. For such theories
empty the concept of institution, broadly conceived, of one of its intrinsic components—namely, that of instituting in the sense of founding, creating, and
breaking with prevailing social realities and creating new ones.71 As a result,
they end up endorsing the status quo of habit and the necessary forgetting that
this assumes—of its social construction and arbitrariness, of the historical contingencies of which it is made, and of the violence inherent to its foundation
through the foreclosure and rupture with other possibilities.72
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What the ethnography presented in this book suggests is how such a forgetting can become impossible to sustain. Also, that no matter how supple and
illuminating and, indeed, necessary such contextualizing moves may be, what
they ultimately leave mysterious is the power of the image or the capacity images have to seize beholders and move them in profound ways, to order subjects’
sensuous apprehension of the world around them, to orchestrate the myriad
appearances that comprise the everyday, to design and characterize what counts
as context. In Ambon, what transpired in the relationship between image and
social reality was dramatic. With respect to the violence that overtook the city,
it is less an issue of comprehending the complex, even mutually accommodating relationship between the Christian visual canon and the less and less
Christian-dominated provincial capital than the sudden appearance of a highly
fraught mismatch, an argument I develop in Chapter 2. If this book is about
the work of appearances, then it is also, unavoidably, about how appearances
do not work. Here, about how the images hitherto deployed by Christians in
the city—from small-scale posters and wall calendars to scenes of the Last
Supper inlaid with the Malukan islands’ lustrous mother-of-pearl—and restricted, for the most part, to the interiorized spaces of Christian homes and
stores began to visually fall short of what was expected of them in the anxious,
dramatic circumstances of the early 2000s. Put otherwise, from the perspective
of many among the privileged Protestant part of the urban population, the
world had itself began to lose the image that they had long held of it.
Of situations of crisis, it is often claimed that the need for art and novel
forms of expression becomes enhanced.73 Elias Khoury, the Lebanese novelist
and prominent public intellectual, writes of Beirut’s crisis in a way that exposes
how the present comes to defy the aesthetic forms of an earlier precrisis moment, “The present has to be written about, not contextualized in historical
terms. The present is mute, it cannot be evoked in yesterday’s language. . . .
Repeatedly, in our interviews we heard about changes in art and language
during and after the civil war.”74 This sense of a profound rupture between
representational forms and the realities these are supposed to address is similar
to the postconflict situation in Ambon, making it possible for Khoury’s words
to resonate powerfully with this other troubled city at a far remove, in most
respects, from Beirut.
Along these lines, I propose in this book that the present of warfare and
rampant uncertainty in Ambon was blind—enclosed in a kind of twilight
that made it impossible to evoke any intelligible, stable reality through yesterday’s pictures. In their stead, huge scaled-up public images rose up, refiguring a globalized Christian print repertoire in ways that poignantly—if also
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defensively—spoke to the predicament of Ambon’s Christians. Or at least, I
argue, this was part of the figuring impulse behind them. Seen in this light, it
becomes possible to understand Ambon’s new pictures, strewn among war’s
wreckage around the city, as a response to the significant mutual orphaning
of image and world—the Protestants’ pictures aiming anxiously to address and
figure the world around them and the world perceived as morphing out of the
precrisis forms and appearances through which it was previously known. From
this perspective, it is no exaggeration to claim that many among the city’s traditional Protestants, for reasons I explore in this book, felt themselves figuratively and literally orphaned in relation to their taken-for-granted contexts of
production and activity.75
Always attentive to their implication in the violence that overtook Ambon
at the turn of the last century, my narrative, roughly chronological, follows the
trajectory of the street paintings themselves, beginning with the war and ending
almost a decade later when, in 2011, a startlingly innovative Christ portrait
appeared on city walls when others had largely disappeared from view and
been forgotten. Successive chapters take up questions of violence, visuality,
images, and appearances, along with religion’s redeployment in Ambon, during
the approximately ten years corresponding to the emergence and gradual disappearance of the Christian pictures in the city. It is no coincidence that the
arrival and departure of these pictures provides the book’s narrative arc. The
period they frame parallels the virtual collapse of a Christian hegemony of
appearances, marked by an unfathomable figurelessness that served as a foil
against which the city’s new images asserted their figuring power. Chapter 1,
“Fire without Smoke,” describes the onset of the war and the myriad consequences for vision of its terror settling over Ambon. Chapter 2, “Christ at Large,”
tracks the arrival to the city of the Jesus billboards and murals from their reliance on the Christian visual canon through their monumentalization along
Ambon’s streets. While this chapter investigates the drive to figure Jesus Christ’s
face across a plethora of street productions, Chapter 3, “Images without Borders,” explores the unprecedented bringing-into-vision of the Christian God
and its implications for the mediation of transcendence by Ambon’s Calvinist
Protestants. A fourth chapter, “Religion under the Sign of Crisis,” homes in
on the far-reaching redeployment of religion during the conflict—among a
highly mobile, heterogeneous urban population of Christians and Muslims—
and the dramas of displacement that exacerbated this process. A final chapter,
“Provoking Peace,” returns to the figure of the child to consider how her intimate association with violence finds a new outlet in postconflict reconciliation
programs. Other initiatives carried out in the name of peace and reconciliation
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include the peace journalism promoted as part of Indonesia’s widely proclaimed
democratic transition and projects launched in the postwar city that circulated
photographs and sketches of urban life, online and offline, to counter rumors
and prevent violence and to foster more positive images of Ambon in and
around Indonesia—the work, respectively, of the so-called Peace Provocateurs
and the Maluku Sketch Walker collective.
As this brief overview of the book makes clear, I have largely left to others
those topics that are commonly considered more fundamental to war. In the
case of Ambon, this would include an analysis of the shift from the initial violence targeting migrants to violence carried out in religion’s name, the specific
dynamics of the battles unfolding in city streets and the role of gangs, thugs,
national army soldiers, and jihadis in inciting it, as well as the massive displacement of persons, and the alarm, disruption, and territorial adjustments accompanying this. Relevant for such studies would also be the many enabling
conditions and provocations of the violence, including the waning during the
previous decade of Protestant Christian hegemony in the city and the ascent
locally and nationally of Muslims, the heightened competition among Ambon’s
religiously defined political elites, the influx of petty criminal gangs from Jakarta, and, last but not least, the reverberations of the national crisis and end
of the Suharto era and the perceptions and uncertainties accompanying these
in Ambon and around Maluku.
My own approach comes at Ambon’s violence and its aftermath more
obliquely—or so it may seem. What I hope to show is how the practice of figuration, rather than extrinsic, is in fact deeply connected to the war and its
devastating effects both as stimulant and antidote. Moving back and forth
between figuration and disfiguration throughout the book, I stay close to and
return repeatedly to the Christian pictures, keeping them in view, along with
their defiant public materiality and the exacerbated circumstances in which
they arose. If I have chosen to frame my narrative by the arrival and departure
of these gigantic pictures, it is because I am convinced that while they risk
being overlooked as mere signposts of slower, allegedly more fundamental
social and political change, for instance, in the field of urban religion, they
constitute the most glaring instance of the subtle, diffuse work on appearances
that is a main concern of this book. While I argue that figuration and, more
specifically, the work on appearances is central to sustaining social life anywhere, my specific investment here is to show how in crisis such work becomes
not only more urgent but also more visible or apparent. Equally importantly,
that such work is an indispensable part of profound sociopolitical transformation anywhere, whether progressive or conservative.
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A Symptomatology of Crisis
Ambon’s street pictures were only the most obvious and assertive among a
wider array of symptoms of the deep crisis that afflicted the city. In contrast to
other manifestations of crisis that I discuss later, these pictures were deliberately
made and unleashed in public space and therefore represent not only symptoms
but also highly creative, provisional solutions to the crisis.76 I have coined the
expression “symptomatology of crisis” as a gloss for things like the pictures that
were simultaneously symptomatic of crisis and energetic rebuttals to it. Along
with other phenomena, they are revealing of the degree to which nonhuman
actors and material stakes in the conflict had effects on the violence and the
particular forms it took. Similarly, other symptoms that surfaced within the
flow of everyday activities, inciting surprise, confusion, and terror, should be
seen not as expressive of crisis but as central components of it, with wider implications for the manner of its unfolding. Somewhat different from the vocabulary introduced above—images, the work on and of appearances, figuration
and disfiguration—a symptomatology of crisis offers a methodological tool
through which to examine the messy, challenging realities of crisis and war.
In the most straightforward sense, a symptom is a happening or sign that
does not escape attention, its presence or effect registered and taken note of,
as opposed to something that goes unnoticed or is only perceived laterally.77
Understood here specifically as a sign of crisis, a symptom betrays something
that is in some sense untoward and novel, out of sync with everyday expectations. Analytically, it offers a method of working through the signs of crisis and
distress manifest in a highly volatile, mutable situation. A symptomatology of
crisis is therefore not simply a series of signs but a form of knowledge in its own
right. Drawing on a terminology that is conventionally used to identify the
presence of disease and bodily affliction, my use of symptomatology is meant
to highlight not only the physical alterations and human duress of living in
wartime but also the sheer viscerality of many of its manifestations. In contrast
to the strict etiological sense of symptom as the manifestation of something
more fundamental, a symptom of crisis, as I use it here, should not be understood as a secondary order phenomenon.
While certainly out of the ordinary, the symptoms that I single out for attention are lodged in the everyday, being especially odd and incongruous in
relation to it. Assigning primacy to symptoms of crisis as an analytical device
has the added value of revealing just how much what we call the everyday is,
under any circumstances, a significant achievement—the result of routine, the
repetition and codification of practices, and sedimentation of habit.78 Beyond
crisis and war, these forms participate relatively unobtrusively in the work of
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everyday world-making or, more precisely, “poetic world making” following a
more aesthetically informed understanding.79 As the presumed texture of the
given, these forms are largely invisible, hovering at the edge of perception.
Attached to things and embedded in quotidian habit and routine, they tend to
be “forgotten” and, for the most part, remain unremarked and “beyond critical
appraisal.”80 As such, they correspond to a certain “recalcitrance of representations” through which people experience and take for granted the world in
which they are born—its “language, institutions, economic circumstances,
and social others, that are, historically and logically, already given before any
capacity to act.”81
In the extreme circumstances described in Orphaned Landscapes, some of
these forms begin to lose their “recalcitrance.” As they dramatically relinquished
their role as, among other things, fixtures of everyday existence, a treacherous
instability afflicts persons and objects. The urban landscape, damaged by war,
becomes increasingly unknowable and dangerous, while much of the environment of the city imposes itself in novel, contingent ways—as incongruous,
assertive, newly opaque, beholden to a “disruptive, alternative aesthetics,” or
in the process of becoming something else.82 A symptomatology of crisis especially homes in on untoward events—faces darting across chapel walls, Christians possessed by Muslim spirits, bullets ricocheting off of bodies, blood
gushing out of faucets—or things marked as “happenings,” following one
definition of a symptom mentioned above. Besides events singled out for attention in rumor and hearsay, the materiality of forms themselves can become
“an agent provocateur of historical change.”83 To assign this role to Ambon’s
street pictures would be to overstate their importance. Still, I propose in this
book that the impact of these Christian images not only responded to the extreme circumstances in which the city’s Protestants found themselves but
helped to precipitate and contributed to a number of far-reaching transformations in the city, especially (although not exclusively) in the realm of the visual
and religion.
In Indonesia, the number of anthropologists, historians, art historians, cultural theorists, and experts on architecture, urbanism, and the history of technology who have studied the manifold “outward appearances” of the country’s
elaborate, highly diverse social, political, artistic, and economic life is high.84
This focus may be a legacy of the significant influence of a culturalist tradition
of scholarship on the country, beginning in the late 1960s and exemplified by
the American anthropologist Clifford Geertz.85 Scholarly work singles out
articles of clothing and style, like shoes and the Muslim headscarf, but also
photographs, shopping malls, radios, and asphalt roads, economic speculation,
money, magic, Islamic calligraphy, the theatrical character of the traditional
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polity, urban design, art, and infrastructure characteristic of colonial and postcolonial Indonesia, including the long period of Suharto’s New Order.86 Especially relevant is the general characterization of the regime in terms of an
appearance of order built up from the Dutch colonial era but reaching an
apotheosis under Suharto’s authoritarian state.87 Besides brute force and the
threat thereof, this appearance of order thrived on the continual summoning
of specters, lurking allegedly just beyond sight, that posed a potential threat to
the regime. First and foremost among these were the scapegoated communists,
but also such things as the sinister formless organizations that, according to
the regime, were waiting to take shape and mobilize at every turn. Especially
during times of election won by the New Order with predictable regularity,
there was a sense of things held at bay, of the possibility of an approaching
moment when something might occur.88 Year after year in the wake of Indonesia’s national elections, rumors proclaimed that nothing after all had happened, that the moment had passed.89 In 1998, if not directly in the context of
elections, the moment finally arrived as the appearance of order—it seemed
without warning—suddenly gave way to crisis.
Beyond Indonesia, recent work by anthropologists, art historians, and visual
theorists explores questions of visibility, visuality, and the deployment of images,
especially in the wars against Iraq, the United States’ proclaimed “War on
Terror,” the Danish cartoon controversy, and the Abu Ghraib prison photographs.90 These works recognize and analyze the changes that images are
subject to as a consequence of the rise of digital media and the numerous ways
in which images contribute to the production of violence, terror, and war. Images, predominantly photographs, act as weapons, are integral to torture, enfold
normative assumptions about enemies and the self, and underwrite violence
as they frame war for audiences at home and abroad.91 The best of such scholarly work demonstrates how politics itself comes to be visualized—whether
through the uneven allocation of visual rights as a means of distinguishing
citizens from alleged lesser or noncitizens, the interaction of visibilities, invisibilities, hypervisibilities, and gray zones in situations of occupation and political
repression, or how something as seemingly innocuous as posting a selfie—that
is, the everyday use of digital technologies and platforms—helps to sustain
military oppression.92 Equally important are the racialized, ethnicized, and
class-based forms of looking that show people what they should look like, even
if what they look like will never allow them to represent or fully imagine themselves as part of a given collectivity.93
In this book I begin, however, not with images or appearances but with
conditions of pervasive blindness corresponding to crisis. Rather than starting
with the production and deployment of images within war, I develop my
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argument in relation to circumstances of disintegration, disruption, and relative
figurelessness in which images surface unexpectedly, forcing themselves into
public view in situations where appearances fail to work or do not work as anticipated. In urgently and repeatedly calling attention to themselves, the strident
images of the Christians and the elusive, potentially treacherous appearance
of persons and things wrapped in war’s twilight evidence the profound difficulty
experienced by Ambon’s population in upholding and maintaining the forms
that had hitherto characterized the city and the fabric of its complicated, urban
everyday. At the outset of this book, it is worth noting that some five years after
my fieldwork in Ambon, few traces could be seen of what I describe here—
whether the Christ that had been so demonstratively at large in the war-torn
city or the disfiguring momentum of violence and crisis that compelled some
Protestants to produce pictures, thereby crafting an alternative, unprecedented
medium to access their God. These ephemeral mediations—along with others
more difficult to grasp, like the fog of war—became enfolded in various ways
in the life and emergent possibilities of the city as it became refigured within
and in the wake of its religiously inflected conflict. While their impact is impossible to measure and their effects hard to gauge, these transient and elusive
processes and phenomena were inherent to and productive of the orphaned
landscapes that describe some especially fraught times and circumstances in
Ambon City and the neighboring Malukan islands along Indonesia’s eastern
outskirts.

1

Fire without Smoke

On January 19, 1999, a run-of-the-mill fight between a Protestant bus driver
and a Muslim passenger escalated into a full-scale battle between what rapidly
became designated as Christian “red” and Muslim “white” forces that was
fought in the streets of Ambon with traditional or makeshift weapons—knives,
spears, machetes, arrows shot from slingshots, fishing bombs, and Molotov cocktails. Occasionally, weapons like arrows were dipped in homemade poison to
ensure their deadly impact. Overall, the violence in this initial phase of the
war was remarkable for its ferocity, with the attacks and killings on both sides
being especially horrific. By the end of the second day, numerous houses, stores,
offices, churches, and mosques had been destroyed or burned and scores of
people had been displaced, while others were wounded or killed. In the largely
segregated city of Ambon, the kind of sectarian border skirmish that set all this
off was common. Under normal circumstances, it would also have remained
a nonevent—except, of course, for those immediately involved. Three years
later, upon the signing of the Malino II Peace Agreement in early February
2002, the conflict had left the city radically transformed.
In what many scholars have identified as the first phase of the war, lasting
from mid-January 1999 until May 2000, periods of violent confrontation between native Ambonese Protestant and Muslim mobs and mass destruction
alternated with lulls in which attempts at reconciliation involving elite Ambonese from both sides were occasionally made.1 Jakarta’s blunders also began
early on, with the dispatch of the first troops to quell the violence from South
Sulawesi—or that part of Indonesia from which the Muslim migrants driven
out of Ambon during the conflict’s first weeks also hailed—with shoot-on-sight
orders and with a general lack of initiative and direction. Far from Jakarta still
33

34

Fire without Smoke

reeling from Reformasi’s many upheavals, Ambon did not rank particularly
high on anyone’s priorities. What is more, the authorities’ will to intervene also
depended on their assessment of the seriousness of the situation.2 In the case
of Ambon, many hoped it would simply blow over.3 This first phase was also
marked by the outbreak of violence in the Kei Islands in southeast Maluku in
April 1999 and in the soon-to-be-declared new province of North Maluku in
August of the same year.4
The second phase marked a qualitative change in the conflict with the May
2000 arrival of the so-called Laskar Jihad in Ambon.5 Called into existence out
of Muslims’ rising concern that the Christians had the upper hand in the
conflict, this militant Muslim organization with recruits from Java, Sumatra,
and South Sulawesi provided both partisan humanitarian assistance and armed
support. The Laskar Jihad emerged in the wake of a massacre of four hundred
Muslims in a mosque in the town of Tobelo on the North Malukan island of
Halmahera in late December 1999.6 News of the massacre spread rapidly via
print media and, crucially, a VCD showing devastating scenes of the charred
mosque interior littered with bodies, body parts, remnants of clothing, and
other traces of the life that had once been there.7 A general call for jihad in
Maluku followed shortly thereafter during a mass rally in Jakarta in early January 2000 under the auspices of such major national political figures as the
country’s former vice president Hamzah Haz and the People’s Consultative
Assembly Speaker Amien Rais. Several months later, on April 6, 2000, the
announcement of the foundation of the paramilitary organization was staged
as a spectacular event, a flamboyant display of numbers and Muslim power,
as some ten thousand Laskar Jihad members demonstrated before the Presidential Palace, an image that became “etched in the minds of the Indonesian
body politic.”8
The arrival of two thousand members of the Laskar Jihad in Ambon in May
2000 was no less momentous. The amount and sophistication of the weapons
used in the war had grown over time, but the group brought a surplus of professional arms to Ambon, along with advanced radio communications technology. It also introduced some order into the local Muslim militias, who at
least initially welcomed these supporters as heroes, and it enjoyed the clear
backing of segments of the armed forces.9 The Christians found themselves
significantly outnumbered and outgunned, and casualties and devastation
increased proportionately. This is also when Catholics began to be drawn into
the conflict—notwithstanding the effort of Ambon’s bishop to play a mediating
role—since the jihadis attacked Christians indiscriminately, making no distinction between Protestants and Catholics.10 By late June 2000, then president
Abdurrahman Wahid announced a state of civil emergency in both Maluku
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and North Maluku provinces, and a special conjoined force of elite troops
under a Balinese Hindu commander was dispatched to Ambon. If the declaration
of the state of emergency greatly curtailed civil liberties—not the least of which
being the press—and further enhanced the militarization of everyday life, it
also gradually limited the number of large-scale confrontations.
This second phase of the conflict was further characterized by a deepening
of the religious definition of the opposing parties and the crystallization of
relevant extremist discourses11—on the one hand, that of militant Islam and
jihad, represented first and foremost by the Laskar Jihad and the smaller, more
covert Laskar Mujaheddin, and, on the other, that of nostalgic sovereignty and
separatism, embodied by the Christian Maluku Sovereignty Front (I. Front
Kedaulatan Maluku, or FKM). Posing as the successor to the former separatist
Republic of the South Moluccas movement (which in actuality exists primarily
as a shadow of its former self among segments of the Malukan population in
the Netherlands), the FKM envisioned its future as the nostalgic resurrection
of an indigenous Malukan identity and boasted a leader who modeled himself
after Xanana Gusmão, the former charismatic leader of Timor-Leste, which,
at the time, was a very recent success story of national sovereignty.
By 2001, with the decrease of large-scale confrontations and their replacement by sporadic bombings and sniper attacks, the partial restraint of the Laskar
Jihad under civil emergency conditions, and the signing of the Malino II Peace
Agreement in South Sulawesi on February 12, 2002, the period of postviolence
may be said to have begun. Civil emergency remained in effect, however, until
mid-September 2003, along with the concomitant militarization of daily life
and the restriction on foreign visitors to Maluku. The initial sense of relief in
Ambon’s streets following the Malino agreement was marred in the following
months by intermittent explosions and attacks that many suspect were orchestrated by those who profit from the perpetuation of chronic, low-level violence—
segments of the military and police, individual deserters from the same, local
gangsters, militant groups, and possibly more shadowy protagonists.12 The influx
of humanitarian aid and the presence of security forces in the city, along with
lingering desires for revenge and religious militancy, further spurred profiteering on, resulting in “a well-funded industry of sporadic violence.”13 For
quite some time, the city remained divided into rigorously defended, religiously
marked territories, or, as one source acutely observes, “concentrated pools of
resentment and bitterness”—or, in other words, potential breeding grounds
for more violence—alongside emerging neutral zones and places of resistance
and peace.14 This, in broad strokes, is the war. Much has obviously been left
out—not the least of which are the kinds of atmospherics with which I began
this book.
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War’s Fog
I was moved to write about the situation in Ambon several months after the
Malino II Peace Agreement was signed and before returning to the city that I
had visited off and on since 1984 en route to Aru in Southeast Maluku. Numerous others—in and around Ambon, in Jakarta, Manado, and elsewhere in
Indonesia, and farther afield in Australia, the Netherlands, and the United
States—had already written before I did, analyzing the conflict, its possible
causes and myriad enabling conditions, and describing its protagonists, warring
parties, and behind the scenes power plays, both local and national. They
include anthropologists and other social scientists, within and outside Indonesia, activists and representatives of a range of local, national, and international
NGOs, a number of the main players in the conflict, as well as media practitioners based in Ambon and the neighboring islands, the capital Jakarta, or
abroad. My initial response was simply one of reaction to such assessments and
reports and, notwithstanding the contribution and insights of many, some
dissatisfaction with the overall story they told or, more pertinently, failed to tell
about the city, its people, and the unfolding conflict among them. Much of
what I wrote in 2002 still stands today and is therefore reproduced in an elaborated, updated version here.15
Ranging from highly engaged and informed analyses to the more codified
versions of NGO-speak and the slanted partisan stories that bolster the truth
claims of one or another side, the origins, complicating factors and backgrounds,
major events, and relevant national and international developments have been
scrutinized and amply discussed in terms of their respective contributions to
Ambon’s violence. As so many theatrical backdrops against which the main
action unfolds, important externalities and internal factors named as enabling
and providing fertile ground for the outbreak of Ambon’s violence include such
macropolitical and macroeconomic structures as the Southeast Asian financial
crisis of 1997 and its aftermath, the unraveling of Suharto’s New Order and the
upheavals of Reformasi, and the behind-the-scenes connivings of Jakarta’s
political elite and the military. Tensions among Ambonese Christians and
Muslims, more specifically, are seen as having been aggravated over the long
term, as well as more recently by the religious division of labor established
under Dutch colonial rule that privileged Christians and marginalized Muslims socially, economically, and educationally; by the parallel processes of Islamicization and Christianization in Maluku in the wake of World War II and
the related erosion of the common ground of custom shared by Ambonese;
and by the Islamicization of Indonesia generally under the late Suharto regime,
as evidenced in Ambon by the appointment of two Ambonese Muslims as

Fire without Smoke

37

provincial governor, leaving the Christians feeling that they were left behind.
Add to this the increasing shortage of land, population pressure, and the in-
migration of Butonese, Buginese, and Makassarese Muslims from South Sulawesi, as well as those who benefitted from the New Order’s immigration
policies,16 skewing the once more or less equal numerical balance on the island
between Christians and Muslims in favor of Muslims, and the involvement of
some, especially urban Ambonese, in gangs and criminality, and one has a
situation waiting to happen—waiting to happen perhaps, but still not yet, not
quite, happening.
While many of the arguments and analyses produced over the years since
the conflict began have added to my understanding of Ambon’s conflict, I was
troubled from the outset by the sense that something was missing. Some of
this writing is just too grand, too abstract, and too removed from the volatile,
fractured field where, throughout the violence, Ambonese men, women, and
children pieced together their everyday lives out of the fears, contingencies,
insecurities, and apprehensions that then weighed upon them. What tends to
be passed over in foregrounding the influence of Indonesia’s major political
players, the networks of militant Muslims and Christian gangs and militias,
the nefarious wheelings and dealings of thugs, the inbred violence, corruption,
and partisan affections of the police and the military, is the character of the
very space in which all of these figures, for better or for worse, deploy their
schemes and make their dubious marks.
Elusive as this may sound, terms like climate, ambiance, atmospherics, and
milieu, often invoked in descriptions of social and political violence, most
closely approximate what I am getting at. If tangential, these terms still conjure
and gloss the influence and effects of a certain presence that, while lacking
any real precision, is understood, nonetheless, to have definitive power in the
shaping of events, human agency and subjectivity, and the production of meaning. While relatively unstudied, this presence is a long-acknowledged condition
of war. In the words of the nineteenth-century Prussian general and military
theorist Carl von Clausewitz, referring to the uncertainty and challenge to
perception posed by warfare, “All action takes place, so to speak, in a kind of
twilight, which like a fog or moonlight, often tends to make things seem grotesque and larger than they really are.”17 A key aspect of this process, as I elaborate below, is the emergence of extreme perception among many of the city’s
inhabitants, Muslims as well as Christians, in the form of an anxious play
between efforts at acute seeing, on the one hand, and an overwhelming sense
of unseeing or blindness, on the other. As the war went on, another component
was the production of religion as a highly visible, public phenomenon that
became crystallized in the marked contrast between Muslim and Christian
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opponents. In short, while my entry onto the scene of Ambon’s violence may
strike some readers as oblique or peripheral to the allegedly more central issues
of politics, economics, and sociology—whether local, regional, national, or
even international—my intention is to offer not only different ways of understanding but also different things to understand, as has been suggested is possible in the field of visual anthropology generally.18 This is because, as I argue
in Chapter 2, the huge Christian pictures and the photographs featuring them
and their makers are closely attuned to the affective dispositions and intensities
of the street. What this book will add is not only attention to ordinary people
and the predicaments they faced in a city at war but an understanding of the
atmosphere that made elite manipulations effective, the change from neighborliness to paranoia plausible, and uncertainty a persistent ingredient of encounter and exchange. This atmosphere comprised everything from the myriad
ephemeral mediations of war like graffiti and provocative pamphlets, which
have received some attention from scholars, to much more difficult to grasp
phenomena like Clausewitz’s fog of war or the diffuse appearances that characterize, however tangentially, a given time and place.
A few caveats are in place. I do not mean to suggest that Indonesia is an
especially or unusually violent country. A number of scholars have expressed
concern about the centrality of violence as a topic of study following Suharto’s
fall from power. This, however, would seem to overlook how all the writing
about violence represents an attempt to come to grips with the legacy of a regime that was itself inaugurated by extreme violence and that deployed violence
strategically in the process of developing its particular brand of governmentality.
Some ventured that writing about violence is itself laden with risk. An Indonesian colleague, for instance, in a private conversation with me, condemned
the publications appearing on Ambon’s conflict while it was still underway as
unequivocally “written in blood.” Other authors hastened to underscore how
Indonesia’s violence is neither novel nor recent but long-standing as they marshaled such glaring examples of New Order brutality—beyond its foundation
on the “mountain of skeletons” left by the 1965–1966 massacres—such as the
invasion of East Timor, the devastating military actions in Aceh and Papua,
the surreptitious killing of alleged criminals in the 1980s by the regime, and
the present-day impunity of the leaders and henchmen toward the events of
1965–1966.19 Besides Suharto and his brutal regime, there is the legacy of long-
standing Dutch engagement in Maluku as part of the world’s violently contested
spice islands and what is today Indonesia, more generally, beginning in the
sixteenth century under the Dutch East India Company. There is also the
Japanese occupation from 1942 to 1945 when the revolutionary leaders Sukarno
and Hatta declared Indonesia’s independence, followed by the colonial war
waged against the former Dutch colonizer from 1945 to 1949.20
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Such legacies are legacies. Although they may fade and be transformed over
time, they do not necessarily disappear but instead leave their mark in more
obvious or subtle but, inevitably, complicated ways. Relevant in this regard is
routine violence or the violence that is part and parcel of the production and
continuity of contemporary political arrangements, or, put otherwise, the enabling conditions of what commonly counts as violence.21 Notwithstanding
the dramatic changes wrought by the 1998 Reformasi movement and the far-
reaching nature of the national decentralization program launched shortly
after Suharto’s downfall, decentralization was by no means a deus ex machina
but rather a significant realignment of existing force fields.22 More surreptitiously, state or authoritarian violence, especially when it is as well-honed as
that of Indonesia’s New Order, tends to penetrate and suffuse as a spirit of violence in every space of society from the economy and domestic life to language
and consciousness—even after it is gone.23
In what follows, I pursue, as closely as possible, in the minutiae and momentum of Maluku’s conflict, but with a special focus on Ambon, the dynamics,
modalities, and material technologies through which violence proliferates and
becomes sedimented. The radical refiguration over time of what was previously
considered possible, expected, or so taken for granted as to go unremarked and
the concomitant breakdown of trust in what everyday life has to offer—especially the visible appearances through which it is conventionally known—describes the particular kind of violence at issue here. At the same time, I heed
Mary Steedly’s call not only to localize violence—something that much work
on violence in Indonesia does a very good job of—but to keep “the landscape
of the banal in view.”24 To the crucial temporality of the “things that don’t fall
apart” and “the ordinary routines of everyday life . . . when expectations hold,”
I would add the way in which the banal is itself rearranged by violence as the
investment and trust in everyday appearances wane and the taken-for-granted
shape of things—foremost that of selves and others—and the circumstances in
which these ordinarily present themselves shift and morph in often highly
disturbing and startling ways.25 In so doing, I pay special attention to those
things to which many Ambonese were themselves most attuned in these unusual, horrific times, including the changes in the city around them and their
relation to it.
Already in the early days of the conflict, barricades sprung up in Ambon’s
streets, inhabitants set up command posts at the edges of neighborhoods,
bullet-scarred surfaces began to replace the shiny facades of fish restaurants,
coffeehouses, and gold jewelry and souvenir shops that had once lined the city’s
main arteries, now increasingly littered with the debris of battle and garbage
that often remained uncollected. In the wake of the destruction of Ambon’s
main market at the onset of the war, smaller, religiously segregated markets
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emerged in its stead, obstructing sidewalks and cluttering streets, while the
itinerant vendors of chicken satay, yellow rice, and hot tea began to sell articles
previously available only in the city’s shopping mall and fancier stores, like
clothing (Figure 4).26 For most of its inhabitants, the space of the city shrank
as it became zoned and they were increasingly confined to one or another of
its religiously marked territories. At the same time, the city was unmoored in
unprecedented ways. Much of its population was on the move, beginning with
the forced exodus of the derogatively named BBM (short for Buginese, Butonese, and Makassarese or Muslim migrants)27 in the first days of the war and the
multiple displacements occasioned by the fighting—the destruction and torching of homes and buildings, and refugees fleeing from one part of the city to
another, as well as into and out of Ambon—through the emergence of what
one priest dubbed new “categories of mobility.”28 The latter comprised, for
instance, pedicab drivers and easily mobile others who, as the war dragged on
and the city became increasingly divided, began to traffic between the different
sides of the conflict, supplying Muslims with, among other things, vegetables
from the city’s traditionally Christian hills and Christians with fish from the
largely Muslim-controlled coastal areas. Relevant, too, are the motorbike-taxi
drivers whose numbers increased exponentially in the early to mid-2000s, since
they could more easily navigate the challenging segregated space of the city
than minibuses or cars. As the population of Ambon dwindled from a prewar
count of around three hundred thousand to almost half of that, all kinds of
new people arrived to the city, from battalions dispatched by Jakarta to quell
the violence, to the influx of journalists and other media practitioners, humanitarian workers, and reconciliation experts but, as mentioned earlier, also some
two thousand jihadis from Java a good year after the conflict began. All of these
changes, along with the presence of ruins, the new obstacles and divisions in
city streets, not to mention the conflict itself and its many ramifications, radically shaped and continued to reshape the appearances that had hitherto made
Ambon what it was. Over time, the city became an increasingly unfamiliar
place for many of its inhabitants, permeated with new and not always easy to
determine dangers, as I describe below.

Fire without Smoke
Let me begin at the beginning—itself a point of bitter contention between
Christians and Muslims, since each side accused the other of largely preparing
and masterminding the onset of violence. Even though Ambon is located on
Indonesia’s eastern outskirts, it is hardly an island unto itself, which means that
Christians and Muslims there are cognizant of violence elsewhere, especially

Figure 4. Street market, Ambon, August 2003. Photo by the author.

42

Fire without Smoke

when it is religiously inflected. As on Lombok, an island about one thousand
miles west of Ambon, where, following an outbreak of anti-Christian riots in
early 2000, graffiti on a house read “This is in response to what was done to
Muslims in Ambon,”29 so, too, may events in other places seize hold of the
imaginations of Ambonese, especially those that took place during this time
in the nation’s capital, Jakarta. Most accounts of the war name a fight between
Ambonese gangsters at a gambling den in Jakarta’s Ketapang neighborhood in
November 1998, the ensuing anti-Christian violence and church burnings
following the deaths of four Muslims, and the arrival of more than one hundred
uprooted underworld gangsters (I. preman)30 to Ambon as the prelude to the
city’s trouble in January 1999. While evidence that these thugs took to Ambon’s streets on January 19 is inconclusive, many Ambonese to this day, both
Christian and Muslim, believe that they were sent to the city by “the center”
to instigate violence.31 Whatever the case, the arrival of this large group of
violent men, along with the widespread awareness of the recent brawl implicating them in Jakarta and the overall uncertainty of these times, left at least
some people with the impression that something imminent was about to
befall their city.
Although this is usually not mentioned in descriptions of Ambon’s conflict,
in the wake of these events the Malukan governor convened a meeting of
community leaders in December 1998.32 The governor impressed upon Ambon’s
Muslim and Christian communities the need to be prepared for violence, to
be on the alert, and to guard against provocateurs and rumors. Meant as precautionary, the meeting instilled a sense of the possible in an already nervous
city, working as an augury of what might happen before it actually occurred.
Besides inaugurating a watchful, anticipatory form of imagination, both sides
went home and set up posko, which are either communication or command
posts (a slippage that suggests how easily the one slides into the other), with
networks of mosques and churches connected by telephones. In the last week
of Ramadan, which ended on the day the conflict began, sightings of Jesus in
the suburb of Gudang Arang caused thousands of believers to flock to the site
for days, frightening Muslims with their displays of emotion.33 Throughout the
war, such sightings persisted in the city but also elsewhere. For instance, in
Pineleng, in the hills above the Christian-majority city of Manado, where many
Protestant and Catholic refugees from Maluku had fled and where, in July
2001, crowds gathered in the hope of catching a glimpse of the Jesus face that
had surfaced on a chapel wall.34 In Ambon, one visionary had committed to
canvas his dream of the apocalypse engulfing the Malukan capital as an
angry God looked down on the city (see Chapter 4). Dated in large, luminous
white letters several days before the conflict began, the depiction of his dream

Fire without Smoke

43

prefigured not only the violence but also the figuring momentum of Jesus
pictures erupting in the city’s war-torn streets.35
In the case of Ambon, anticipating and preparing for the worst can in crucial respects be said to have produced the worst. When the fight broke out in
the city’s main marketplace on January 19, each side quickly mobilized its
members—staging in no time at all a battle between forces that were rapidly
designated Christian reds and Muslim whites. On either side, representatives
claimed that the opposite party appeared in the streets wielding matching
machetes, something that was taken as a sure sign of their culpability in initiating the violence. Others pointed to the colored head ties—red for Christians
and white for Muslims, allegedly worn by one or the other side from the first
day of the confrontation—that betrayed the premeditation of belligerence.
Depending on the perspective, either Christians or Muslims would have formed
a huge swath of homogenous color reminiscent of the vibrant bands characteristic of political rallies, school parades, and civil servant gatherings in Indonesia.36 Ironically, it is precisely this preparedness and visible organization
that each side repeatedly held out to the other as proof of their opponent’s
preconceived plan to mount an attack. It is also what many scholars seized
upon as evidence of the conflict’s large-scale, coordinated, behind-the-scenes
machinations.
My second example of how anticipation augurs what actually comes to pass
also derives from that same first, fateful day—one that happened to coincide
with Idul Fitri, the festive close of the Muslim fasting month Ramadan. In
retrospect, some may see January 19, 1999, as falling into the category of “likely
violence days,” a formulation coined by a U.S. embassy security officer in Israel
in recognition of the patterned repetition of violent outbreaks on Palestinian
commemorative occasions.37 Whether conjoining identity and trauma or, as
with Idul Fitri, religious celebration and community, such days are charged
with a practiced, ritualized sense of collectivity. Yet in many parts of Indonesia
and in Ambon, until the war, the celebration of Idul Fitri was also crosscut, its
alleged communalist potentiality complicated by interreligious conviviality,
hospitality, and sharing. Nor was Christmas in Ambon much different in this
regard. In 1999, however, the last day of Ramadan saw fights break out among
young men in various parts of the archipelago, including four places in Central
Java, also in West Java, Central Sulawesi, North Sumatra, the South Sumatran
city of Lampung, and West Kalimantan.38
“Bloody Idul Fitri,” the Muslims’ preferred name for the day, yielded “Bloody
Christmas” later in the conflict, commemorating the destruction of Ambon’s
landmark Silo church on December 27, 2000.39 In opting for such names, each
side aimed to blame the other while claiming victimhood for itself within the
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intense negative reciprocity that, together with anticipation and the countermoves this provoked, was another key dynamic of the war. The reciprocity
played itself out in multiple registers—from the back and forth of onslaughts
carried out with crude weapons in the conflict’s initial phase, in which the brutal
actions of one side elicited even more gruesome retaliations by the other, to the
colors, names, forms of address, and graffiti through which Muslims and Christians aggressively mirrored and engaged each other.
On that first day, a journalist friend of mine found himself at the office of
Ambon’s oldest newspaper, Suara Maluku, alternately taking calls from a Muslim
friend at home in the neighborhood where the battle subsequently broke out,
making plans for the Lebaran celebration that evening, and from a Christian
friend with whom he was coordinating their joint attendance at the feast.40 On
call from different ends of the city, his ongoing double conversation with his
two friends and colleagues is itself an instance of the first stirrings of the conflict. After finalizing their plans, the Muslim friend immediately called back,
telling my friend to bring his camera since a fight had broken out—a regular
fight, he said, the kind of thing we have seen before. The other friend called
again, too, saying he would not come because people were in the streets with
machetes, up in arms because of a burned-down church. Caught in between,
my friend heard of both mosques and churches being burned before any smoke
was seen in the city. As he himself put it, the rumor preceded the event and,
contrary to the laws of nature, where there was fire, no smoke had been seen.
Indeed, the only fire around was a wildfire of misinformation and suspicion
sweeping with incredible speed across Ambon.
Any kind of balanced information, not surprisingly, was one of the first
victims of the violence. Soon after the conflict broke out, the three friends and
Suara Maluku journalists who happened to be Muslim, Catholic, and GPM
Protestant, and who had conversed by phone across the city as the violence began,
could no longer come together. The location of the paper’s office in what rapidly became marked as Christian territory meant that Muslim journalists could
not safely come to work, while Christians dared not venture into the Muslim
area where the newspaper’s printing press was now located. Seizing a good
business opportunity when it emerged, the Surabaya-based media conglomerate
the Jawa Pos group, of which Suara Maluku was a member, created a Muslim
spin-off newspaper, the Ambon Ekspres, where the former Muslim Suara Maluku journalists were employed. With the increasing severity of the conflict
and the rise in partisan feelings, this situation further aggravated the rapid
polarization of local media—not just print but, as we will see, the vernacular
forms that especially predominated in the conflict, like graffiti, VCDs, and
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incendiary pamphlets or “hardcopy rumors”—into Christian and Muslim mouthpieces, thereby glossing over the heterogeneity within each religious camp.41
A strict chronological account would fail to do justice to the erratic rhythms
and unfoldings of the war, which depended as much on fantasy and desire as
on apprehension and fear. If experience, contrary to popular belief, is mostly
imagination in any circumstance, this is all the more so in the fraught mobile
environment of war, where the tendency to make things seem grotesque and
larger than they really are is enhanced, as Clausewitz already recognized in
the nineteenth century.42 In much of the scholarship on Ambon, too little attention is given to “the work of the imagination” and the construction of
knowledge in violence’s production and sedimentation and, specifically, how
these compel and propel particular actions and shape those who carry them
out.43 The mobile, dense, and murky terrain in which something that is waiting
to happen does in fact happen is built on spirals of information, misinformation, and disinformation, on the revamping of criteria of credibility, customs
of trust and accountability, and on knowledge forms that blur the boundaries
between what is seen and what is heard, what is known and what is suspected,
what is feared and what is fantasized, what is fact and what is fiction. Rather
than try to extricate a causal chain, I argue that confounding any clear trajectory from which one might plot the actions of the various parties involved is a
swirl of images, vocabularies, sound bites, slogans, and vectors introducing a
host of mediated and mediatized elsewheres into the picture—or, inversely,
projecting Ambon, with all its troubles and sufferings, onto a larger-than-local
scale. It is in the thick of such things and their powerful effects that one may
begin to address Ambon’s violence.44
This means situating violence in all its complex specificity at the myriad
sites of its production as a structuring and destructuring force of social life. It
is there where violence emerges and spawns its own supplementary effects,
which, in turn, are evidenced by new outbreaks of violence in other parts of
the city, across Ambon Island, or elsewhere in Maluku.45

The Thick of Things
Let us turn now to the myriad images, vocabulary, anticipatory practices, elusive agencies, and specters, and to the consolidation of hard-edged religiously
inflected enmity that characterized the war. This means seriously engaging
the thick of things that, for many Ambonese and others implicated in the violence, was part of its defining conditions. It was in these conditions, too, that
the protagonists came to see and, significantly, not see each other within the
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aggravated perception that over time came to describe an important dynamic
of the war.
Take the difference between the Christian reds and the Muslim whites.
Despite the common perception that these groups stood opposed from that
first day as ready-made enemies, this is hardly the case. Notwithstanding the
serious grievances, suspicion, and intense competition between religiously
embedded networks46 and insidious stereotypes that marked the relation on
both sides, many of those who clashed in Ambon’s streets were also in an
important, hardly negligible sense neighbors. Whether one understands such
relationship in terms of poor knowledge of the other, the “alien but proximate”
space inhabited by culturally and socially different “strangers” in another
depiction of one of Ambon’s crowded, religiously mixed, urban neighborhoods
harboring many poor migrants, or intimate, as in my own preferred description of the religiously based enmity that subsequently evolved between
Christians and Muslims, the more pertinent issue is not the factual knowledge
held on one side or the other.47 It is rather that the large majority of Ambonese,
both Christian and Muslim, assumed with no uncertainty that they knew their
long-standing religiously distinct neighbor. To be sure, the intensely populated
conditions in Ambon City proper where Muslims and Christians lived cheek
by jowl, including the dense proximity of more religiously homogeneous
neighborhoods, are relevant to this understanding. But beyond any empirical
reality, the assumption of long-standing familiarity and knowledge of the
other was what really came to matter in the messy terrain of the war (see also
Chapter 4).
The cruel work of severing what was once the largely livable city of Ambon
for many of its inhabitants and the congealing of difference into hardened
binary identities resonates with instances of so-called communal forms of
conflict elsewhere, where—much as in the Malukan capital—ordinary people
had for a long time tacitly agreed to live together with all their differences and,
therefore, also with greater or lesser degrees of communal tension and occasional, small-scale violence. This is a somewhat different perspective than the
anodyne one offered by then president B. J. Habibie, who lamented in November 1998 that the religiously inflected brawls involving Ambonese in Jakarta
shattered the long-standing reputation of Ambon as a model of religious tolerance in Indonesia. However one describes this kind of cohabitation, once
enmity is sealed in bloodshed and memory and codified through collective
talk and imagery, ordinary people can apparently engage in and commit the
most horrific acts, and dehumanization of the opposing party can become
second nature for just about anyone—over time.48 Contrary to easy discussions
of “dehumanization” (as if it involves something that people wake up to one
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day and decide to do), the distancing that dehumanization presumes must
actually be produced, with an enemy made and identities recognized and
reforged in the heat of impending and ongoing confrontation. What it means
to be human and, therefore too, nonhuman will also be inflected by attitudes
toward killing, suffering, and the body, as well as by notions of vengeance,
retribution, and reconciliation, among many other things.49
I do believe that the extreme violence in Ambon was, at least in part, attributable to the need to turn those in one’s own image into something else, with
the violence figuring as part of the work involved to bring about a radical difference.50 For all the underlying tensions, interreligious rivalry, dark legacies
of the Suharto era, and even turf wars between the military and police, the
civil war in Ambon was just that: largely fought out among Ambonese—that
is, among former colleagues, friends, and neighbors. A refugee from the area
even suggested that the differently colored head ties worn from the beginning
on both sides were imperative for telling each other apart—given, he said, that
we are all Ambonese.51 One might even venture that in this example, the work
of appearance was superficial, operating solely at the level of outward appearance—that is, with the difference between Christian and Muslim imposed
externally by Ambonese who found it difficult to discern friend from foe. Over
time, however, as the violence persisted, a different discourse became increasingly prevalent. Following this discourse, religious difference increasingly came
to be seen as naturally embodied and, as such, identifiable by physical appearance alone, which was understood to operate independently of externally
imposed signs like head ties or other cultural accoutrements.
Already early on, however, distinctive colors and other distinguishing marks
seemed unable to sufficiently conjure difference out of taken-for-granted sameness or to contain the weight of growing fear and hatred as the experience of
war, with its trail of anger, loss, and grief, increasingly shaped the terms of
perception and action on either side. Perhaps hatred is precisely such a restless
search for new names and new labels in which to provisionally shelter an emotion that inevitably exceeds them, or perhaps such a search is simply part of
the effort that goes into consolidating a radical, hard-edged rift between those
who previously—notwithstanding all their differences—lived in some sense
together as a workable urban collectivity. Whatever the case, additional names
and images of the enemy Other accreted along the way, further deepening the
divide between Muslims and Christians and making it more difficult to imagine its undoing. A by-now-infamous public service announcement broadcast
on national television and on several commercial channels some months after
the violence began seems to have been compelling enough to emerge as an
emblem of mutual enmity. Shortly after its airing, the spot took on a life of its
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own—one quite different from that intended by its producer, who, as a result,
claims to have suffered trauma.
A sweet, sentimentalized vignette of only several minutes, “Voice of the
Heart—Acang and Obet” features two young Ambonese boys, the Muslim
Acang, short for Hassan, and his bosom friend, the Christian Robert, or Obet.52
The scene is an abandoned, gutted-out basement of a large, concrete building,
evoking the ravages and dislocations of war. The spot opens with Acang awaiting his friend, anticipation on his face, and the smiles and joy on both sides
when Obet arrives (Figure 5). The two share a quick, stolen conversation in
which the more obvious problems afflicting Ambon’s children somewhat stiffly
parade by: Obet complains we cannot go to school, see our friends, study at
home, or sleep; Acang, that he misses school since moving to a refugee camp,
where life is difficult. To Acang’s question “Why did Ambon fall apart like
this?” Obet responds, “I don’t know, it’s a problem of adults.” Acang is left with
the punch line: “It’s an adult problem and we kids are the victims.”53 The camera zooms in on the two friends, their arms around each other, speaking jointly
from the heart, the one echoing the other, voicing the hope and mutual promise

Figure 5. Screenshot from the video CD “Voice of the Heart—Acang and Obet.” Produced by
Franky Sahilatua, 2001.

Fire without Smoke

49

that “even if Ambon is destroyed like this, our bond of brotherhood should not
be broken.”
The spot has all the trappings of the documentary—sophisticated, objectivist
aesthetics and a credible backdrop bolstering cinema’s illusory realism,54 authentic Ambonese dialect, Indonesian subtitles, and two emblematic, young
Ambonese boys. The drama resurrects the trope of friends torn apart by uncontrollable circumstances—seen on-screen as early as D. W. Griffith’s 1915
classic The Birth of a Nation, set during America’s Civil War, but also more
recently with the Indonesian Revolution as backdrop in the film version of the
1948 Dutch novel Oeroeg by the grande dame of Indies literature, Hella Haasse.
Strikingly though, unlike their predecessors—whether standing in for America’s
North and South or for the Netherlands and the birth of Indonesia—the Ambonese heroes of “Voice of the Heart” do not grow up. It is worth pointing out,
incidentally, that the theme of a nation divided not only underwrote the “Voice
of the Heart” PSA but was often read into the rupture between red and white
in Ambon’s war as allegedly corresponding to the two horizontal bands of the
“red and white” (I. merah-putih) Indonesian flag. In the immediate postwar
period, the popular genre of reconciliation art and media focused on children’s
faces, voices, and drawings also uncannily reiterates the bifurcated symmetry
of both the PSA and the Indonesian flag, something I discuss in Chapter 5.
Yet, notwithstanding its compelling aesthetics, the trope of bosom friends, and
the PSA’s message of peace, the names Acang and Obet came to be shorthand
for enmity for each side in the conflict.
To be sure, children are the future of any nation and emphatically so in
Indonesia, where a large proportion of the population is under the age of
twenty-five.55 The war in Ambon had terrible effects on everyone—not least
the children, many of whom were left fatherless, orphaned, homeless, in refugee camps, and out of school.56 Many saw and experienced horrific things
and many, too, participated in their making, serving as militia messengers on
both sides, becoming skilled producers of crude, deadly weapons, torching
houses, and vandalizing neighborhoods after an attack. One source claims that
between two thousand and four thousand children aged seven to twelve—the
same age as Acang and Obet—took part in raids on enemy villages or assisted
in defending their own. On the Christian side they were known as “sandfly
troops,” among Muslims, “crowbar troops.”57
Apart from their involvement in the conflict, children featured prominently
on the online site of the Protestant newsgroup Masariku and on the website
of the Communications Forum of the Sunna and the Community of the
Prophet (I. Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunnah wal-Jama’ah, or FKAWJ), of which
the Laskar Jihad was the paramilitary wing.58 On both sides, the appeal and
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propaganda value of children—also the point of departure for the Acang and
Obet ad—was deployed to portray children as both victims and key agents in
the war.59 Books with a jihad theme targeted children, while the FKAWJ website produced reports on the “DIY Troops” and “Plastic Troops,” the latter
evocative perhaps of toy soldiers, or their terms for Malukan children who
dressed as jihadists and aimed to partake in their struggle.60 Masariku, in turn,
in its Portraits of Maluku series, showcased photographs of child members of
the sandfly troops in uniform, wielding wooden swords with miniature bibles
hanging from their necks or protruding out of their pockets.61 In short, while
the Acang and Obet ad aimed to promote peace rather than generate sympathy
for either of the warring parties, the hijacking from the ad of the boys’ names
to serve as key terms of enmity suggests that what mattered most was the connection between violence and the figure of the child characteristic of the
genre—a connection that, as here, can be mobilized for quite different ends.
As opposed to the more belligerent depictions, what fantasy structures the
pro-peace PSA “Voice of the Heart”? It is a fantasy that at the time also underwrote letters and poems of refugee children published in Indonesian newspapers
that similarly emphasized the longings for each other among former Christian
and Muslim playmates.62 To set off the pair from the violence around them,
Acang and Obet’s cave-like shelter is a microcosm where, speaking from their
child hearts, the pair evokes the pela blood brotherhood alliances mythologized
in Maluku and frequently held up in peace and reconciliation initiatives as a
model of harmonious religious plurality and coexistence (see Chapter 5). These
alliances conjoin some Central Malukan Christian and Muslim villages but
also some Christian villages through bonds of kinship and mutual aid that are
stereotypically evoked in the image of Muslims building the church of their
Christian pela partners or Christians aiding their Muslim brothers in constructing or repairing a mosque. If these blood-brother relations were already
widely acclaimed examples of cross-religious relationality before the war, it was
only in its context that the bond developed into an instrument of Christian
and Muslim reconciliation and peace generally. As such, the ad offers not only
an early intimation of its later importance but also the degree to which the
alliances have been romanticized.63 The space where the two friends meet is
also a haven of apolitical innocence—located less beyond the upheavals of
dislocation, refugee status, interrupted schooling, and everyday trouble, which
the ad clearly names, than beyond the politics, power structures, and political
economy permeating and informing all of these. The diminutive child’s world
also serves to diminish the conflict—bringing it down to size, to that of spoken-
from-the-heart childhood honesty and clairvoyance—and thereby trivializes
its real impact on Ambonese children. At the same time, the PSA’s exaggeration
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of interiority—its portrayal of a miniaturized world of children, the voices of
the two friends issuing directly from their hearts, and the secluded surroundings in which the meeting between Acang and Obet occurs—enhances the
ideological impact of the message it hopes to convey.64 The spot offers a fantastic world unto itself, one that makes the exacting, difficult circumstances
of wartime absolutely exterior to itself, presenting a time out of time that negates
change and the lived reality of the war.65
In blaming adults for Ambon’s violence, the spot also conjures an orphaned
landscape via a double delegitimization: of the parents of all Obets and all
Acangs, of pemuda—or “youth,” a morally charged category on the crest of all
revolutionary change in Indonesia, recently reinvigorated during Reformasi—of
students, and of all others excluded from the enclosed world of “Voice of the
Heart.”66 Like Viva Indonesia! An Anthology of Letters to God, discussed in the
Introduction, and other child-centered productions of the time that launched
children’s faces and voices as sentimental antidotes to violence, the ad unambiguously declares violence an adult problem and the result of their agency.
Other productions similarly named or portrayed the abandonment by Indonesians of their duties as parent-citizens, the violent disruption of the father-child
bond, or, more abstractly, children who appear alone in orphaned landscapes
of one kind or another.67 In the case of “Voice of the Heart,” what remained
after this pernicious erasure was an abstract, easily appropriable clarity—a
schema amenable to multiple ends, including violence.
A name and face for the enemy is all that Ambonese took from the spot
meant to foster peace among them. Refugee talk on my tapes from 2000 and
2001 is replete with phrases like “Acang attacked,” “Obet’s territory,” “Acang
retreated,” and “Obet retreated,” testifying to the currency of the public service
announcement’s unforeseen afterlife, the rampant circulation and uptake of
media, especially pronounced in such overheated circumstances as Ambon’s
conflict, and the unpredictability of audience reaction. As late as September
2003, the names hijacked from the PSA could still be heard in Ambon—cautiously if talking about the recent opponent but also exuberantly in peace songs
and propaganda. For instance, a drum inscribed with the names Acang and
Obet hung in the office of the Jesuit Refugee Service that organized reconciliation events for children.
If, arriving unwittingly from elsewhere, Acang and Obet’s message went
awry in its adjustment to Ambon’s belligerent conditions, so, inversely, did
Ambonese actively borrow examples from other places that seemed to approximate their own fraught world. Like a voracious fire consuming anything in
its path, everything became swept up and recast in the conflict’s polarized terms.
Although I cannot date its emergence, the city’s main dividing line between its
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Muslim and Christian parts was known colloquially as the “Gaza Strip” (I.
Jalur Gaza), although several others emerged over time. This name had already
been prepared in the first days of the conflict, when graffiti desecrating walls
and buildings included insults of Jesus and the Prophet Mohammed, references
to Jews, Israel, Muslim Power, and Muslim Pigs, stars of David, and allahu
akbar in Arabic writing. Along similar lines, when the Laskar Jihad arrived in
Ambon, its members quickly set about renaming streets and tagging guardhouse
walls, clinics, and other buildings with the organization’s logo, calligraphy, and
characteristic images in the Muslim-dominated areas of the provincial capital.68
In this way, for instance, Ambon acquired a Martyr’s Street that it had never
had before. Such fragmentary, free-floating bits of discourse work best in display
mode—on T-shirts, banners, posters, and head ties—as visual and verbal slogans. Taken out of context, they also transcend it, becoming monumental and
indexing a universe—one of closed ideological systems and stand-off
positions.69

Soundtracks of War
Language was another frequent casualty of the war as names like Acang and
Obet became codified, venomous accusations and everyday communication
was highly politicized—to an extent that accords with the claim of some scholars that in circumstances like that of Ambon, language, along with much else
that comprises the everyday, becomes inflected by violence. Violence’s effects
can be so dramatic that what remains in its wake is merely “the debris of language.”70 In the Introduction, I proposed that the present of a city at war may
become alienated from the images or language through which it was previously
known.71 A compulsion to label usurps the place of everyday conversation and
exchange, one that in Ambon gave way to a belligerent religiously inspired
call-and-response—the Christian cry of “Halleluyah,” for instance, countering
the Muslim “Allahu akbar” in Ambon’s streets, along with numerous other
examples of nefarious mutual mimesis.72 The aggressive mutual engagement
of the opponents left a long-lasting legacy in the Malukan city; for instance,
in the Christian convention, dating from the war, of using syalom as a greeting
“since the Muslims have wassalamu alaikum,” or in the need, when addressing
a young Ambonese, to quickly determine whether he is a Muslim bang (from
abang) or a Christian bung or she is a Muslim cece or a Christian usi and to
use the appropriate gendered and religiously marked terms of address.73 Such
examples of language’s extreme reification may be especially suited to capture
the traumatized concretism of the aggravated situation of danger corresponding
to the experience of war.74 As an attempt by people to visually and linguistically
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get a hold on the increasingly elusive realities around them, reification surfaces
as a corollary and symptom of the atmosphere and uncertainty that wrapped
the city in war’s fog.
Not only language but also sounds were another potent ingredient on the
urban battlefield: Muslim VCDs came with nasyid songs that make explicit
use of religious dogma and were especially composed for jihad in Maluku,
while Christians sung hymns like “Onward Christian Soldier” as they moved
toward combat.75 Not surprisingly, such soundtracks of war had important effects
on those who heard them, instilling courage and a sense of collective purpose
before battle and anger and hostility in those on the opposing side. “Us Christians still have the fear of God in us,” a young Malukan in Manado told me.
“We are diligent churchgoers, now all the more so, more determined. When
there is violence, we sing Onward Christian Soldier, onward. When we hear
this sung, we feel courageous, and when we go off to battle, we pray first, either
in church or at home. We don’t want to kill but are forced to do so. If we don’t
kill, we will be killed ourselves. That is the situation.”76 By the same token,
such singing often instilled fear in Muslims. “Smoke was everywhere, so we
were confused,” a Muslim woman who had fled Ambon early on in the conflict
told me as she described how she saw fires burning everywhere on the first day
of violence.77 “This is so sad, fires while it is Lebaran. It’s a holiday while houses
are burning” was how she recalled her thoughts at the time. Two days later,
she remembered how “kids between the ages of fifteen and twenty, bare-chested
with red ties around their heads” showed up near her home.78 “At the time, I
could not read the situation, but they were lined up and began to sing. They
were singing and yelling and yelling like I don’t know what.” I asked if they
sang religious songs and she replied, “No, those are slow, but these were kind
of different. They were singing and taunting the soldiers.”79 Such aggressive
cries and songs could have an effect even on those who aimed to maintain
distance vis-à-vis the conflict. A Muslim journalist representing a national news
magazine, whom I met in Manado, confessed that while he did his utmost to
remain neutral as a reporter, he was so concerned that “one more cry of ‘Halleluyah’” would bias his reporting that he asked to be transferred back to Jakarta.80 Similarly, a priest complained to me of the effects on Protestants who
would tune in to the Laskar Jihad radio station and become revved up by what
they heard.81 Since the station dominated the airwaves, it was often impossible
to drown out, so the incessant insults and provocations of the jihadists continued to infiltrate the walkie-talkies of clergy and others around the city. Much
better equipped and more technically savvy than their opponents, the Laskar
Jihad included a download section on the organization’s website with sound
files of such memorable events as the speech given by their founder, Ja’far Umar
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Thalib, at the mass meeting held at Jakarta’s Senayan Stadium in April 2000,
the event that led to the jihadists leaving for Ambon a month later.82 There
were also the myriad sounds of wartime communication—from passwords and
rapping on utility poles meant to convey secret information to those in one’s
camp, to the explosions and sounds of different weapons going off and the
noise of confrontation and attack. Loudspeaker technology deployed on both
sides meant that the sounds of the Muslim call to prayer and imam’s khutbah
competed with Christian sermons broadcast beyond church walls as congregations gathered up to three times a day at the height of the war. Over time,
the aggressive back-and-forth and mirrored vocabularies and practices of Ambon’s intimate enemies, emergent out of their ongoing negative exchange,
further sedimented violence in the city and, with it, a projection of the conflict’s
alleged intractability emblematized by its own Gaza Strip(s).

Amplifications
I am interested in this usurpation of a powerful name from elsewhere because
of its effects within the dynamics of the conflict—both more than local and
less than global, though feeding off of and beholden to much larger than national
designs—and because of the mediatized, mediated realities of Ambon, as virtualized as almost anywhere these days, especially since the war. Akin to the
synchronic nomenclature identified by Benedict Anderson with the beginnings
of the imagination of community as nation—like New York, New London, Nuevo
León, Nieuw Amsterdam—Ambon’s Gaza Strip could “arise historically only
when substantial groups of people were in a position to think of themselves as
living lives parallel to those of other substantial groups of people—if never
meeting yet certainly proceeding along the same trajectory.”83 In our own
highly globalized times, however, such neat parallelisms between metropole
and colony have increasingly opened out, giving way to multifaceted and more
rhizomatic forms of imagining.84 Thus, the potent trope of the Gaza Strip not
only assumed definitive power in Ambon but also insistently cropped up elsewhere—even in what seems such an unlikely place as Venezuela—to characterize what appear to be the most hardened and intractable of violent situations.
Another factor that fed into the analogy in Ambon was the locally prevalent
assumption that the conflict between Israel and Palestine should be interpreted
in religious terms. The specifically Pentecostal understanding that the apocalypse presumes the habitation by Jews in the biblical homeland prior to the
Christian end-time further supports this interpretation. Given the importance
that charismatic churches assumed during the war, it is safe to conclude that
this understanding was also at work here.
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Twinning Ambon with this other, more famous, intensely mediatized war-
torn place may have been one way of making the violence in Maluku—hardly
a priority in Jakarta—matter, a way of lending local suffering and loss a larger-
than-local meaning.85 It also demonstrates the theatricality and dramatic
imagining of social actors in a world dominated by NGOs, international peacekeeping initiatives, Human Rights Watchers, and other important audiences.
If the sense of audience is always crucial to the production of political violence,86
in Ambon’s conflict different senses of audience may be discerned that draw
on identification and desire for recognition across vast distances, build on histories of connection (or presumed connection), and were facilitated by changes
in communication and media technology and, not the least, imagination. In
an admittedly oversimplified fashion, there is the immediate sense in which
Christians and Muslims in Ambon were significant audiences for each other,
something that I have repeatedly emphasized. But there was also the widespread
perception, or at least hope, that important international actors held to be potential supporters might be watching as well—such as, for Christians, the United
Nations or European Union, and for Muslims, their fellow coreligionists around
the country but also in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Another crucial
ongoing dimension of the sense of audience for Ambonese on both sides of
the conflict was the more transitive awareness that others were seeing what
they saw.87 Necessarily, the ways in which the gaze of such others is imagined
varies socially and historically, but it figures increasingly as a dynamic in situations of crisis and conflict everywhere. If during Indonesia’s Reformasi people
felt that the eyes of the international community witnessed events in the country,88 the gaze of others in Ambon was, as so much else, religiously defined, as
Muslims and Christians alike imagined and hoped that their transnational
coreligionists would not only be watching them but also be watching with them
as partisan witnesses and coviewers of the war. And to some extent, they were:
Muslims rallied in Jakarta against the alleged Christianization of Maluku or
tagged walls in Lombok with graffiti about the burning of a mosque in North
Maluku, while Dutch Malukans, the majority of whom are Protestants, maintained close contact with their relatives in Ambon and mobilized in different
ways around the conflict.89
Notwithstanding such examples, arguments that foreground the empirical
fragmentation across different media of incidents of violence according to the
type and location of audience or insist that the “actual participants” of a given
“transnational or macropublic sphere” may in fact only constitute a “numerically small group” miss the point.90 While useful perhaps for purposes of
market research, such analyses bypass the role of imagination in the amplification of war’s import—including the imagination of others who see what you
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see, as suggested here—but also, how, as with any other public, religious publics
are never wholly present to themselves.91 In any event, one wonders if the import of the conflict, once amplified, can thereafter so easily be scaled down.
For once you imagine Ambon as “Gaza,” or a stage for an epic contest of
Christianity and Islam, how do you get back to some version of a messy, if more
or less workable, cohabitation? Besides the enormous difficulties of moving on
and reassembling lives after conflict, due, among other factors, to how its violence lingers in the patterns, language, and gestures of everyday social existence,
much of war’s materiality may long remain in place. It has certainly done so
in Maluku, in myriad ways,92 not least via the spectacular assertions of aggression and exclusion performed by Ambon’s Christ pictures vis-à-vis Muslims.
For let us not forget that these adamantly Christian productions continued to
be maintained and repainted for a good decade after the official peace. An
example from the conflict in North Maluku are the martyrs’ graves and other
monuments that, while offering a material counter to an official discourse on
“reconciliation,” repressive of memory of the violence, run the risk of objectifying the volatile religious terms in which the conflict was played out as they
also bear witness to the trauma and dead of war.93 Like the VCD showing a
Christian mural where the camera zooms in on Jesus holding a globe on which
the state of Israel has grown to continental size, such literal amplifications were
also part of the conflict’s aggravated stakes and the wider enhancement of its
significance.94
Neat schema and ideologically compelling images, like those from “Voice
of the Heart,” Ambon’s Gaza Strip, or insults sprayed on city walls, facilitated
amplification since they summed up so much in succinct condensations of
abstraction and affect that could circulate and be remediated easily. Within a
much larger arena of conflicting messages, fragmentary information, and representational immediacy, amounting to a veritable infrastructure of the imagination, some stood out more than others, proving provocative enough to trigger
large-scale violence. One especially infamous incident involved a phantom
letter allegedly issued by Ambon’s GPM church calling for Maluku’s Christianization. Once multiplied, read aloud over megaphones, and spread about,
this letter contributed directly to the dislocation and deaths of numerous North
Malukans.95 While Muslims seemed to have accepted its veracity without
question, Christians indulged in forensics that exposed the letter’s falsity: “bizarre and mysterious, the leaflet lacking a letter head and using a language
that is not that of the church only circulated among Muslims,” one report
notes.96 Such dark circuits underlaid, crossed, and competed for attention with
partisan descriptions by the local press (the Suara Maluku newspaper, as noted
above, not only consolidating into a Christian paper but spawning a Muslim
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competitor), village gossip presented as truth on Christian and Muslim websites,
Christian-inclined state radio vying with the illegal Laskar Jihad station, banners
spanning avenues or hanging from buildings, rumor piggybacking on technological reproducibility to produce “xeroxlore” in folklorists’ terms,97 graffiti
sprayed on walls, streets, and war-damaged buildings, and numerous processions
and protests that occupied the main thoroughfares of the city. These included
mass ambulatory prayer sessions as Christians took to the streets with red head
ties, bibles in hand, and pictures of Christ that floated above the crowd. Muslims, in turn, wore white head ties, unfurled green and white flags, and bore
banners with Arabic calligraphy. Local representatives of the national organization of Concerned Women, a procession of Christian clergy in February
2001, including Ambon’s bishop and former bishop, priests, brothers, and nuns,
and numerous Protestant ministers representing different denominations protested against the forced conversion of Christians by jihadists on the Malukan
islands of Kesui and Teor in late 2000 and early 2001. Demonstrations by Muslim refugees objecting to the ban of the jihadist radio station, or others protesting
the imposition of civil emergency, were among the many public manifestations
of the city at war.98 These divergent and convergent voices and views drowned
out, echoed, interrupted, and jostled each other in the cramped, ideologized,
divided space of Ambon, made up of myriad mediated elsewheres, amplified,
narrowcast, obscure, and confusing realities.
Even the supposedly, on the face of it, simple problem of actors—the whodunit
of the violence—could be hard to pin down. Take the abstract lexicon produced
by some nonpartisan, pro-peace press journalists—people with the very best
of intentions. In the aim of diminishing the conflict, they often deliberately
obfuscated the information about a violent exchange.99 In part, this may be a
legacy of the self-censorship and prohibition under Suharto on SARA—or
“Suku, Agama, Ras, Antar-Golongan,” publicizing differences based on tribe,
religion, race, and class—that remained operative in many quarters during the
Reformasi era, notwithstanding its call for transparency and a new openness.
But it also had to do with the way in which peace journalism, only recently
introduced in Indonesia at the time, was often interpreted. Reading the accounts of some journalists, one is left none the wiser: houses of worship are
stripped of denomination, and only elusive actors are named—“certain parties,”
unidentified “political elite,” “puppeteers,” and the ever-popular “provocateur.”100
Applied, in short, was a systematic unnaming of the war’s combatants.101 Whatever its aim, I argue elsewhere that this lack of specificity with regard to
agency may in fact produce a sense of phantom danger, lurking both nowhere
in particular and therefore potentially everywhere in general, provoking fear
and, perhaps, new violence.102 Moreover, with the use of phrases like “Muslim
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cleansing,” imported early on from Jakarta, and other vivid, slanted versions of
war, a more neutral source is quickly marginalized since—as one Ambonese
journalist put it—it appears ludicrous by contrast.103 I further discuss some of
the dilemmas that reporting on the conflict posed for journalists in Chapter 5.

Anticipatory Practices
Throughout this chapter, I have stressed the role of the possible and the conditional in the spread and sedimentation of violence. It remains to give some
sense of what people caught in the midst do—with multiple influences and
images impinging upon them. Let me begin with the VCDs made by both
Christians and Muslims but circulated only by the latter (which I therefore
highlight). At first glance, they fly in the face of the stripped-down media reports, sound bites, and schematic images discussed above. The VCDs’ appeal
depends upon their sympathetic, almost tactile engagement with, especially,
victims and their bodies—on close-ups of oozing wounds, bullets protruding
from body parts, maimed and charred corpses, and the bodily contortions,
moans, and screams of people’s suffering too painful to watch. But they were
watched—over and over again. Besides the victims, the occasional imam,
Muslim NGO spokesperson, or, in the case of Christians, Protestant minister
delivering an emotionally charged sermon in the ruins of a burned out church,
and the hands of surgical intervention (doctors themselves are rarely seen), the
main action is that of mass scenes of attack and violence drawn largely from
the war’s earliest moments. Very much in the thick of things, these VCDs
provide little perspective on events and often make no pretension to having a
narrative—besides, that is, the insistent, repetitive one of victimization resurrected on and out of body parts.104 Indeed, part of the affective appeal of this
VCD genre, if necessarily different for Muslims and Christians, may reside
precisely in its obsessive return to the “wound” and repetitive enactment of
disaster that does not resolve itself easily into narrative but repeatedly assaults
the viewer.105
These VCDs are composite works; they range from the more professional
to the homemade, though both often contain the very same clips, which were
clearly shared and copied profusely. In Ambon I was told that, during the war,
just as around Indonesia one could commission a CD of favorite songs, so, too,
in some of the city’s shops, could a compilation of select scenes be put together
on a personalized VCD. Some of the clips were produced, or at least endorsed,
by the military and feature soldiers casually standing by or going about their
business, neither shying away from nor interrupting the camera. Others are
said to have been filmed by doctor-volunteers who not only stitched wounds
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but lent their steady hands and surgical gazes to the close-up cinematic engagement of broken bodies. Many VCDs, at any rate, are pieced together, and
many evidence the presence of different hands—some steady, others shaky,
and still others apparently entranced by the zoom function.
How did the mass appeal of the VCD genre translate into the actual creation
of a sense of community and the shaping of perception and action in the conflict? This is a question with inevitably somewhat different answers for Ambon’s
Christian and Muslim populations, one that I address in more detail elsewhere
with regard to Muslims.106 If, however, community in the sense of collective
purpose and futurity has anything to do with the circulation and consolidation
of shared symbols, memories, and sentiments, then the nature of their mode
of transfer and sedimentation is clearly important. Among Christians in Ambon,
VCD traffic was relatively small scale, difficult to break into, and closely controlled, with VCDs bearing advisory labels like “intended for own group.”
Similarly, the founders of the Christian website Masariku expressed their concern that materials from the site might fall into the wrong hands, and they
repeatedly warned their members that circulation should only take place within
the Masariku group.107 Such concerns evidence the sense shared by many of
Ambon’s Christians that they were a tiny minority under continual threat of
attack or even annihilation by an aggressive Muslim majority. For even if Protestants received support from their relatives in the Netherlands and via church
networks there, around Indonesia, and to some extent internationally, they had
difficulty collaborating, probably due to the number of denominations in the
region and the divisiveness among them. This may have further enhanced
their paranoia and insistence on group loyalty. By contrast, the Muslim VCDs
were not only mass-produced, sold during the conflict in markets and streets
across Indonesia, but transnationally popular and quite homogeneous: Ambon’s
VCDs looked much like Kashmir’s, Bosnia’s, and those of Palestine watched
in Malaysia and elsewhere.108 Once the Laskar Jihad began to arrive in Ambon
in May 2000, its members trafficked openly in jihad VCDs and print media
on the large passenger boats heading to Maluku from the western parts of the
archipelago. Their newsletters also explicitly located Ambon’s conflict within
a larger, transnational arena of religious warfare by referring, for instance, to
religious war in Bosnia.109
For any of these VCDs to have any effect—whether in the claustrophobic
enclave of Ambon’s Christians or in the transnational Muslim space stretched
thinly perhaps across the geopolitical mosaic of different Islams—a number of
things are needed. The first are codified discourses like those of the Laskar
Jihad or Christian FKM mentioned earlier or the more general panics aroused
by accusations of Christianization and Islamicization that served as rallying
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cries or even captions orienting and providing a framework for perception and
action. Many of the VCDs also contained authorizing discourses, slogans, and
religious leaders—from the emotionally charged scene of a minister speaking
in the charred hull of Ambon’s landmark Silo Church following Bloody
Christmas, or the voice of a man disciplining a visually incongruous crowd
of jihadis by reciting the rules of jihad (no stealing, no felling of trees, no raping
of women . . .), to imams soliciting donations, to energetic displays of the physical prowess of the cakalele warrior in performances of the famed Malukan
war dance on-screen.110
Apart from such authorizing figures and discourses embedded in the VCDs,
another aspect inherent to the effects of these and other media during the
conflict are what Raymond Williams calls “social expressions in solution,” as
distinct from other semantic formations that he considers more evident and
immediately available.111 Neither institutionalized nor reflexively present but
tentative and incipient, such social expressions in solution—or “modes of affect
and feeling attendant on emergent social processes”—inhabit a patchy, dispersed
terrain, constituting community only as a potential.112 If they do congeal, then
this is as structures of feeling that operate in tandem with other historical and
political conditions and the aspirations, uncertainties, and contingencies of a
given moment. In the context of Ambon’s war, the attention of those who
watched such VCDs as I witnessed, among others, at a screening in an ustad’s
home in Manado and, therefore, at a relative distance from Ambon’s violence,
was acute and affectively charged.113 Their brutal graphics and unambiguous
visualization of victimization made the VCDs, on both sides, key components
of social expressions in solution in which the tendency to produce a strong
sense of the communal—however transient—was overdetermined.
One of the most professional VCDs, called North Maluku’s Suffering, graphically intimates the kind of fluid, contingent expressions in solution that must
have suffused the Muslim collectivity congealed on-screen.114 There, the gathering of people is bent to the common task of jihad in North Maluku but, I
believe, in another situation, just as easily dispersed. Visibly at least, this public
is an ad hoc collection of eclectic affinities.115 While everyone present, primarily
men but also a few women, is dressed more or less in white, some appear orthodox and sober, others are inscribed from head to waist with ajimat (magical
charms dating to the Crusades),116 some wear Saudi-style dress, others are
wrapped in Palestinian headscarves, and still others exhibit Jihad-Central Javanese Yogyakartan style. Several carry Philippine Moro-t ype machetes, others
have bows and arrows or spears, some have AK-47s, and a few even wield plastic
guns, perhaps for their effect on unsuspecting audiences.
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In sociological terms, the question of the VCDs’ effects on those who engaged them is, at least in part, one of mobilization or another way of asking
how the mass appeal of the VCD genre shaped perception and action during
the war. Compelling evidence from the conflict in Poso, Central Sulawesi,
that, much like Ambon, played itself out along religious lines, suggests how only
a small group of poorly organized men is capable of galvanizing a large segment
of the population.117 Also that such group is often responsible for the majority
of the killings, implying that most people implicated in collective violence are
not themselves drawn to kill others.118 Nonetheless, as in Ambon, it seems to
have been the case that hundreds of Protestant men joined vigilante brigades
and committed—or at least actively participated in—gruesome acts of violence.119 Although not a central concern here, this means that it is crucial to
recognize different levels of engagement, commitment, and action in the
production of violence. More importantly, how forms of imagination, discourse,
and imagery in inciting and perpetuating violence—the focus of this chapter
rather than sociology per se—are much more broadly dispersed across a given
population. This is a dimension of violence that is often underestimated or
not given the attention it deserves by observers and analysts of violence, whether
those employed by official government bodies, NGOs, or scholars, as I suggest
above.
Another example of the imagination that appears to have suffused the city
during the war are what I call anticipatory practices or the compulsive need
to interpret and mine just about everything for hidden meaning, to see any
trivial occurrence as a sign or omen of what might come or a hyper-
hermeneutic.120 There is, relatedly, the drive to produce signs (head ties, graffiti,
and the like) for one’s own group, for other social actors, for larger relevant
audiences, and, not the least, for the enemy Other. Lest this seem too cerebral,
the crucial dimension filling out this constellation of anticipatory practice is
extreme, pervasive distrust: things are so thoroughly scrutinized because their
nature and appearance are suspected of concealing something else.121 Again,
as elsewhere in this chapter, the general climate of fear, insecurity, and mental
and physical exhaustion that Ambonese inhabited on an almost continual basis
during the war is important to bear in mind.
A prevalent assumption that things are other than they seem is nowhere
more evident than in the discourse of disguise and revelation that followed an
attack and ran through the more general talk about the conflict. A discourse
of hidden depth, such talk revolved around the discoveries made when corpses
were undressed, when the folds and pockets of garments were explored and
turned inside out, disclosing a truer identity underneath—a jihad fighter with
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an army uniform under his robe, dates in a pocket indexing a devious connection to the Middle East, folded papers with talismans, and so on.122 A young
Christian man who had participated in the fighting told me that, while initially
Muslims wore white and Christians red, as the conflict dragged on, some
Muslims wore red to make Christians think they were a friend rather than an
enemy.123 This discourse on disguise fed into that of hidden depth and, besides
red and white head ties, often involved army uniforms. In a clip I saw in 2003,
for instance, a stringer’s video camera moves back and forth, repeatedly returning to and lingering over an army uniform laid out on the floor as if such
persistent technological scrutiny might force it to yield another truth. This
predicament—of being trapped in events beyond one’s grasp and comprehension, of seeing no way out, of immersion in the thick context of terrible things—
comes through poignantly in my taped conversations with Malukan refugees
from 2000 and 2001, in the voices and demeanor of Ambonese speaking on
news reports before the 2002 Malino II Peace Agreement, and in the recollections of the men and women with whom I spoke in Ambon in September 2003
and during the time I spent in the city thereafter. “Everything is oppressed by
rumor and the stories [that circulate] are always more fantastic than what is
actually evident,” is how one person characterized the atmosphere in
wartime.124
More disturbingly, as the war went on, more and more people claimed to
discern just under the surface of your ordinary Ambonese face its Christian or
Muslim contours (see Chapter 4). A striking indication of the sedimentation
of violence, this claim stands in sharp contrast to the assertion of an Ambonese,
cited earlier in this chapter, who, at the onset of war, explained the Christian
and Muslim practice of wearing differently colored head ties as due to the
inability to tell each other apart—because, he explained, we are all Ambonese.
While prepared in multiple ways and waiting, as it were, to happen, the hardening and primordializing of communal identities, evidenced in the naturalization of visible religious difference, must be understood as an outcome and
not the origin of Ambon’s conflict, as one sign, among many, of violence sedimenting and taking hold of the city. What this example also suggests is how,
over time and to a much greater extent than was previously the case, the difference between Ambonese Muslims and Christians came to be something to
be seen, something allegedly apparent beyond superficial distinctions of dress
and habit. Such an essentialized understanding of religious difference was by
no means absent in Ambon before the war. But it assumed a new volatile significance as violence provided religion with a highly elaborated, publicly
visible dimension, one that helped to crystallize in ways visible to all the allegedly inherent difference between the city’s Muslims and Christians. This
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essentialized visualization of difference is merely one outcome of the extreme
perception that prevailed during Ambon’s war.

Official Peace
On February 12, 2002, the Malino II Peace Agreement was signed after over
three years of intermittent and devastating warfare. Of the Malino agreement’s
eleven points, no fewer than six invoke the rule of law, law enforcement, law
and order, and human rights, while others refer to principles of transparency
and fairness. The largely elite parties who took part in the two-day meeting
convened by Indonesia’s then coordinating minister of people’s welfare, Jusuf
Kalla, were familiar with the new laws brought into being under Reformasi
and, along with many Indonesians, undoubtedly regarded the law, however
flawed and limited its application in practice, as somehow inherently just. The
weight and value accorded to the law in Indonesia (which, following Dutch
colonial tradition, is a negara hukum or, in Dutch, a rechtstaat—literally, a state
of law or a constitutional state) only increased as the dramatic changes around
and following Suharto’s fall were inflected by the prevailing global discourse
on democracy, transparency, rights, and human rights in our contemporary
Age of the International Community.125 Since the heady times of Reformasi,
a great deal of attention has been paid to law, much of it focused on the courts,
the police, and prosecution, in that order, and there have been some successes.
As elsewhere, there is also a multitude of legally oriented NGOs focused on
legal reform, corruption, rights, gender, and environmental issues at work in
Indonesia, and a new energetic and promising generation of young legal reformers and activists. In recent years, social media provides another venue
where people may mobilize to combat social injustice, although the success
of such social media activism is often more restricted than it might seem since,
in Indonesia at least, it depends on a particular felicitously conjunction of
different factors.126
During Ambon’s conflict, even after the imposition of civil emergency in
June 2000, the security forces and police were, for a variety of reasons, virtually
powerless when it came to taking legal action against those responsible for
disorder. In a section on failure to uphold the law, an International Crisis Group
report states that no fewer than 490 criminal cases were investigated and 855
suspects arrested as of July 2000, while a month later there was talk of holding
trials on naval ships.127 More than a year thereafter, however, in November
2001, the governor described the courts as still paralyzed and admitted that
under the circumstances the law could not be upheld. In April and May 2001,
some symbolic legal steps were taken against extremist leaders on both the
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Muslim and Christian sides but, for different reasons in each case, prosecution
has not been successful. What we have, in other words, is, on the one hand, a
genuine regard for the law and repeated appeal to the judiciary as a privileged
instrument deemed capable of restoring order and, on the other, a legal vacuum
in terms of the means to enforce the law, along with considerable resistance
to change by those schooled in the old system, and, in Ambon, until 2003, the
ongoing presence of the armed forces under civil emergency, which are generally known for lending their support to local clients.
Throughout the conflict, multiple attempts were made to reconcile the
warring parties, many of which appealed to grounds other than the law that
were seen as potentially offering a solution or alternative to the war. These
include customary law, most notably through the invocation of the pela blood
brother alliances and the reinstitution of the older raja system of rule under
Law 32/2004 that was part and parcel of decentralization in Maluku.128 Other
arenas of reconciliation and peacemaking include the mass media through
the broadcasting of pro-peace public service announcements on radio and
television, projects advocating peace journalism and more neutral forms of
reporting, and the interventions of various charismatic leaders on both sides
who at different moments and through a variety of means tried to stop the
fighting.129
It is difficult to evaluate how much significance, in the end, should be attributed to the relative success of the Malino agreement and its appeal to the
law, given that this agreement benefitted from the relative calm imposed over
time by the civil emergency and was met with skepticism by many ordinary
Ambonese, who saw it as yet another elite move that only minimally touched
on their problems. Notably, Ambonese I spoke with in September 2003, when
the violence was still a recent memory, spoke of four and not three years of war
and insisted that whatever calm existed in the city was more than anything
else the result of the extreme fatigue among the city’s population and the feeling that they had suffered enough—and, although this was not mentioned,
without any clear advantage on either side.130 Others, testifying to the appeal
of conspiracy theories in Indonesia, attributed Ambon’s troubles to meddling
by outsiders, especially to the operation of otherwise unspecified politics in
Jakarta. “When they beat drums in Jakarta, we dance in Maluku,” is how one
minister put it.131 Yet, however important the peace accord might have been
in establishing the relative détente that prevailed from early 2002 in Ambon—
barring a number of major disturbances thereafter—not just one but at least a
hundred Malinos were needed, a local cultural activist insisted, to remake a
city that had been so radically transformed and disfigured by war, not the least
by the enormous Jesus pictures that sprung up along its streets during the
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violence.132 Another instance of amplification, these pictures offered clarity
and even solace for Protestants caught up in war’s uncertainty and its aftermath.
But for all their monumental posturing and contribution to change in the city,
the peace and normality that has gradually consolidated in Ambon emerged
not out of one hundred but out of the many more mini-Malinos that occur
every day—from the minute gestures of hospitality and mutual acknowledgment that connect neighbors and the exchange of pleasantries and passing
conversations among people on public transportation and in markets to the
fading of the memories and trauma of conflict and crisis, including their expression on Ambon’s walls, to which I now turn.

Figure 6. Painting on canvas by Jhon Yesayas, Ambon, 2005. Photo by Danishwara Nathaniel.
One day when discussing his street art with me, Jhon mentioned that whereas his postwar
murals and billboards were “comforting,” those he did during the war depicted the violence
in the city, as he went on to recall painting with bullets flying around him. I asked if he could
do a painting for me like the ones he did during the war. It is the only painting I commissioned
for this project. The painting, reproduced here, shows the attack on Ambon’s GPM Silo
Church on December 26, 1999, an event often referred to by Christians as “Bloody Christmas.” When I showed up in early August 2005 to collect the painting, Jhon was adding a few
final details—small figures crouching behind the barricades of the Christians, rocks and
debris scattered in the street, cracks running up the side of a building. He explained that the
scene “should not look too clean, so that it would be obvious that the atmosphere was terrifying.” Expressing regret that the painting was small, he mentioned that he would like to do
the same picture on a large scale. (Notes from an interview with author, Ambon, Indonesia,
August 3, 2005.)
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“The moment was actually during the violence,” Jhon explained when I said
I was interested in the pictures that had arisen in Ambon’s streets,
when the faith of us believers, us Christians was shaking—many
people fled from Ambon . . . so we thought even if it is only a picture, a painting, we were always convinced that he was here. . . .
Back then, the situation was really hot, so we imagined this spontaneously. We wanted to ensure that God would really and truly be
present in the conflict. We wanted to do this even though the city
was burning on all sides, but we were convinced God was here.
So I painted while Ambon was in flames, God on clouds. And this is
truly what we think: if you figure it, Christians in Ambon should
already have been done with. Just imagine what we had here—what
kind of weapons did we have? We had nothing. We only had bombs
that we made out of bottles. When they went off they sounded like
firecrackers.1
A year later, I returned to the Christian neighborhood where Jhon lived to
spend more time talking with the motorbike-taxi drivers as they hung around
their stand waiting for customers. My argument in this chapter draws especially
on fieldwork in 2005 and 2006, but it also moves between different temporalities—from the time of the war and recollections of the violence, as in the
passage above, to the postwar circumstances in which such recollections took
place. The paintings themselves straddle these distinct temporalities, since in
the mid-2000s many that had been done during the conflict continued to be
touched up or repainted in the immediate years thereafter.
67
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Facing a large mural depicting canonical scenes from Christ’s life, the men
spoke to me about what they claimed was the city’s first picture to have been
produced during the war—a hijacked billboard showing Jesus looking down
on Ambon and the surrounding Malukan islands that stood next to the mural
facing their bike stand. The most talkative among them recalled:
During the conflict in Ambon Christians were slaughtered by Muslims. We took the decision to do this picture even as the Muslims were
attacking us. We took the decision with Jhon who is a youth from here.
Jhon said, “Why don’t we paint Jesus blessing Ambon here?” The guys
liked the idea because Jesus blesses Ambon so that we feel close to
God. Lord Jesus cries as he looks down on Ambon City. He cries to see
the suffering of the community of Ambon City. Long ago we lived
happily, but now we kill each other.2
Another account of the Protestant turn to picturing comes from a GPM
council member who described how his church commissioned a Christ reaching out with extended arms from behind the altar as early as 1999 or during
the conflict’s first year:
There was a general atmosphere of panic and fear, so this was done to
strengthen the faith so that people would know that God was always
here. People had the feeling that God was not here. Violence was all
around. Fires were everywhere. The picture was [intended] to provide
the assurance that God is with us—that he lifts us up. Faith was still
shaky.3
Sammy Titaley, a prominent Protestant minister and the GPM synod head
during the conflict, offered a theologically more grounded explanation that
similarly draws a connection between the street pictures’ emergence and a
surge in faith afflicted by crisis among the city’s Christians:
I think this was done only to channel the conviction that God was
here, because according to us what kind of appearance does God
have? Is the image of God like a photo? It’s not, right? But if there were
a photo . . . So, now what emerged was the desire to make God visible.
Whatever God is, a man, we don’t know. Maybe it could be a woman.
And what kind of face would she/he have? Also that we don’t know.
But because of the enthusiastic flaring up of faith, he wanted to paint
as if this was the God he worshiped. And he did not care if in the
street our young people sometimes thought, “So what if we die.” So
because of this whatever they did—painting, singing—all of this was
actually a form of expression, an expression of faith.4
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Insisting on God’s presence during the conflict—he was here—along with the
desire to ensure such presence in circumstances in which “faith was shaky,” was
a recurrent theme in the interviews, casual conversations, and passing exchanges
I had with Christians in Ambon in the mid-2000s—besides painters, motorbikers, and Protestant ministers, also local journalists, ordinary women and men,
the occasional aid worker, and in sermons in GPM churches. Echoing the
statements I heard in the streets, for instance, the repeated reassurance that
“God is here, you must not doubt, he is loyal,” punctuated a minister’s sermon
one Sunday morning in July 2006 in the Maranatha church. As such, it is just
one example of how church officials repeatedly invoked God’s unwavering
presence amid the difficulties besetting wartime and postwar Ambon and, beyond the city, the myriad disasters afflicting Indonesia in the mid-2000s—from
volcanic eruptions and the spread of HIV/AIDS to the 2004 tsunami.5
Not everyone was as taken by the street productions as the above excerpts
from my field notes and recordings suggest. Given that they signaled a highly
public departure from the aniconic tradition of the Calvinist church, this is
hardly surprising. But other attitudes were also relevant, especially the GPM
clergy’s evaluation of the young men who supported the pictures and put them
in place. They ranged from people like Minister Titaley who welcomed them
as “expressions of faith” to others who voiced their concern that the behavior
of the motorbikers in the vicinity of the pictures might not correspond to what
they considered Christian. Jhon, for instance, described to me some of the
opposition he faced as a street painter but then quickly cast aside any criticism
by insisting on the overwhelming need to demonstrate that Jesus “really, really
is here, he is here”:
“Why are you painting in the streets? You are just wasting time” [is how
some people challenged him]. There were certainly some who spoke
like that. There were. At the office they also got mad at me b
 ecause
I didn’t show up for work. Occasionally because I was tired from painting I did not go into work. I was tired. I would work until morning
using a lamp. Until morning. And if I was sleepy in the morning I
would not go into work. But this is only because sometimes there are
those in favor and those who are against, some who do not approve and
think, “Hey, what are you doing painting Jesus in the streets?” But
while some thought Jesus was not here, you have to think that Jesus is
here, and make him large so that all can see it. Once and a while people
think what are these pictures for, but we have to show that Jesus really,
really is here, he is here, you must not be doubtful, you must not, that is
the objective. But once and a while, people have an understanding that
is different, one that is not the same as our own. We are people of God.
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We want what is good, so that all people can see this. Sometimes
people are that way but in general people liked the pictures.6
During the conflict, not only was Christ present, he was present in particular
ways. Jhon’s recollections of the billboard on which he painted Jesus overlooking Ambon on a Sampoerna cigarette advertisement suggest that key elements
in ensuring the Christian God’s presence were scale, visibility, and an omniscient ordering gaze:
When I paint, I paint large-scale, on the walls of homes, the same on
ceilings. In the big houses—great houses—of businessmen, on the ceiling, angels then God at the center with angels all around him. His origin, his origins are those angels, right? Previously, you know, there was
another picture of ascension. Birth, death, resurrection, ascension. The
picture of that ascension is already ruined, that is the one we made like
an advertisement, so we raised it up high, higher than all the other images because of his being on high. We used his face, we raised it up
high, using supports, scaffolding. So it was like an advertisement, we
raised it up high, so we pictured him up on clouds so that was high.
Jhon further underscored the importance of the street pictures’ visual appeal
akin to that of the billboard ad that his painting of the ascension had covered
over: “They should be pleasing to look at,” he added, “and be able to be seen
from a distance.”7 Part of this appeal lies in how the painting provides a perspective, a reassuring, all-seeing presence capable of being seen from a distance
overlooking and apart from the chaos of war.
But in addition to Christ’s appearance on billboards and murals, he was repeatedly sighted in the city during the war—emerging in different places around
Ambon, bearing arms on urban battlefields—and more far-flung even in Manado, a provincial capital at the northeastern tip of Sulawesi Island that harbored
many Christians who fled the violence in Maluku. There, in the summer of
2001, Christ’s face darted across a chapel wall, appearing and disappearing and
drawing crowds who hoped to see it. Minister Titaley explained:
Here is an example. During the Time of Violence, many people saw
images of Jesus appear on walls. There were people who saw this and
there were those who did not. [“What do you mean they did not see
this?” I asked.] It was not visible, like that. It was not seen but there
were people who said, “It is there, and there, and over there,” like that.
But it was not seen. What emerged were apparitions. His face appeared. Before that there was even an image of Jesus that bled, in
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Manado. But in Ambon we just saw images, images of his face. In
Benteng, in . . . almost everywhere. I went to look but I never saw
them. People asked me, “Pak is this true or not?” I said to them, “Let
us not say this is true or not true, let us not say that they lie.” Because it
is possible, and when an image appeared almost all of Ambon went to
look. And it also made people afraid; they did not like it. The image of
Jesus. Everyone went to look. At the time I was in Namlea [on the
neighboring island of Buru], so because of this I did not know about it.
There was one that appeared in Dobo [the capital of the Aru Islands in
Southeast Maluku], in the church. The minister back then was a
woman. There was violence in Dobo. Then it appeared again, following the violence in Dobo. In the church but also in houses. In Benteng
it was not in the church but in a pigsty. It also appeared in Gonzalo up
there among the Catholics. Many people asked, “Where? Where?
Where?” They could not see it. But it was seen before violence, it was
seen during violence, it was seen after violence, so people were
afraid—“What if this means there will be violence again?”8
Another way that Christ was at large, if equally immersed in the violence,
was as a war commander. Rather than a frightening apparition auguring violence’s onset, Christ surfaced in the midst of fighting, where he was seen striding
forth into battle leading the Christians against the Muslims. Here, again, is
Minister Titelay:
There were many stories that circulated, right? Saying that there was a
white commander among us, a large man with shoulder-length hair.
He was seen everywhere. Those who wanted to kill him never could.
Shooting at him was like shooting at the wind. He appeared everywhere—in Tanah Lapang Kecil, all over, as far as Seram he appeared.
Over there in Poka Rumah Tiga he appeared. They [Muslims] said,
“Christians are afraid. They are using a commander from Europe, a
Westerner, a foreigner.” His hair was shoulder-length, long. People said
this is Jesus, right! Among those people who spoke about this were also
soldiers. [He appeared] in the midst of violence, during the conflict.
Because of this I always say, “Believe it or not!” [in English]. Never
before did he come like that. So this is why I often say, “A kind of miracle, no?” [English]. Actually this should be written about in books.
There were even some people who came especially from Malaysia
when they heard about this, they came to check it out. Office girls
from Jakarta, Malaysians. I say just ask the kids in the street, go around
and ask them to tell you about it. They all can tell the story.9
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Christ was on the move, elusive and mobile, appearing here, there, and “everywhere” during the war, if not to everyone. In Manado he drew crowds hoping
to spot his face migrate across chapel walls, he led Christians into battle in city
streets, and showed up in a pigsty in a Catholic neighborhood above Ambon.
Surfacing in the thick of violence, his apparition and especially his face measured out violence’s duration—prefiguring its onset, marking its direction,
haunting its aftermath. Emerging frequently against the backdrop of a cross,
the tormented Christ face of crucifixion folded his martyrdom into the general
suffering of Ambon’s Christians.
I quote at some length here in order to convey the tenor of the conversations
I had with Christians about the street paintings and to highlight a few themes.
Noteworthy are the desperation and terror that drove the impulse to make the
pictures: statements that their “faith was . . . shaking,” that “people had the
feeling that God was not here,” that “Christians were [being] slaughtered by
Muslims,” and that “Christians in Ambon should already have been done with,”
for example. Noteworthy also is the sense of God’s estrangement, the wavering
of faith in a burning city, and the lack of any defensive mechanism to fall back
on: “What kind of weapons did we have? We had nothing.” But also, how Christ
at large in the city articulated a dynamic among different manifestations—on
the one hand, he was immersed in violence where his fleeting appearance
acted as a harbinger of violence and caused fear, on the other, his painted appearance on billboards and murals situated him here in Ambon as an empathetic figure arising above the fray.
My interest is in understanding the insistence on God’s presence across
diverse settings and how such presence materialized monumentally on sidewalks, along highways, in homes, behind altars, and at Christian neighborhood
gateways. But also, the qualification voiced by at least some GPM Protestants
that the billboards and murals were, of course, “just pictures.” Minister Titelay’s
position is more ambivalent, echoing the dynamic outlined above. Although
he characterized the street pictures as welcome “expressions of faith,” casting
them nonetheless as epiphenomenal vis-à-vis the more primary phenomenon
of religion, he also called them “apparitions,” miraculous and ungraspable like
the wind. The latter attitude comes closer to the adamant insistence on God’s
presence often heard in the streets insofar as it complicates any dismissal of
the new popular medium as mere portrayals of Christian themes modeled after
familiar print originals. It also points to an unresolved tension surrounding the
Christian paintings as to whether they acted as efficacious presences, bringing
God into vision and enabling physical and emotional identification and interaction with him (something I take up in Chapter 3)—in short, behaving like
devotional images—or whether they were only neutral, uninterested surfaces

Figure 7. Murals and billboard paintings of Jesus Christ, Ambon,
2005 and 2006. Photos by the author.
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easily assimilable to canonical Protestant attitudes about images.10 An enormous
sense of precarity regarding the position of Protestants in Ambon and around
Indonesia fed this dynamic, one that comes through in the frequent claims
about how faith was on the wane and fragile, or how some people felt that God
was either not here or that he needed to be brought close, suggesting, at the
least, that the Christian deity was somehow drifting or distracted. Put otherwise, I am interested in the coming-into-vision of Christ in Ambon City but
also in the anxious uncertainty surrounding his appearance, in the nagging
sense that God might not be watching over the city’s Christians, that rather
than being in situ, here in Ambon, he was disturbingly at large in an increasingly precarious and threatening world.

Christ at Large
The commentary offered by Ambonese on these images and the production
and spread of the pictures themselves all beg the following question: When
did the Christian God begin to appear inaccessible via the ordinary means
available to his followers? When did he begin to appear so absent that a picture
of him—albeit “just a picture”—needed to be put in place to offer the assurance
that he really and truly was here, always here? To paint pictures and embrace
them in the calamitous, edgy environment of the war was to experiment in
certain desperation, to launch a new medium in the hope that it might engage
and moor the Christian God who appeared elusive or at least too far away to
provide the necessary solace. But this God was not simply absent or out of
reach. At large in what Minister Titaley called the “Time of Violence,” he was
also insistently present. He was “here, there, and everywhere,” manifest as a
fugitive figure visible to some but not to others—a transitory apparition moving
across walls, sighted in a pigsty, passing through or announcing violence that
unfolded in full brutality around him. In the context of these extraordinary
times, a number of young men took the decision to paint Jesus looking down
on the suffering in Ambon City from a billboard facing their motorbike stand.
Alternating paintbrush with prayer, this painting and the others that proliferated
during and after the war bear poignant testimony to a vast effort to bring God
in intimate connection with the world, to visually pinpoint and circumscribe
his location here overlooking the violence that cast a thick cloud over Ambon
and severely taxed religious faith. Rather than caught up in the violence like
the Ambonese, he is pictured at a close, comforting distance, on a larger-than-
life scale high up on clouds and surrounded by angels. This perspective that
repeats itself across the street paintings helps to diminish the conflict, making
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it picturable and seeable to God’s eye in contrast to the all-encompassing horrific, murky realities on the ground.
To assess the creativity of the drive to picture as well as that of the pictures
themselves, it is worth considering the discontinuities that mark this newly
invented practice. At stake in these dramatic times was the articulation of a
desire and a force that was daring, experimental, and aggressive—hence, not
just the urgency that drove the pictures’ production but also the undeniable
energy with which they sprung up and spread across the city. For what the
pictures bear witness to and helped to put in place was nothing less than the
imagination of something quite different from what had been seen before—
perhaps most radically in the sense of figuring a novel mode of mediating
transcendence or accessing the Christian God by bringing him into view and
close. Sites of experimentation in more than a few respects, the paintings
break with the past and, specifically, with the antimaterialist, aniconic tradition of Ambon’s Dutch-derived Calvinist church, the GPM, and they are assertive in the new publicness they accord to religion—although certainly not
alone in this in Indonesia after Suharto (see Chapter 4). So, too, are they radical
in seizing upon the traveling images of a globalized Christian print capitalism
and in the inspiration the new artisanal practice found in the range of other
materials around. Daring, also, are the city’s Christian images in their envisioning of myriad mise-en-scènes as the possible loci of new understandings
of community and in their visualization of heterotopias that potentially transport those who engage their effects beyond the discursive frames of the Indonesian state and its codified forms of citizenship or those inherited from its
predecessor, the Dutch colonizer (see Chapter 3). They are radical as a new
medium of expression and communication—socially, politically, aesthetically,
and spiritually. Last but not least, they are novel in their self-organizing capacity—no church or other institution or authority rallied around or pushed the
production of the images.11
Yet, while radical in so many ways, not the least in the brute fact of their
physical presence around the city, in other respects these picturing projects
were quite nostalgic, especially in their positing of a visual public that excludes
anything incompatible with a wholly Christian universe. Constituting what
might be called a postwar poetics of world-making, what these pictures want
is to repair and restore the everyday lifeworlds of a previolent moment when
Ambonese Christians still, by and large, enjoyed relative power and privilege.12
They were world-making, too, in their dramatic sense of arrival and in the
novelty with which they stood out from the ruins of the recent war and forced
themselves into public view. Put simply, this world-making condensed two
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distinct temporalities—the first is evident in the obligatory, recuperative reiteration of Christ’s face across myriad productions. The second is more open-
ended, future-oriented, and, in some respects, disoriented. I refer here to the
wildly experimental backdrops to the Christ figure and face that I mention
occasionally in this chapter but address more fully in the next. Admittedly, this
division between foreground and background is heuristic since the two not
only function together but the former, while stereotypical, is also unstable and
may, in some respects, be equally described as lacking orientation. This chapter
focuses more on the globalized Christian iconographic canon, how it became
articulated and transformed in Ambon’s streets and infused by the energies
and passions of the young men who supported them. Chapter 3 introduces the
painters and homes in closely on different pictures and clusters of pictures,
exploring both their diversity and their similarity in bringing the Christian
God into vision and close to Ambonese.
Both this chapter and the next are concerned with the paintings and the
environments in which they arose—how, through graphic means, the street
pictures aimed to put in place and restore the appearance of a city that, through
the early 1990s, had a decidedly “Christian impression about it.”13 Through a
nostalgic form of representational redress, the pictures reinstated the public
visibility that Ambon’s traditional Protestants had long taken for granted as an
everyday aspect of their entitled, state-authorized position—at least locally and
regionally in Central Maluku. The formulation “representational redress” was
coined in the context of postapartheid South Africa to designate the progressive process of “re-figuring who we are but also how we define our future socio-
spatial and political relations.”14 Although driven by similar concerns in Ambon,
and notwithstanding the considerable innovation of the street pictures, the
urge to refigure who we are and how we can ensure our future was not progressive but restorative and bent on self-preservation. In a somewhat perverse take
on poetic world-making, Christian Ambonese aimed to seize hold of a disappearing world, one that upheld their historically accumulated privileges, not
the least the Christian domination of the city and provincial civil bureaucracy,
including prize positions like that of Maluku’s governor.15 Via the pictures, they
recalled a world that faithfully reflected back to them its reassuring Christian
contours in sociospatial and political terms and, through these, the image that
the Protestants had long held of themselves. This is an embattled vision, one
that looks to the past and relies on and recasts old iconographies, albeit necessarily in innovative ways.
Put otherwise, the concerted work on appearances undertaken in Ambon’s
streets was inflected by the desire to (re)institute a sociopolitical order and
distribution of the sensible with a decidedly Christian appearance, one that
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sustained Protestant Ambonese privileges, assumptions, and sense of place.
Articulated through the visual medium of painting, this work may be seen as
yet another manifestation of the extreme perception that developed during the
war along with the anticipatory practices that I described in the previous chapter. More pragmatically, amid the conflict’s zoning of urban space and its many
displacements, hijacking billboards and spraying Christian scenes and symbols
along public sidewalks and walls claimed territory for the Christians as Christ’s
visual presence Christianized the public space around them. Equally importantly, although impossible to determine with any precision, the rise of the
street pictures paralleled but seems also to have partially preceded the dramatic
redeployment of religion during the war and the changes in religious affiliation,
practice, and experience that characterized this redeployment—to which, significantly, the pictures contributed. Among other noteworthy transformations
in urban religion, as I discuss in Chapter 4, were the significant numbers of
Protestants who abandoned the GPM for charismatic churches in search of a
less hierarchical, more intimate relation to God in contrast to the distant, fatherly figure of Calvinism.

The Canon in the Street
Notwithstanding their dramatic appearance, a striking feature of the paintings
scattered around the city was their essential restorative impulse. To be sure,
the pictures were inevitably striking and, in many respects, experimental, if
nothing else because of their immense size. I refer instead to the intentions
that drove their production and their insistent reiteration of the globalized, if
locally conventional, Christian iconography. With only a few exceptions, the
handful of artists who I worked with around the city, some more than others,
set out to reproduce rather than change or reform the images that they borrowed from the Christian iconographic canon familiar to them as Protestant
Ambonese. Regularly, on my stopovers at the motorbike stands, and especially
when I visited the painters in their homes or, in the case of the most commercially minded among them, at his roadside studio, I would come upon the
painters engaged in their artistic work. Almost always, on such occasions, a
book would lie open next to them on the floor or a page torn from a Christian
calendar or magazine would be taped alongside or tucked behind the canvas,
showing illustrations drawn from Euro-American examples. More often than
not, these Christian scenes focused on the figure of Christ in the guise, for
instance, of a shepherd with a flock of sheep, a pilgrim pausing before a house
door, or Jesus praying in profile at Gethsemane or up on clouds with angels.
People who commissioned painters often described to me the models they had
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provided—for instance, a minister mentioned the “photo” of Gethsemane from
the Christian magazine Gloria that had inspired the design of the small prayer
room in his home, a GPM council member recalled the calendar image of
Christ of the Second Coming that he had asked Jhon to reproduce in his
church, while the larger than life angel on the exterior wall of a Christian home
was similarly copied from a calendar, the kind given out by Christian stores
around the Christmas holiday (Figure 8). Again and again, traveling in and
around Ambon in the mid-2000s, I saw copies of the same Christian print-
derived pictures: for example, the kneeling angel in a Halong home was the
same as another in Belakang Soya, although painted by different men; the
billboard of a gentle, brown-eyed Christ in front of the Maranatha church and
the portrait-size Jesus hanging in a Christian home reproduced the same image
of the German painter Heinrich Hofmann, whose religious body of work,
dating from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, has been reproduced widely (Figure 9). His Christ in Gethsemane, seen on walls around
Ambon, is one of the most copied paintings in the world.
Apart from the repetition of the global Christian print repertoire, there was
also a brisk two-way traffic between the canonical print imagery and apparitional forms, especially during the war. Christ’s common depiction as a European derives, Ambonese often remarked, not only from the pictorial examples
provided in church and schools but from his own occasional appearance to
them. If rumors circulated of Christ arising as a white commander upon the
city’s battlefields, in a more direct translation of the apparitional into the pictorial, an Ambonese with a gift of prophecy engaged a painter to commit his
visions to canvas, resulting in a large triptych, dated ten days before the conflict
began, that forecasts Ambon’s apocalyptic destruction (Chapter 3).16
Notwithstanding such spectacular examples, what most characterized the
traffic in Christian images was, again, repetition—repetition that involved
interchanges, substitutions, and replicas within a canon of images and variations thereof. No strict divide, in other words, walled off the apparitional from
print media or separated dreams, apparitions, and prophetic visions from print
models and their painted reproductions. Indeed, these myriad image forms
seemed to cycle seamlessly into each other—making any strict adherence to
an aniconic ideology that asserts pictures are “just pictures” difficult to sustain.
A short example will suffice. Following a minister’s injunction to his son one
morning before church to imagine Christ’s face while praying, this face arrived
repeatedly to haunt the family throughout the remainder of the day. During a
nap following church, the minister’s wife had a dream in which Christ appeared
to her—first, she explained, as identical to a framed print of Jesus’s head that
hung before us in her home as she described to me her vision and, subsequently,
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Figure 8. The painter Jhon Yesayas working on a mural of Christ as shepherd with the print
images he is copying from on the floor beside him. Walls depicting Christ in Christian homes
and market stall with posters that are a common source of inspiration. Ambon, 2005 and
2006. Photos by the author.

in the guise of another print she recalled in which he appeared with a bare
torso and emanating light. In the minister’s wife’s account of her experience,
these mediated appearances surfaced, in turn, in two additional appearances—
each an exact replica of the other—in the form of framed prints of Jesus in the
homes of two families of the minister’s congregation that she and her husband
visited that day. What is more, a widow in the second home the minister and
his wife stopped by that Sunday owned two prints corresponding to the first
apparition, which, I was told, had appeared to the widow in the exact form as
it had to the minister’s wife. One of those prints, a gift by the widow to the
minister’s wife, also hung before us at the time of the interview.17
What stands out in this account is not only the reproducibility but also the
sheer force of Christian mass print culture, as well as the emphasis on its
dominant mediating role. Also noteworthy is the insistence on Christ’s face,
on the light rays radiating from his head—which the minister’s wife evoked
for me by pulling her hands repeatedly out from her head—and the role of
print media as a visual currency in the reproduction of the GPM community.
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Figure 9. Painted billboard in front of the Maranatha church based on Heinrich Hofmann’s
painting Christ at 33, Ambon, 2003. And a home with framed images of a Warner Sallman
and a Heinrich Hofmann Christ, hanging on the wall and propped up against it, respectively,
Ambon, 2006. Photos by the author.

Notwithstanding the uncanniness of her experience, one wonders if the Calvinist insistence that pictures are “just pictures” does not also intervene in this
particular case, given that what the minister’s wife claims she saw was not or
at least not conclusively Lord Jesus but a proliferating series of print renditions
of him.
The majority of the pictures around the city drew on calendars and illustrated books that featured the work of the American painter Warner Sallman,
whose paintings of Christ were a crucial component of popular religiosity and
Christian visual culture from the mid-twentieth century, especially in the
United States. Repeatedly, in Ambon I saw such Sallman classics as Head of
Christ (1940), Christ at Heart’s Door (1940), The Lord Is My Shepherd (1943),
and Christ in Gethsemane (1941) both precisely and more approximately rendered.18 To a somewhat lesser extent, Heinrich Hofmann’s Christs were also
popular. Such models provided a steady reference, a source of inspiration, and
even control for the painters’ work, as they tended to delimit the kinds of pictures that could be made. Experimental and daring as they also surely were,
representationally they largely remained tethered to the Christian print canon.
It would be a mistake, therefore, to understand the artistry in Ambon’s streets
or behind church altars in conventional creative terms. From this perspective,
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the question posed by Jhon to the motorbikers manning the stand at the edge
of his neighborhood—“Why not paint Christ blessing Ambon here?”—should
especially be understood as an effort to visualize the Christian God as an empathetic figure watching over the city as opposed to indebted to any decorative
impulse or understanding of painting as creative expression alone.
A canon presumes a delimited, knowable, and, in the Christian case at least,
somewhat orderly visible world. When the world is more or less in place, the
appearance of things and the actions of one’s fellows correspond to common
expectations: persons and objects moor each other in predictable ways, enabling
the canon to unfold its conventional images in an environment where family,
churches, community, and polity are more or less in place to receive them.
When, by contrast, the world falls apart, the canon may succumb to unprecedented pressures, especially in circumstances where the visual is a focus of
attention and under revision, as it was in Indonesia generally during Reformasi
and even more in Ambon for reasons that I analyze in this book. In such circumstances, what images want becomes frustrated, since their correspondence
to the world no longer applies.19 Put otherwise, they can no longer count on
the frames that hitherto sustained them. In such moments of intensified desire
and frustration, pictures may come out, bursting from their frames, becoming
assertive and monumental, demanding new forms to satisfy their needs.20 Under
such conditions, the provisional connection that pertains between canonical
images or, for that matter, any image world and the world for which the images
were made can become strained. Different possibilities may arise. Under duress,
the canon may be abandoned or the images that comprise it may assume new
forms as these are reworked and extended in new directions. The profound
materiality of such images then comes to the fore—as evidenced in Ambon,
for instance, by the aggressive encroachment of Christian pictures on public,
urban space, by their exaggerated, blown-up proportions, and by the way they
“filled the sight by force.”21 Hence, notwithstanding the restorative urge that
largely drove them, the ways the pictures strained and adapted to the canon’s
frames and experimented on city walls demonstrate their world-making
capacity.
If Orphaned Landscapes is about the work on appearances, then it is also
about how appearances do not work. Evidence of the latter can be found in
the constant adjustments made to the canon to ensure that the pictures addressed the circumstances around them, especially the plight of the Protestants
and the sense prevalent among them during the war that not only they themselves but their everyday existence was under siege and even at risk of annihilation. The first adjustment was the Protestants’ own pictorial turn involving
not only an embrace of pictures but, with it, a significant departure from the

Figure 10. Christ images on the walls of a church assembly room, in private homes, and on a
billboard along the highway into Ambon. The mural of a cherub playing a musical instrument
signals a noticeable departure from the centrality of Christ in the Christian street art of the
early 2000s. Ambon, 2005, 2006, and 2016. Photos by the author.
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aniconic tradition of the Calvinist Protestant Church. Admittedly, before the
war, calendars and, to a lesser extent, posters and embroidered or mother-of-
pearl inlaid Christian scenes were conventional props of Christian homes and
stores. Such elements of decor, together with Sunday school manuals, are a
familiar component of the global Christian print repertoire that has long been
available in Ambon. Confined to interior spaces, they seem not to be subject to
the kinds of restrictions on images that existed in the GPM churches. Yet, if the
Christian sacred was never invisible or faceless in the city, prior to the war it
was—visually at least—not a privileged focus of attention, public or otherwise.
Of course, in Ambon as elsewhere, and notwithstanding Calvinism’s antimaterialist ideology, transcendence unavoidably relies on mediation. Writing
of mediation, Hent de Vries, a philosopher of religion, underscores its intrinsic,
enabling role given that “without and outside of [it] . . . no religion would be
able to manifest itself in the first place.”22 But this is precisely what makes religion vulnerable, since mediation means that religion is always already subject
to the risks, contingencies, limits, and translations that the material world
presents to human desires and schemes.23 If already the case in ordinary circumstances, the vulnerability of religion at large in the world becomes enhanced
in conditions marked by crisis and dramatic change, as in Ambon at the turn
of the century. At stake then was much more than religion’s regular vulnerability on account of its unavoidable material mediation. Rather, it was the
anxious if also enthusiastic adoption of a new medium driven by the Protestants’
desire to ensure God’s presence and draw him close via his image.
Despite the long history of Dutch-derived Calvinism in the area, Ambon’s
Protestantism and that of the wider region were never as adamantly aniconic
as that of their former colonial masters.24 Around Maluku, other traditions of
materiality and ritual performance remained operative; indeed, some of these
witnessed a significant revival during the war (see Chapter 5). National practices such as the requisite display of photographic portraits of Indonesia’s president and vice president in government offices and public buildings (which in
Ambon were populated predominantly by Protestants) perhaps had an impact
as well. In a more intimate register, Indonesia’s citizen’s identity card (I. Kartu
Tanda Penduduk), with its obligatory ID photograph and declaration of adherence to one of the five world religions recognized by the Suharto state, seems
also to have been refracted in some of the street pictures, as we will see below.25
Besides the commercial advertisements for things like cigarettes, cell phones,
and English-language and computer classes strategically positioned around
the city, there were the faces and party affiliations of local political candidates
that proliferated with regional autonomy and state-produced genres like maps
and posters of married couples in ethnic dress standing in for Indonesia’s
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unified diversity decorating government offices and classroom walls.26 During
the New Order, billboards that translated the Suharto state fetish of “development” into visual form—happy, uniformed students, white-coated scientists,
and planned families (with the slogan “Two children, That’s enough!”)—were
seen all over the archipelago.27 Others showcased the regime’s endorsement of
the five world religions it recognized. The more temporary banners suspended
over main thoroughfares in the postwar city announced university registration
dates, competitions in marching, disco dancing, and the increasingly popular
Muslim fashion shows, but also propaganda put out by the police and occupying armed forces mimicking—usually poorly—Ambonese Malay language and
calling out for anything from postwar reconciliation and peace to proper garbage disposal.28 In today’s visually crowded world, all sorts of image flows, visual
modalities, and discourses—the density and diversity of which augmented
during Ambon’s war—converged upon, were taken up or discarded, and fragmented in different ways in the postwar environment.29 I address these visualities and their multiple divergent perspectives in Chapter 3.
Along with the Protestants’ turn to pictures, a second, related adjustment
made to the canon was the effort to bring the Christian God close, something
that, necessarily, involved significant iconographic departures from the canon
as, for instance, Christ was depicted, in an unprecedented manner, hovering
over Maluku or in situ in Ambon and the surrounding islands. Besides the
teary-eyed Jesus looking down on a globe turned to Maluku on a billboard, his
head floats over the destruction of the GPM’s landmark Silo Church on a
canvas where tiny white-clad jihadis engage khaki-colored National Army
soldiers in battle; on another he extends his arms to refugees fording a river as
they escape violence on neighboring Seram; on yet another he appears as an
indigenous Malukan with dark skin and curly black hair, in a clear departure
from the Euro-American iconographic canon centered on a white Christ. Not
negligibly, bringing the Christian God into vision and up close also meant
bringing oneself into view—via the church at which one worships, the islands
where one resides, the portrayal of one’s wartime predicament or that of fellow Christians similarly caught up in violence, or as Christ in the image of an
Ambonese.
Commenting on these pictures, local painters occasionally recalled how
they abandoned the canon’s iconographic conventions. Discussing his work
during one of our recurrent conversations, Jhon underscored how, in choosing
to portray Jesus overlooking Ambon Bay rather than Jerusalem, he had used
his “imagination.” He also drew my attention to how Jesus not only overlooks
Ambon but does so from the vantage of Karpan or Karang Panjang, a location
above the city that is celebrated by its inhabitants as offering the best view of
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Ambon and that was often featured on the odd tourist brochure put out by the
city’s Department of Education and Culture before the war (Figure 11). The
same view crops up in a colonial album of photomechanical scenes from around
the archipelago, evidencing its framing already under the Dutch. On another
occasion, during a tour of several days in which Jhon took me to visit churches
and other locations around the city to see his work, we stopped at a small church
that, with the madrasah next to it, served the religiously mixed population of
the hospital on the grounds on which it stood. A large Christ painted behind
the altar clasped a red heart to his chest in a scene that Jhon identified as the
ascension, while a series of four paintings ran along the wall under the church
windows. These, he said, depicted “creation” as a luxuriant green landscape,
followed by the “birth” of Christ, “crucifixion,” and “death” or, more precisely,
resurrection showing a small illuminated Christ surfacing at the center of a
circle of women in a cave-like enclosure. Except for the crucifixion, Jhon assured me, all the paintings were based on “models.” When I remarked that the
Christ with the heart struck me as Catholic, Jhon agreed but then quickly
qualified any possible sense of emerging difference among diverse Christianities
by insisting that “the objective is the same,”30 an ecumenical discourse that I
take up in Chapter 4. Still, it is safe to assume that the model for the Christ
with the sacred heart was not taken from the Protestant print repertoire. Instead,
it evidences the tendency to bricolage that, along with loyalty to the canon and
the desire to bring Christ close, also informed the changing iconography of
Ambon’s canonical pictures.

Figure 11. A composite image of a photomechanical picture of Amboina (left), the name of
Ambon City under the Dutch colonizers, and a painted mural of Christ overlooking Ambon
Bay from the same location (right). The photomechanical image originates from an album of
scenic views of the Netherlands East Indies from the 1930s or 1940s. Reproduced by permission of the University of Cambridge Museum of Archaeology & Anthropology (BA5/4/1).
Mural painting by Jhon Yesayas, Ambon, 2005. Photo by the author.
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If in overt statements almost all of the painters emphasized their adherence
to the Christian iconographic canon, in practice they creatively remediated
and reimagined it in startling ways. Even as they departed from the reproduction of time-worn visual models, copying predominated as the point of departure
in the artistic practice of the handful of men—with one notable exception—who
painted Jesus Christ in the streets, behind church altars, and in private homes
during and after the war. Given the restorative impulse that drove the Protestants’ pictorial turn, such upholding of tradition is to be expected. However,
due to the enormous pressure that the conflict exerted on the canon and what
must also have been the sense of a diminishing correspondence between the
print repertoire and the circumstances of war, all of Ambon’s painters also,
whether explicitly or not, relied on their “imagination,” finding inspiration in
the myriad materials around them to alter, elaborate on, and deploy the canon
in unprecedented ways. Given how much the iconographic canon was rooted
in European depictions of Christ and biblical scenes, the crisis of faith in the
city may have summoned forth an awareness of the lack of correspondence
already there—namely, between the colonially derived images and Ambon’s
Christian Protestant world. Continuing the focus of this chapter on Christ at
large, specifically in Ambon’s streets, I leave my introduction of the painters
to the following chapter and turn now to the young men who supported the
street pictures.

Guardians of the Neighborhood
In his fascinating analysis of the long history of guardhouses (I. gardu), “visible
at almost every junction in major cities” in today’s Indonesia, Abidin Kusno
describes a photograph of pemuda, or male youth, from the Indonesian revolution waged against Dutch colonizers—young men who might have belonged
to either the Indonesian National Army or unofficial militias but whose stylistic
formation (in the photo at least) recalls the image of security guards standing
at guardhouses in more contemporary times.31 But the scene is especially worth
citing for the powerful ways the image resonates with the young men grouped
across the city at the edge of their neighborhoods in postwar Ambon:
It was an image Indonesians would expect to confront as they
approached the entrance to a guarded neighborhood. These youth
represent the city (in ruins) behind them. They consider the city as
being under their guard and see themselves as its protectors, as well as
the destroyers of things associated with the enemy. Patrolling in self-
styled uniforms, they considered themselves to be the vanguard of the
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newly liberated world of the Indonesian masses (the rakyat). They took
the urban space as a gigantic canvas on which they inscribed writing,
slogans, and flags associated with this new time and new identity. They
saw themselves as the embodiment of order and security, even though
many of them participated in political violence and acts of destruction.32
Importantly, this passage captures not only the longue durée of such loci and
the young men with whom they are identified but also the masculine style and
sense of threat that the men equally embody. Dieter Bartels, an anthropologist
who has worked for many years in Ambon, observes how the more open atmosphere resulting from Reformasi, along with the unrest of the city’s conflict,
offered such young men “an opportunity to express their freedom from authority
through acts of violence.”33 He also writes of “Western-style gangs” that at times
fought each other in some parts of the city before the war, as well as how these
gangs morphed during the violence “into freedom fighters defending their
neighborhoods against outside attacks and invading those of their enemies to
burn them down.”34 Some of the motorbikers recalled how in wartime men
would pose before the Christian billboards and murals to be photographed,
weapons in hand, before setting off to battle. A few others showed me their
scars; one man, identified by another as “a victim” as he whirled his bike around
to join us at the stand, rolled up his T-shirt to show me the ugly dark scar across
his chest. Still others had tattoos, including the Star of David, a key symbol
among Christians during the war. For the most part though, except for recurrent complaints about the Christians’ makeshift weapons or statements about
how the Muslims slaughtered them, the men avoided any reference to the
violence. When they did remember the war, it was most often to compare the
amount a biker could earn then with the much more meager take they could
expect today.
When I inquired about the existence of biker associations, motorbike stand
or group names, or neighborhood gangs, the men commonly reeled off the
names of loud musical groups with which they or other motorbikers identified.
For example, the response at one stand was the Sex Pistols, the name of the
all-male disco group that some of the men had formed in order to participate
in dance competitions. Not surprisingly, the wall behind the platform on which
the bikers sat between rides and during lulls in business bore the logo of the
band enclosed in a ring of dripping blood that made it resemble a bullet
hole—“because we live and die for this,” one of the bikers explained when I
wondered about the design (Figure 12). “For us,” another continued, as a number of the men crowded around to listen in on our conversation, the logo or,
perhaps more accurately, brand “is the same as Coca-Cola—always Coca-Cola,
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Figure 12. Sex Pistols and Guns N’ Roses logos at a Christian motorbike-taxi stand (left) and a
Muslim one (right), Ambon and Ternate, 2006. Photos by the author.

always Sex Pistols.”35 Around the city, many such biker “brands” were similarly
adopted and, at times, adapted from the emblems of musical groups.
Not only the young Christian men whom I spent time with in Ambon in
the mid-2000s but also those I met in April 2006 in North Malukan Ternate
and in 2008 both there and in neighboring Tidore—where the populations are
predominantly Muslim—embellished their stands with designs taken from the
CDs and DVDs of bands like Guns N’ Roses, Limp Bizkit, Linkin Park, and,
of course, the Sex Pistols. Some names were apparently holdovers from earlier
times, such as the Gipsy Kings, a band popular in the 1980s, “during the time
of our fathers,” one of Ambon’s bikers remarked. Faces like those of Che Guevara or the Indonesian cult singer Iwan Fals, along with slogans like “Punk”
and “Rebel,” also moved indiscriminately across Indonesia’s many religions
and regions and settled into the rich stratigraphy of these sites (Figure 13).36
Besides such consumer-and youth-based sources, a study of these sites’ stratigraphy would reveal other group markers as well, especially, as I noted earlier,
those of political parties and soccer teams. Apart from the display of consumer
culture and myriad emblems, the Christian billboards—whether freestanding
or adjacent to murals covered with Christian scenes—often emerged in the
same kind of location, along the city’s main thoroughfares or at crossroads
facing onto major streets, as commercial advertisements, if, indeed, they had
not been painted over these. This, for instance, was said to be the case of the
alleged first Christ portrait in the city that overlay a former Sampoerna cigarette
advertisement.
Beyond their explicit wartime and postwar identification with Christianity,
Ambon’s men and their bike stands form part of a wider masculine youth
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culture that draws inspiration, emblems, and sources of style from a common
repertoire that is seen across Indonesia. In 2006 and 2008 in the North Malukan
sultanates of Ternate and Tidore, I even came across a few Muslim power
murals, similarly connected to male neighborhood stands, although these were
few and far between.37 Unlike the Christian murals, I only saw one in North
Malukan Ternate, although there was also a billboard showing Saddam Hussein
on a stallion chasing a tiny, sweating George Bush. On the small neighboring
island of Tidore, there was another Muslim power mural, but I saw none in
Ambon or elsewhere in Central Maluku. Although only the Ternate mural
bears the “Moslem Power” slogan, both form stunning portrait galleries featuring such historical and political male heavyweights as Indonesia’s first
president, Sukarno; the eighteenth-century anticolonial Malukan hero Nuku;
long-time opposition singer Iwan Fals; Muammar al-Qaddafi; and Osama bin
Laden (Figure 14). Like the Christian walls, they served on occasion as open-
air photographic studios. In Ternate, I was shown photographs of groups of
young men as well as married couples posing in their new Ramadan clothing
in front of the power mural there. When I began to photograph the Tidoran
mural, a man repairing the gutter next to the wall spontaneously jumped in
front of my camera, raising his thumb in approval of the huge portrait of Saddam
Hussein in front of which he stood. Similar to the Christians, the Muslims
took their examples from print media, in this case, hard-line Islamist magazines
like Sabili or more traditional print lineups of Muslim religious leaders like
those I saw hanging in Ternatan homes along with larger images of the holy
city, Mecca. Importantly, the men who did the mural were themselves not
Islamist in orientation. Both the Muslim and Christian propaganda at these
locations and their designation as motorbike-taxi stands dates from the war
when the bikes flourished as substitutes for public minibuses and cars due to
their safer and more malleable mobility. Nonetheless, the major difference
between the Muslim and Christian murals is that while the former proclaim
a long history of Muslim greatness, if somewhat defensively in the aftermath
of war (see also Chapter 5), the latter claim in the first place a novel visibility
as they envision a more proximate connection to the Christian God.
It is worth pointing out that, in all of my conversations with the bikers of
different stands around Ambon, only infrequently was any mention made of
the city’s most famous—or infamous—gang. Dating from the war and hailing
from the Christian neighborhood of Kudamati, the group Coker, short for
Cowok Keren or the “cool men,” were led by Agus Wattimena, a man widely
recognized as a preman or thug. Whatever wartime violence any of the bikers
had been involved in, none of these self-assigned neighborhood guardians, as
far as I could tell, formed a gang along the lines of Coker that lived and

92

Christ at Large

Figure 13 and Figure 14. Muslim power murals in North Maluku (top), Tidore, 2008. Photo
by the author. The Ternate “Moslem Power” mural painting (bottom) was painted and photographed by Aki Saleh, reproduced with permission.

reproduced itself through violence and extortion. Speaking of the gang, a
Christian woman who I will call Lusi used the phrase “Christian pemuda,” to
refer to its members, evoking the revolutionary youth described above, but
adding a local twist that merged the storied heroes of the Indonesian nation
with Ambon’s own homegrown Christian freedom fighters. But Lusi’s praise
for these pemuda was ambivalent, since members of the gang would apparently
betray their fellow Christians for a fee, or so she claimed, by, for instance, setting their homes on fire. This explains her other name for the men—“Judas’s
kids,” the term used for duplicitous Christians during the conflict.38
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In contrast to the gang, the men I came to know in the mid-2000s—including
as a frequent motorbike-taxi passenger—formed loose motorbike-taxi collectives,
the members of which identified strongly with their neighborhood and stand,
including its corresponding signs—the “brands” of their favorite musical groups;
those of preferred political parties, notably in the early 2000s, Megawati Sukarnoputri’s PDI-P political party with its black-on-red water buffalo logo
among the Christians; and the especially charged Christian billboards and
murals. Not all of the men associated with a given bike stand had necessarily
grown up together, given the many displacements of the war. But they were
closely knit by ties of loyalty, friendship, shared history, and their common
identity as both Christians and young men. Although by no means systematic
across the biker groups, some collected fees to cover the costs of treatment
should any member be involved in an accident or fall ill. Collectively, they
pooled the resources to pay for the street paintings—supplying the painters
with paint, brushes, and other materials, including the usual, so-called cigarette
price, a gloss for the cigarettes and snacks given to the painter while he worked.
They also took charge of the upkeep of the murals and their immediate surroundings, especially in anticipation of Christian holidays, when they would
decorate the sites festively. Members of the neighborhood often chipped in,
especially around Christmas.
Although the general function of these locations was clear to me, it proved
impossible to obtain detailed information about their history during the war.
This may have had something to do with my gender and age at the time of
fieldwork but also perhaps because for most of the men, there was not a great
deal to say: as in ordinary times, the defensive function of the neighborhood
guardhouses was obvious; in wartime this had simply been expanded and made
more explicit. But, once in a while, I sensed reticence on the part of some men
who seemed reluctant to recall war’s troubling episodes, as well as things that
they may have felt were better left unsaid, if not forgotten.
But if these men, like the Indonesian revolutionaries before them but also
youth the world over, took the city as their canvas as Abidin Kusno describes,
equally evident in Ambon was the diffuse sense of threat that he also records—
but also, by extension, neighborhood security—that emanated from the men
and their stands. Recall that, in many cases, the combination of command and
communication posts that were established during the war occupied the same
strategic locations at the borders of urban neighborhoods as the motorbike-taxi
stands do today. These were especially potent sites at the time, as we saw in
Chapter 1—places where prayers were said and trumpets blown, where processions of Christian men and women set off holding images of Jesus Christ high
above the crowd, and where the alarm sounded, rousing the neighborhood, in
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the case of an attack. Tellingly in the Southeast Malukan islands of Aru, the
Indonesian state required villages to construct the guardhouses that, at this
eastern end of the archipelago, had never been seen before, as part of the
preparations for the 1987 national elections. As I came to understand, the need
for such defensive structures was meant to conjure the possibility of an unseen
enemy who might emerge at any time to challenge the Indonesian state. According to the same logic, Aruese men were forced to train with mock guns
they were told to carve from wood in case “something happened.”39 I mention
this example to underscore the enormous strategic role linked to the ubiquitous
guardhouses—whether in everyday circumstances, elections under Suharto,
or wartime. But also to bring out their long-standing, intimate connection with
forms of state control—connections that were enhanced during the Japanese
occupation of Indonesia during World War II (1942–1945) through the system
of neighborhood organization that the occupiers imposed to monitor and control the population and that was consolidated and expanded under Suharto.40
To give just one example of their defensive function in ordinary times, a Catholic priest based at a church across the road from one of the biker stands, a
man who I knew from my time in Aru, told me of an incident in which the
electricity in the neighborhood had gone out and a woman employed in his
home called out for help when she saw someone spying on her through a window. Within minutes, the priest recalled, along with his own surprise at the
time, forty motorbikers had surrounded his house. When they caught the offender, the bikers “roughed him up a bit,” but the priest insisted they turn the
man over to him since he had been caught trespassing on church grounds.41
Socially, symbolically, but also defensively standing in for their neighborhoods,
the guardhouses, in other words, are places where multiple social and strategic
needs are met, today as in the past.
Due to their predominantly young age, gender, and, commonly, unmarried
status, the men who hang out at these spots in front of their neighborhoods
tend to inhabit a place at authority’s edge. Their creative activities, notably the
Christian pictures, are not sanctioned by the local churches, who tend to regard
them with ambivalence, often commending the images for how they showcase
Christianity but voicing doubts about the religiosity of the young men who
make the pictures or cynicism regarding the un-Christian behavior that they
assume takes place around them. Indeed, it is these young men who the painter
Jhon had in mind when he described his street art to me as pictorial khutbah
or sermons, and he claimed some success. Sitting across from Christ’s face,
these men are less inclined to drink or fool around with women, or so Jhon
said.42 In casting his paintings in the role of Pentecostal witnessing, the painter
also betrayed the influence of the charismatic church he had begun to attend
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at the time even as he continued to join services at the GPM, intimating a shift
in which he was hardly alone (see Chapter 4).
As elsewhere, such men are the recurrent object of suspicion and surveillance and, where possible, are mobilized to political ends in decentralized
Indonesia’s continual campaigns and elections. For instance, around election
time it is not uncommon to see small television monitors appear in motorbike
stands in addition to the even more common bright new T-shirts on the motorbikers.43 Importantly, these groups are a phenomenon of orphaned landscapes, surfacing in wartime and afterward, when the guardhouses and their
occupants became exemplary of the grassroots emergence of forms of authority
and regulation, the enhancement of defensive protection, and, in Ambon, a
religious definition of these processes. In this respect, it is important to recall
that on the other side of the city, young Muslim men grouped at motorbike
stands mirrored the loose neighborhood gangs of the Christians. As memories
of the war faded, some of these groups collaborated as the Christians manned
the Muslim stands during Muslim holidays, providing transportation for Muslim passengers and vice versa, as I discovered in 2017.
But in war’s immediate aftermath, many more men than women were left
without sources of employment.44 Un(der)employment in the city especially
affected its young people, comprising close to 60 percent of the urban population. There is also disturbing evidence of quite widespread domestic violence,
as well as violence in schools following the war.45 For many of the young
motorbike-taxi drivers who are neither married nor in schools, these specific
types of violence may not be directly relevant. But they do speak to the war’s
widespread trauma and other effects and to its ongoing consequences in the
postwar city—including those that resulted from the devastation and scrambling
of neighborhoods due to the redrawing and hardening of territorial boundaries
and internal displacements, the memories of violence and the psychological
and psychosocial damage resulting from the constant threat of violence, the
loss of family and friends, the interruption or termination of school and employment, the destruction of futures and hope. There were, of course, differences among the men in this regard. In the mid-2000s, some of the older
members of the biker groups were those who, in war’s wake, were among
Ambon’s most adrift—their past clouded and often violent, their present precarious, and their future up for grabs. Others were more settled—younger men
for whom motorbike-taxi driving was a source of income and a privileged
component of masculine style, students aiming to support their studies, or the
odd civil servant moonlighting to supplement his salary.46 Among the differences were also those of class, since before the war a civil servant, and especially a Christian one, would not have been easily caught driving a pedicab or
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motorbike. Indeed, one of the most common ways that middle-class Christians
had of summarizing the decline in their social position was to point out that
after the war, even Christians drove pedicabs, considered the lowliest of
occupations.

Streetwise Masculinity
War and the city’s postwar streets elicited masculine performances in which
the male body figured centrally. It is possible that the precarity of postwar existence, more aggravated in many respects for men, may have further provoked
the display of male power, whether in the form of domestic or other physical
violence or through more sublimated forms like the Christian street art. Whatever the case, style among the city’s young men is an ongoing preoccupation
in which the motorbike assumes special importance as a crucial component
of masculine performance. Demonstrative strutting and cruising has long been
a feature of Ambon’s streets, where men critically assess each other’s performances.47 Equally important is the creative work that goes into embellishing
the motorbike as an accessory and instrument of masculine display and, collectively, the painting and decoration of the motorbike stand.48 These different
elements of style, male bravado, and group identity come together in stunning
photographs of men performing stunts on their motorbikes in front of the Christ
murals, as I discuss below.
If style generally is something to be put on show, then such style was performed with a vengeance during and after Ambon’s war. A Protestant minister
spoke to me of the first Pattimura Day celebration held in the city in mid-May
2005 to commemorate the resistance to Dutch colonial rule on the part of the
nineteenth-century Christian hero and his followers.49 Part of the ceremony
includes a performance of the cakalele war dance by Christian men dressed
in ancestral wartime attire upon their arrival to Ambon City from Saparua
Island. If always impressive, the first postwar performance took place in that
part of the city where the conflict began and in other ways, too, was especially
uncanny. Following so closely upon the war’s conclusion, the spectacle of the
bare-chested men brandishing many of the same machetes they had only recently used in combat could not but evoke the city’s immediate past and, what
is more, be infused by some of the same passions and energies that drove the
widespread violence, or so the minister said. With a hint of amusement, he
added how it was obvious that a number of the men had prepared themselves
for the public performance through some extra bodybuilding. Two years earlier
in 2003, as I sat in front of my hotel enjoying the relative cool of the evening,
I witnessed countless practice sessions that filled the wide, tree-lined Pattimura
Avenue leading up to the city’s first national Independence Day celebration
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since the war. Late into the night, groups of twenty to thirty young men—but
also some women—marched up and down the avenue in military style to the
tune of a harmonica or a whistle blown to keep them in line. Variations on the
style included “beautiful marching,” which replaces the tight discipline of the
military version with graceful, flowing movements, or another in which the
military march alternates with short bouts of break dancing. Eager for some
entertainment after the difficult years of conflict, people at the time commented
enthusiastically about the impressive number of groups that had signed up for
the Independence Day parade and how fabulous they would look in their different, color-coordinated clothing.
Cocky, streetwise, and displaying a decidedly Christian sense of style, Ambon’s young men were key customers for the booming wartime market in
Christian-themed T-shirts and the crosses that grew to immense sizes around
their necks like some sacred Malukan bling. Music, stickers, and signs distinguishing minibuses destined for different parts of the city became demonstrably
religious in nature, echoing in a different scale and register the aggressively
spectacular Christian billboards and murals. Not surprisingly, the street pictures
lent themselves to masculine performances, resulting in striking juxtapositions
of canonical Christianity and monumentalized male bravado. While taking
photographs of a motorbike-taxi stand one day, a few of the bikers offered to
show me what they called their own dokumentasi, or photo collection documenting the “before” and “after” of their decorated motorbike stand and adjacent wall.50 Some of the photographs showed these sites at different stages of
completion; in others, the men gathered proudly around the partially done or
finished wall. Among the stacks and small plastic albums provided by stores
when they return printed photographs were scenes of group activities that
captured male camaraderie and fun on camera—a motorbike excursion and
boat trip to Seram during durian season, men striking poses next to their bikes
or performing stunts at motorbike rallies. Taken over a period of time, the
photographs recorded the shifting stylistic, political, and religious identifications of the group and the creativity displayed in their articulation.
But the most striking in the bikers’ self-documentation were several photographs that showed young men performing motorbike stunts in front of Christian billboards and murals. In these pictures, male bodies merge with the
Christian scenes behind them, as in one remarkable image in which the erect
bike, supported by its owner dressed in his Christmas best, aligns perfectly with
the crucified Christ behind it. In these carefully preserved photographs, the
double import of backdrops in the construction of Christian identity and
youthful masculinity alike comes to the fore: bikes, bling, and backdrops work
together as prostheses of male bodies in public space, as the props of male
performances, or even, following a more expansive definition, as a bodily
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adornment of the pictured body, fashioning the subject within.51 This is nowhere more evident than when the bike aligns with the Christ backdrop in a
dramatic expression of male motorbiker style and a masculine assertion of
public Christianity. As a photograph, specifically, the picture offers a more
intimate take on who this man and others like him “want to be when they pose
before the camera.”52 In doing so, this remarkable shot folds into its frame but
also into each other the seductive bravado of youthful male bluster and the
power of pictures—including that of the global print Christianity from which
the model for the billboard derives; the imaginative, theatrical space offered
by the backdrop itself;53 the glossy appeal of advertising that suffuses the gigantic
airbrushed Christ; the performative force of being who you want to be before
the camera, as well as, explicitly here, out in public space and poised for widespread consumption; the material presence of the monumental, in-your-face
Christian street picture itself.

Figure 15. A photo album showing the range of sources that different Christian motorbike-taxi
groups draw on, from the logos of political parties and portraits of political leaders, Christian
print media, and the Israeli flag, to Dutch Christmas cards, T-shirts, and musical groups.
Notable is the importance given by some groups to documenting the creative embellishment
of their stands and the ubiquitous presence of the motorbike. Ambon 2003, 2005, and 2006.
Photos by the author and by motorbikers.
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This Face Wants you
This is what the Christian billboards and murals say to the pedestrians, motorcycles, cars, and minibuses that pass them by. It is also what they say to the
young men who, in Christian neighborhoods around the city, hang out on the
raised platforms facing the megapictures—passing their time, smoking cigarettes, gossiping, and reviewing passersby (especially young women) while
awaiting motorbike-taxi customers. Looming over this terrain, Jesus’s gigantic,
glossy face with its adjacent murals simultaneously gates the community and
brands it as decidedly Christian. In doing so, these pictures posit a direct relationship between the core symbols of the Ambonese Christian community
and physical territory at the same time as they facilitate an identification between the martyred male Jesus and the young men who gather around his
image and, in turn, through them, a connection to the wider community for
which they stand. This, incidentally, is an identification fully enabled by the
teachings of Protestant Christianity. In Chapter 3, I consider more closely the
identificatory circuit that is established discursively and via the pictures between
Jesus Christ and Christians, one based on an inherently visual idea—namely,
that of man being created in the image and likeness of God. For the young
men who sponsored and cared for the pictures, the significance of the connection between themselves and Jesus was, however, not circumscribed by the
teachings of Christianity but centered also on his identity as a young man.
Whether Christian or, for that matter, Muslim, Indonesia’s neighborhood
guardhouses have long been sites of masculine identity and expression. This
explains why, besides men, only older women from the neighborhood might
pause briefly with their parcels from the market in the bike stand before heading up the hill. But it also explains the concern on the part of the priest whose
church is in full view of one of the biker stands that the large statue of the
Virgin Mary planned for its pinnacle might offend its occupants (Figure 16).
In my view, his observation had less to do with any explicit difference between
Protestants and Catholics, something that was actually deemphasized during
the war, than the more elevated position of the Virgin vis-à-vis the stand and
its adjacent Christ murals. Recall, in this respect, Jhon’s description of the
billboard that stood in front of this motorbike stand during the war but was
removed when its scaffolding rusted: “That is the one we made like an advertisement, so we raised it up high, higher than all the other images because of
his being on high.” Not only would the Catholic statue symbolically eclipse
Protestantism’s privileged position and superiority, but it would also install a
markedly Catholic female figure looking down on the male sociality grouped
around the bike stand. Not surprisingly, the adamant masculinity of these
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Figure 16. Statue of the Virgin Mary overlooking the mural painting of Christ across from a
motorbike-taxi stand, Ambon, 2005. Photo by the author.

stands comes across in the iconography of the Protestant murals where the
only women occasionally depicted serve as props to Christ, either as his mother
Mary or the handful of women witnessing his resurrection.
Taken together, the territorial claims and Christian scenes built into and
arising at these defensive neighborhood locations fed on and were energized
by the symbolically charged, dense sociality that converges on the borders
demarcating Ambon’s Christian neighborhoods—increasingly anxiously and
self-consciously—from the city and country around them. At these potent sites,
highly territorial versions of community became articulated at the same time
as the very idea of community in relation to territoriality became the site of
creative exploration and experimentation—especially via the pictures thrown
up on billboards and walls. Born out of conflict and an intimate part of the
scene of war, the Christ at large in Ambon’s postwar streets was, among other
things, an emblem of violence where the difference between self-love and
other-directed aggression was hard to discern. Seen in this light, the street art
has much in common with the wartime graffiti that a journalist described as
either self-referential or about the enemy—Israeli versus Egyptian territory,
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Muslim power or Muslim pigs.54 “We live and die for this,” one biker explained,
speaking of the musical group linked to his stand—and although he referred
to the Sex Pistols, it might as well have been Jesus Christ. Invoked frequently
by Christians lamenting their circumstances during the war, many claimed
that “Christ was our only weapon,” as they went on to recall the flimsy bows
and arrows, makeshift rifles, home-brewed poisons, and occasional black magic
with which they aimed to protect themselves. The Lion Alley wall showing
Jesus holding a Sacred Heart encircled by thorns with flames shooting out of
it looked to some like an exploding bomb encased in barbed wire (Figure 17).
Such comments speak less to the skill—or lack of such—on the part of the
particular artist involved than to how easily Christ and violence collaborated
during the war. Recall, along these lines, how Jesus Christ’s apparition often
prefigured the onset of violence, or how some Christians—but allegedly, too,
a handful of soldiers and several Muslims—saw him commanding the Christians in battle. Beyond these religious associations, bullet holes with bloody
skin bent back to frame motorbike emblems or pistols in the place of heads on
torsos have long been popular images at bike stands. Even if Christ on billboards
and murals is depicted overlooking rather than immersed in violence—a crucial
distinction—he remains close to and engaged with it. What his separation from
war’s all-encompassing terrifying terrain enables is seeing Christ as a comforting rather than a foreboding force.
If, during the war, Ambon’s Christian pictures poetically, but also provocatively, publicized the question of territory in a city rent by violence, the practice
of graffiti, often deployed in anticipation or in the aftermath of confrontation,
served to advertise territorial conquests by inscribing the respective losses and
gains of the enemies directly onto urban space. On either side, competing
sound bites sprayed on city walls claimed territory for the self while defacing
the opponent. Insults of Jesus or the Prophet Mohammad traded places with
Stars of David, the names Israel and Mossad, or “Allahu akbar” in Arabic writing (Figure 18). All of these markings violently scratched onto the face of the
city bore within them highly charged figures of territory: they staked claims to
homes, public buildings, beaches, and stores, and to strategic loci in and around
the city.55 They desecrated the ground only recently relinquished by the foe,
registered the vicious back-and-forth of enmity and contestation, cordoned and
enclaved the community. Charged with aggression and meant to insult and
provoke the enemy, such markings were the material conduits of the affective
intensities, emotional commitments, and circulation of energies that animated
the work on appearance during the war, especially that which took place in
the streets and was driven (largely) by men—those who defended and fought
for their neighborhoods, who gated and branded them with Christian scenes,

Figure 17. Christian neighborhood gateways, Ambon, 2005 and 2006. Photos
by the author.
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Figure 18. Wall with tags, graffiti, and a painted Christ and church bells that gives a sense of
the diverse range to which such urban canvases are put. Soahuku town, Seram Island, 2005.
Photo by the author.

who did stunts, posed, and photographed themselves in front of the Christ
billboards and murals. It is worth recalling that, besides the Muslim enemy,
another factor that must have energized the street art and fed its creative dynamism was the presence of multiple groups of such men around the city and
the considerable competition among them, at no time more than in the weeks
preceding Christmas and, to a lesser extent, Easter. Certainly, this competition
between the men of different bike stands was evident after the war, but it probably also encouraged the spread and popularity of the street pictures during
the conflict, something that was suggested to me by Lusi, the Christian woman
I mentioned above.
One of the most spectacular scenes I ever witnessed where some of these
energies and affective investments were exposed was in a short video clip that
a stringer in Ambon showed me of Christian men on their way to fight the
Muslims. Following a truck careening down the main thoroughfare and commercial hub of Ambon’s A. J. Patty Avenue, the camera zooms in on a handful
of young men with red head ties waving and gesticulating with their weapons.
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Pulling abruptly curbside, the truck pauses to disgorge the men, who jump out
of its back, squat in the street, and scrawl slogans on its tarred surface with
white paint—Nazareth, Ambon Mossad, Israel anti-Muhammed, Repoblik
Maluku Sarane (sic), and a white, six-pointed star on a red background that
subsumes the Christians’ wartime identification with Israel within the red and
white colors of the Indonesian flag.56
“Emosi!” was the word the stringer used to describe the outburst of youthful
energy and aggression that we briefly saw on screen and that left me stunned.
Akin to the Dutch word emotie, or emotion, from which it derives, emosi in
Indonesia has a negative connotation. When it comes to emosi, the sense inevitably is that there is too much of it, indicating a lack of control and intense
anger. In the case of the stringer, himself a Christian, the word expressed less
a judgment than a straightforward appraisal of the situation, of just how revved
up the young men had been when they set off to confront the Muslims. Similarly, following the stringer, the difference between the wartime graffiti and
the banners temporarily suspended over urban streets that we also saw in some
clips was that while the former was driven by emosi, the latter responded directly to specific events, such as actions on the part of the Indonesian Armed
Forces (I. Tentara Nasional Indonesia, or TNI) in Ambon: “This is the result
of the criminality of the TNI,” accused one banner; “TNI belongs to Acang
[the Muslim enemy],” declared another; still another threatened the then
commander of the armed forces in Ambon, substituting his first name, Max,
with that of the Muslim Prophet, “Muhammed Tamaela should be strung up
and burned.”57 My invocation of emosi here and especially the clip that registers
its inscription on one of Ambon’s main arteries is because, more than any other,
this scene conveyed to me with frightening clarity and force how much not
only the wartime graffiti but also its companions in the streets, the Christian
pictures, emerged and stood their ground as enormously charged, embattled
artifacts, aggressive claims to territory, and as a highly defensive articulation
of representational redress.

Sighting the Street
In his influential essay “The Rhetoric of the Image,” Roland Barthes coins the
term anchorage for the captions, titles, and other bits of text that rein in and
reduce the myriad meanings and interpretations that any image may spawn,
with the aim of circumscribing its significance.58 With respect to the Christian pictures, it is possible to see the array of material practices and artifacts,
the sociality, masculine performances, and interpersonal dynamics, the personal and collective identities, the sense of God’s estrangement, the drive to
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experiment and figure, and the explosion of emosi as constituting an anchorage
that helped to channel the impact of the pictures in Ambon’s wartime and
postwar streets. My intention in using this term is not to circumscribe or,
indeed, diminish the power of these images by reducing their impact to contextual considerations. Rather, anchorage allows me to marshal some of the
connections—or, more actively, the force field—that help to account for the
street pictures’ undeniable potency by identifying some of the forces that fed
and sustained them, including the aggression and territorial commitments that
were folded into the pictures. Understood dynamically as a field of heterogeneous energies and palpable materialities, anchorage in Ambon’s streets comprised the defensive locations of the guardhouses, the style and sense of threat
presented by the bikers, their presence and performances at the edge of Christian neighborhoods, the sociality that converged on the borders of religiously
marked urban areas and thickened during the conflict, the myriad inscriptions
on the material surfaces of the city, the neighborhood pride and loyalties, the
shared histories and shared enmities, and, during the time of my fieldwork,
the then still recent experiences of the war.
I began this chapter with an account of how and why Protestants turned to
painting Christianity in Ambon’s streets and how doing so meant abandoning
the long-standing antimaterialist and aniconic tradition of Calvinist Protestantism and how this new material commitment, animated by the desire to bring
God into vision and up close, entailed dramatic adjustments to the Christian
iconographic canon. As the Christian pictures moved out of homes and stores
and became monumentalized in the postwar urban environment, they not
only changed but opened themselves to the pressures, desires, and imaginations
of the streets—despite the avowed commitment on the part of the painters to
copying rather than transforming the Christian canon. It is these streets that,
approached from several angles, I have tried to keep in view in this chapter—
from the characteristics of the key locations where the billboards and murals
first arose, to the young men and biker groups who sponsored the pictures and
the more diffuse Christian neighborhood-based sociality clustered around
them, to the energies, desires, and expectations that suffuse these sites, keeping
in mind also those of the multitudes who regularly passed by the pictures and
saw how these conformed or did not conform to what Indonesians expect to
see when they approach the entrance to a guarded neighborhood.59
In a thoughtful essay, Dilip Gaonkar singles out the rising significance of
streets (along with slums), notably in the Global South, as the preeminent site
where people congregate and where increasingly a kind of history is made:
“The closing years of the last millennium and the opening years of the new
millennium have witnessed the so-called people without history, or on the edges
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of history, storming the gates of history in the streets and squares everywhere:
Tiananmen (Beijing, 1989), Azad (Tehran, 1979, and 2008), Tahrir (Cairo, 2011),
Taksim (Istanbul, 2013), Maidan (Kiev, 2013) and elsewhere.”60 To this list,
Bundaran HI—Jakarta’s huge roundabout in front of the iconic Hotel Indonesia
built by Sukarno and the site of multiple student demonstrations and gatherings
in 1998—might have been added. During the period of Reformasi, the spectacle
and exuberant publicity of a panoply of new political, religious, and artistic
forms and performative styles claimed the nation’s streets as their recurrent
stage. “Take to the streets!” was a recurrent battle cry among the country’s
young men and women who marched in the capital Jakarta and other Indonesian cities in 1998 and 1999, bravely stood off the army at often considerable
risk to their own lives, occupied the parliament, and celebrated under Reformasi’s hopeful banner when the downfall of the regime came about.61 In the
years immediately following Suharto’s downfall, a “visibility contest” took over.62
Streets across the nation became crowded with different groups—one more
theatrical than the next—that contested and vied with each other for social,
political, and economic stakes in postauthoritarian times: intellectuals, artists,
and transgender people protesting antipornography and “pornographic action”
laws; Islamic militants in white, yelling and waving weapons; or, further afield
in wartime Ambon, ecumenical processions of Christians marching against
forced conversions to Islam; the local branch of the national organization of
Concerned Women gathered in front of the governor’s office; people carrying
fake coffins in protest of the imposition of civil emergency; Muslims demonstrating against the closure of the Laskar Jihad radio station; and so on.
Like many national histories, Indonesia’s has for long been written from
the perspective of the center, documenting its influence and reach, imposing
a state-endorsed unity on the country’s remarkable if depoliticized diversity
(including religion) and channeling the ambitions of its huge citizenry. But
Gaonkar suggests how, in recent times, the so-called people without history
or at the edges of history may be coming out in multitudes, leaving their mark
on major spaces of their respective nations and, at times, transforming them.63
When they break through the proverbial gates of history, they become part of
it—as Jakarta’s storied pemuda, several times over, have entered history since
their canonization as a force of change following Indonesia’s independence
struggle.
But what happens when the impact is more marginal and ephemeral, when
people at the edges of history remain outside of it, not entering and attempting
to alter official history dramatically as in Tahrir or Tiananmen Square but
more diffusely introducing change from below without, by and large, any
awareness of doing so? Ambon offers just such an example of significant, if
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unwitting, change that began in the streets, was propelled by young men at
the edge of authority and, certainly, the margins of history—the Protestant
motorbike-taxi drivers who seized urban sidewalks and walls and subjected
them to a vast, anxious work on appearances. To be sure, this example evidences
the increasing role of the street in Ambon and Indonesia, as elsewhere, as an
especially important site for significant sociopolitical transformation today. But
what such a bottom-up history or, better, bottom-up visual history may also
have to offer is an enhanced attunement to the affective intensities that animate
the lifeworld of the street and, as such, bring us closer to some of the desires
and motivations of those who congregate, act, and dream there.64
Besides the Christian street paintings, photographs of young men—whether
taken during the Indonesian revolution, for a motorbiker group’s documentation, or culled from my own archive of materials on Maluku—featuring individual men or groups of motorbike taxi-drivers, painted bike stands and walls,
and urban neighborhoods and traffic took center stage in this chapter. The
stylistic expressions they record, as I have tried to suggest here, come closest
to men’s highly performative, embodied practice, offering an avenue though
which to tap the energies and affective investments of the street. Except when
they are incorporated into photographs as backdrops for masculine performances, Ambon’s street paintings do not provide the same kind of access in
this regard. They do not show us as directly who the young men want to be as
when they pose before the camera; as such they are even more mediated than
such photographs—by the Christian iconographic canon, by the medium of
paint and wall, by the significant departure from Calvinist tradition, by the
street painters themselves, by fierce contests among different Christianities,
and by a host of uncertainties, longings, and concerns. But, in other respects,
they are as bottom-up as the young men’s photographs, especially in how they
bring us close to the heterogeneous imagination, the creativity, and wild experimentation that propelled the practice of figuration, as the billowing purple
smoke enveloping one of Ambon’s besieged landmark churches as Christ looks
on from above, in the painting reproduced before this chapter, fantastically
conveys.

3

Images without Borders

I begin with some fragments from Ambon’s postwar urban environment:
The city is in crisis, its great walls crumble, rocks and debris pile up
below. Smoke shrouds large swaths of the country, tongues of flames
leap out of churches. A populace in ancient garb is on the move; they
raise trumpets and shake tambourines in defiance. Above, the angry
face of God etched red and grimacing against dark clouds, behind
him a crowd of angels borne on the storm. This is a scene of dramatic
devastation. (A painting housed in a warehouse on the outskirts of
Ambon City.)
It’s as if we are praying in his hands. . . . One feels as if one is praying in
his hands. . . . Gethsemane in miniature. (From an interview with a
Protestant minister about the prayer room in his home in Ambon City.)
A Christ with a heavy beard and a busily patterned shirt gazes down
lovingly at the five children held in his embrace. The boys and girls
wear necklaces. Bands with flowers and feathers catch their hair. One
wears a cloth draped over her shoulder. Noteworthy is the warm intensity of Christ’s look and the crisscross of gazes among the children.
It is Good Friday, March 31, 2002. (A charcoal drawing by a Protestant
minister in Ambon City.)
A serene Christ portrait with frayed edges stands out against the unfolding canonical scenes from his life—birth in Bethlehem’s manger, a boat
carrying Christ and his apostles tossed at sea, his body bent under the

113

114

Images without Borders

great weight of the cross, crucifixion, resurrection. (A billboard and adjacent mural facing a motorbike-taxi stand in Ambon City.)
Scenes from a wreckage, the above fragments—bits of citation snatched
from conversation or more formal interviews and my own thumbnail sketches—
aim to foreground the provisional, incomplete, and exploratory nature of the
images that are the focus of this chapter. My interest is in the diversity of the
scenes these images conjure, ranging from God’s-eye views and apocalyptic
visions to intimate physical exchanges between God and humans, from the
Christian sacred geography of Gethsemane to God in situ or in close proximity
to Ambon. Christ intimately blends as an Ambonese with local children, dark
complexioned, in native dress, with wavy hair and beard, or overlooks from a
distance the Malukan islands below—although then, too, he is clearly moved
by what he sees. I am struck by the way these pictures seem to pull in different
directions. Foreground and background easily trade places or slide into each
other; scale is up for grabs, shifting from one picture to the next or even within
a given picture as, for instance, in the superimposition of Christ’s gigantic
portrait onto a narrative unfolding of his life. Perspective and views onto the
city and its inhabitants are mobile and varied, while the landscapes envisioned
in the pictures migrate seemingly without effort among this-worldly and otherworldly scapes and novel topographical formations. These include those that
sacralize Ambon’s conventional cityscape, as when Christ overlooks Ambon
Bay rather than Jerusalem or his head hovers over the attack on one of Ambon’s
landmark churches, and more biblically inspired scenes. Striking in all of this
is the strong sense of movement.
Keeping in mind the street pictures’ more pragmatic function as figures of
and claims to territory discussed in the previous chapter, I focus here on the
dynamic interplay between the movement implied in many of the pictures and
the efforts to contain the disquieting motion of a Christian lifeworld unmoored
and rendered strange. Apart from the recurrent sense of movement, the sheer
diversity of the street pictures, the visual genres they draw upon—most obviously, that of globalized Christian iconography—and the range of visualities
and perspectives they display, each picture installs a landscape, one that turns
“site into sight, place and space into a visual image.”1 By using this term, I want
to underscore how much, as in traditional landscape painting, the pictures are
animated, broadly speaking, by the effort to secure a view on things, both in
the sense of a perspective and of an order within a scene that contrasts sharply
with the immersive, chaotic surround of the wartime and postwar city.2 Together with the ubiquitous, stereotypical rendition of Christ’s face, the pictures
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as landscapes would still a world in restless and, at times, terrifying motion
and reestablish the familiar terms of quotidian existence and, not the least,
overall appearance of the prior Protestant Ambonese lifeworld. In light of the
desire to bring the Christian God into vision and, with it, the Christian self as
seen by God, visually monumentalizing the Christian God’s face amounts to
an urgent plea for recognition in which the Protestants position themselves to
receive it as the privileged addressees of their pictures.
Yet emergent in a world ravaged by war and uncertainty, neither the painted
landscapes nor the Christian self easily establish stability, remaining unable
to offer unequivocally an ordering perspective or guarantee of recognition.
Moreover, despite the often voiced qualifications about pictures being “just
pictures,” what Protestants often seemed to want most was not any distanced
view on the world but removal from it, in favor of immersion in a wholly Christian sacred space. These affectively charged sacred landscapes undermine any
traditional sense of landscape and complicate, in varying ways, the connection
between a distant Calvinist God and his devotees. The aggravated conditions
in which the Christians made their pictures further demanded a dramatic retooling of visual imagination, one that drew upon the range of media and models
already at hand and on others salient or introduced during the conflict.
In what follows, I explore questions of framing and backdrops, both visible
and invisible, that are relevant to understanding the dynamics of the street
pictures and to gauging how they were seen by Christians and others who
looked at them or passed them by. Much of the chapter homes in on particular
images as I examine closely some of the images without borders that Protestants
put in place to resurrect the frames that, disjointed by crisis, had previously
sustained their lifeworld, along with the image they held of themselves. On
the one hand, these images were borderless in their exploratory impulse and
search for new modes of expression, but also in their bringing-into-vision of a
universal Christ, unchallenged by other religions, and in their usurpation of
the authority of the Indonesian state, an argument I develop below. On the
other, the street painters monumentalized the familiar visual frames of Protestant religion, defensively circumscribing a lifeworld on the wane, as the
pictures aggressively marked the material borders of urban Christian enclaves.
If the last chapter tracked the emergence of the pictures within Ambon’s masculine street culture and the phenomenon of Christ at large in the city, this
chapter homes in on the dynamics animating individual pictures and introduces
their painters. Yet even as I consider individual pictures more closely, it is crucial to bear in mind that none of these can be seen in isolation but must be
grasped collectively as something akin to an open-air urban gallery.
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Painting Christianity
All told, fewer than a dozen painters produced the pictures that surfaced in
Ambon’s streets, and even fewer the ones that emerged behind altars and in
private homes. I had only one or two conversations with two of the least active
among the painters; two others I never managed to meet, since they were either
away from Ambon or unavailable when, on several occasions, I tried to see
them. I worked especially closely with Jhon Yesayas, Ambon’s most prolific
painter, but also spent time with Victory, who opened a roadside studio in 2006,
as well as with some of the motorbikers connected to the stand featuring his
work, including the big, blue-eyed Christ. I visited Pak Lamberth C. Joseph
at his home on several occasions. As the former director of Ambon’s Siwalima
Museum, Pak Joseph was well known locally. Many Christians were also aware
of his conversion to Pentecostalism following a narrow escape from an attack
on his home during the conflict. The only painter in the city with art school
training, having been sent by the government at a young age to study at Yogyakarta’s Art Academy, he was designated by some of the street painters as the
“master” or “teacher of the arts” in Ambon. Besides these artists and the young
men of several motorbike stands who sponsored the pictures, I developed
especially warm relations with the late Pak Nus Tamaela, the founder of a
museum dedicated to Seram’s indigenous culture (especially the island’s
allegedly brutal headhunting tradition), and his son, the late GPM Minister
Chris Tamaela, a teacher at Ambon’s Christian University (Universitas Kristen
Indonesia Maluku, or UKIM).3 The father and son stand out from the region’s
other painters since they were the only ones to portray Christ as an indigenous
Malukan, departing from his locally conventional rendition as a white
European.
With the exception of Victory, all of the painters claimed some religious
conviction or motivation for their work, although the manner in which they
did, the kind of religiosity that informed their artistic practice, and their institutional religious affiliation also betray the increasing diversity among Malukan
Protestants that, to a large extent, was accelerated by the war. Apart from their
professed Christianity, these men were also, not unimportantly, painters or
people who love to paint. In terms of how they envisioned their work, they were
more ambitious than the persons who, before the war, made the occasional
mural or embellished gateway that, from time to time, was sponsored by the
city government. In contrast to these incidental productions, the street paintings of the 2000s were, significantly, driven from below, as I argued in the last
chapter. Nor should we overlook how all of Ambon’s painters active in the 2000s
began to paint in the street as a direct response to the violence around them
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and their sense of being under attack as Christians. A graphic artist and photographer who, as a Muslim, was forced to leave Ambon with his Christian
wife during the conflict because of their mixed marriage had occasionally been
asked before the war to decorate a wall in his neighborhood around Christmas
or to welcome the New Year. But today’s pictures were different, he claimed,
since they had everything to do with “identity.”4 Indeed, my friend’s long-
standing nickname, Mas Embong (“Mr. Wall” in Javanese), underscores just
how out of the ordinary street painting had been prior to the war. A number
of people, including several artists, remembered one or two occasions when
the mayor’s office had held a competition focused on painting neighborhood
gateways, a practice common in Indonesia especially in connection with the
celebration of the country’s independence on August 17. Notwithstanding such
examples, it is impossible to identify any real precedent for Ambon’s street
pictures.
Let me begin by introducing Jhon, who I have already quoted in the preceding pages. I first heard about Jhon from a young woman employed at
Telkom, Ambon’s telecommunications office, who, already before the war, had
become a fervent convert to Pentecostalism and an active member of her
church. She knew him as a fellow worker at the Telkom office but also because,
from time to time, he worshipped at her church. When she brought me to the
Telkom Graphics Department, housed in its own small building behind the
large office, we found Jhon bent over a drafting table, drawing a map of Ambon’s underground cable network. Eager to talk about his painting (and probably
also flattered by my attention), we began what evolved into a series of somewhat
more formal recorded interviews that punctuated the ongoing conversation
that unfolded between us over the years, beginning in 2005 and continuing
through 2011. In 2006, we toured Ambon and its outskirts for several days, visiting churches and homes that held examples of Jhon’s work. We also traveled
together to the Christian village of Waai, which had been the target of a vicious
onslaught during the conflict, to visit another painter who spoke of a mural he
had painted on the wall of a refugee camp where he and fellow villagers from
Waai arrived after a harrowing flight that took them deep into Ambon Island’s
forested interior. Although it no longer existed, the painting depicted a miracle
that took place during the flight: a procession of men, women, and children
from Waai being guided to safety by a divine light that cut a path through the
nighttime forest, an event I had already heard about from a GPM minister. I
often accompanied Jhon on visits to the homes of his two minister friends,
one from the GPM who commissioned him to paint a wall and prayer room
in his home, another a self-styled minister who, while not ordained or affiliated
to any church, Jhon accompanied, when his schedule permitted, on religious
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revival trips to the neighboring islands. Besides distributing bibles, this minister
took part in the revival sessions that were necessary, Jhon explained, because
“during the violence people were close to God but now distance is setting
in—this is why we hold religious revivals.”5 Without exception, Jhon referred
to and addressed the former Chinese Indonesian businessman as “Minister”
and clearly admired him.
Jhon began to draw and paint at an early age, winning several prizes in local
contests when he was young. After school, he would practice what he called
his hobby at home. He attended a technical high school, where he specialized
in technical and architectural drawing but was unable to continue his studies
since his parents could not afford the cost. Jhon often complained about the
precarity of his position at the telecommunications office where he had already
been employed for nine years on a contractual basis when we first met. Nonetheless, during the time I spent doing fieldwork in Ambon, he managed to
build a house overlooking the bay in the attractive, tranquil neighborhood of
Amahusu with the money he earned from painting: “If you talk about pictures—goodness!” he exclaimed. “In Ambon alone I have so many pictures
that a gallery would not be able to hold them—at Batu Gantung, inside that
neighborhood, in the [inaudible] Church that was destroyed in the violence
of 2001–2002. [I paint] for Christmas, commonly for Easter, often at Christmas
to create its atmosphere.”6
In such conversations, Jhon always emphasized the religious underpinnings
of his work and, occasionally, its evangelical potential:
It’s like this—many of us have talents. A minister has the talent to give
sermons, to show people the true way, but I also have a talent, right?
The Lord gave it to me. It is [a talent expressed] through pictures, and
sometimes I think maybe those pictures can make people aware, that
is, via the pictures. What I mean is that place where we sat before that
used to be the hangout for kids, it was a mess—they would drink, get
into fights, make trouble, kids from here, youth. So I have a way that
might help them change. Maybe if I paint Jesus so that they can see
him—certainly there would be some feeling if they got drunk there
some time, if they kept creating trouble there. Perhaps that could work
in an indirect manner. My style is like that. I don’t know how to give
sermons. I can’t, but maybe through drawings. When it comes to
Ambonese, it is not certain that if we reprimand them they will pay
attention. It is not at all certain since they are tough, their character is
tough. But if we approach them like this, through hanging out, I hang
out with them. So when I do something, they want to do it. If we want
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to make a garden, I make it; if we want to make pictures, I make them.
And I say to them, “These are not just views or other kinds of pictures,
this is our Lord, right?”7
With this statement, made in lowered voice in respect of the Lord, Jhon
offered a twist, even a compromise, between the Calvinist claim that pictures
are “just pictures” and portrayals of Christian scenes that are not “just views”
but something more akin to sacred, efficacious presences. In the same interview, Jhon described the way he works and the kind of collaboration he had
with the motorbikers who not only sponsored the pictures but, before Christian
holidays, would clean and touch them up, string colored lanterns above them,
and tend to the narrow strips of grass that commonly run along the murals’
bases:
When I made the picture, I did not ask for payment. A payment would
have been in the thousands. [“How long did it take?” I asked.] It took
about two weeks. I would come home from work and paint until late
at night—on my days off, on Sundays, Saturdays, I painted and they
helped me. I told them to buy cigarettes, to get some drinks. We did
the base painting, they were the ones who painted the base, entirely
white. This was the way—after the base painting was done, I took the
picture of Jesus from his birth, I started with his birth, I painted his
birth. [“Where did you get the image?”] From a book. I actually forgot
this book in Kusukusu; I was painting there the other day and left it
behind. This painting was of Jesus’s life, I made him really big.8
Except for the academy-trained Pak Joseph, Victory was the only painter
who signed his pictures and, in his case, too, assumed a professional name. A
member of the GPM congregation like the majority of the city’s Protestants,
Victory never mentioned any religious motivation to his work, in contrast to
the other painters. Even on those occasions when a religious interpretation
might have been offered, religion was clearly not on his mind. For instance,
when I asked him about the six-pointed star that he had added to the Jesus face
on the wall at Belakang Soya, he claimed that the star had no particular significance. Rather, the Jesus face copied by one of the bikers from a T-shirt onto
the wall turned out “small.” By enclosing Christ’s face in a star, he had aimed
simply at achieving some kind of pictorial “balance.”9 In 2006, this most commercially minded among the city’s painters opened a roadside studio constructed, among other materials, from an immense billboard featuring the
faces of then Indonesian president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and his wife,
Kristiani. To form the rear wall of the structure, the billboard had been
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dismantled and reassembled with the incongruous result that Kristiani’s chin
and red lips ran vertically down one end of the wall while her eyes gazed out
oddly, one stacked above the other, from the other. Commissioned by the
Central Malukan governor’s office to be displayed at Ambon’s airport when
the presidential couple arrived, the billboard had not been claimed when the
visit was cancelled following the devastation of Aceh in North Sumatra by the
December 2004 tsunami. A sign with Leonar Tahalea’s professional name,
Victory, advertising his specialty, “Airbrush Painting”—a skill acquired during
the time he spent in Jakarta—hung next to the studio door (Figure 19). Occasionally, I saw business cards with “Victory ’72 Gallery” listing services like
“painting a portrait from a photograph” tacked up in stores in the predominantly
Christian part of the city. Victory charged considerably more for his work than
the other street painters, except presumably Pak Joseph, and could live on what
he earned from his work. This may be why the Christian mural at the Belakang
Soya bike stand was painted by no less than three men, including one of the
motorbikers, since commissioning Victory alone would presumably have been
too costly.
Victory’s thematic range also stood out from that of the others. Until I visited
his studio in 2006, I had always regarded him as just another of the city’s Christian street painters, which, of course, he also was. This meant that I was all the
more surprised when I visited his studio to see several kitschy, soft pornographic
paintings of seminaked women—one bare-breasted with a scrap of cloth loosely
draped around her hips standing defiantly in front of a dragon, another with a
huge snake coiling around her, yet another full-breasted mermaid with a Marilyn Monroe face, her back arched to further accentuate her breasts—propped
up against or hanging from the studio walls. Competing for attention in the
small, one-room studio was a crucified Jesus face positioned above the door
and another freshly painted Christ face that stood out on a white canvas where
the artist had recently begun to copy the image taped alongside it.
When I asked Victory about the paintings of the voluptuous, seminude
women that, like all of his work, was copied from examples, he showed no
sense of any contradiction between these paintings and his Christian ones.
Like the airbrushed Christ with a shepherd’s staff standing among a flock of
sheep, the pictures formed part of his expanding “collection” and were something new he was trying out. In my experience, even the motorbikers showed
some embarrassment if they were caught engaging in allegedly un-Christian
behavior in the vicinity of the street pictures. Once when I started to photograph the mural at a bike stand that I had visited many times before, several
young men quickly fled the scene, abandoning an open bottle of alcohol as

Figure 19. A composite image of the painter Victory’s studio and gallery, Ambon, 2006. Photos
by the author.
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they did. Certainly, some of the other men painted subjects that were not overtly
Christian—faces of political leaders and logos of the political parties that
mushroomed in Indonesia after the downfall of the authoritarian regime, murals supporting soccer teams, with the Dutch national Orange team a favorite
among Christians, scenic views or motifs taken from local culture commissioned to beautify karaoke bars and hotel lounges. Still, they did not paint
images that seemed so directly to contradict predominant sensibilities of Christian morality and modesty.
In stark contrast to Victory, Pak Joseph, who described himself as a teacher
of the arts in Ambon, spoke of his Christian paintings as a form of Pentecostal
witnessing. During the series of interviews we conducted in his home, his
conversion from being “just your ordinary Christian” or GPM Protestant to
“living according to what is written in God’s commandment” inflected our
exchange.10 Pak Joseph’s personal history was especially wrenching. The narrow
escape from death as he and his family managed, almost miraculously, to flee
their burning home when it was set on fire by Muslims as they hid within, the
destruction of the family home and gallery that held his life’s work, comprised
what Pak Joseph referred to only obliquely as “the event.”
Whenever we met, it was amid the tangible signs of his charismatic religion,
as even the terrain surrounding Pak Joseph’s home had been turned into a
space for witnessing “what is written in God’s commandment.” A white sign,
for instance, occupying a prominent place next to a well read in bold letters:
“Do unto others as you would have done to you. Matthew 7:12.” Besides being
a material form of witnessing, the sign was meant to encourage Pak Joseph’s
neighbors to safeguard the cleanliness of the place. Witnessing and quoting
scripture punctuated his speech. At times, he disparaged his former religion,
positively contrasting, for instance, his second baptism to his first as like “that
of old-style Christians with a full dunking, not just a sprinkling of water.”11
Apart from the conventional Pentecostal attunement to the written and spoken
biblical word, Pak Joseph ended one of our conversations by emphasizing his
vocation as a painter and the “more attractive” power of pictures over words.
Drawing himself up in his chair, he pronounced: “Conclusion: the news of
salvation comes not only through the blessings conveyed by God’s servants,
via sermons or witnessing, but it also comes through paintings. It is through
these that I myself offer a witnessing to salvation for peoples of all ethnicities
who have not yet heard God’s Commandment.”12
Pak Joseph related how, following his conversion, he felt the need to adopt
a style that he deemed more suitable for portraying the subject matter of the
apocalypse, including the onslaught of crises and devastation in Indonesia
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that he believed augured the Christian end-time. In the home where he settled
with his family following several displacements, I saw paintings cataloging
traditional Malukan life and folkloric themes like sago roasting, fishnet making,
and the bird of paradise dance, along with nationalist portrayals of state-
endorsed ethnicities. These works, that he described as “naturalistic,” harkened
back to the time he was a state employee as director of Ambon’s Siwalima
Museum (Figure 20). This style contrasted with the “surrealism” of his more
recent religious paintings with the shift from naturalism to surrealism dictated,
as he explained, by the “supernatural” character of his new religious subject
matter. Apart from Ambon’s violence, Pak Joseph singled out the October 2002
terrorist bombings in Bali’s tourist resort, Kuta, as an important impetus to his
adoption of a surrealistic style. For him, as for others in Maluku with an apocalyptic bent of mind, the numerous incidents of violence around the archipelago, along with disasters like earthquakes and the tsunami that followed the
serial crises accompanying Suharto’s downfall, evidenced the thick, calamitous
conditions of an imminent Christian end-time.13
Like Pak Joseph, other painters often invoked the special appeal or power
of pictures, distinguishing their effect from that of texts or words. While watching television one evening with his family in Seram, Pak Nus Tamaela remarked,
as his grandchildren played around us, how much he loved to paint.14 Besides
the presence of the television, this observation may have in part been provoked

Figure 20. The two paintings on the left are “naturalistic” depictions of traditional Malukan
life, according to the painter. The one on the right falls within his “surrealistic” style. It
indexes Mazmur 133 from the Bible (“Behold, how good and pleasant [it is] for brethren to
dwell together in unity”) and Ibu Pertiwi, a personification of the Indonesian motherland.
As a whole, the painting on the right is a graphic interpretation of the Indonesian Republic’s
motto “Unity in Diversity.” Paintings by Lamberth Joseph, Ambon, 2005. Photos by the author.
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by the box of Dutch Rembrandt paint that I had brought him from Amsterdam
along with some fine Belgian linen canvas, a gift from my father—a painter,
like Pak Nus, in his eighties at the time. “Painting is great,” Pak Nus offered,
“I just love doing it.”15 “When people watch television, they watch the stories
but I watch the images.” Picking up on the thread of our conversation, his son,
Chris, a GPM minister and ethnomusicologist, mentioned a picture of his
own—“just a sketch,” he said, “on an A4 sheet of paper”—that he would show
me when we were back in Ambon. Chris went on to describe his charcoal
drawing depicting Lord Jesus embracing five children, each representing some
aspect of Maluku’s cultural and ethnic diversity. “People are tired of talking
about reconciliation,” Chris remarked, justifying his preference for pictures
or, equally important for him, music over words. “Let us embrace each other,
pictures work well with the pela song,” he went on, referring to a song about
the traditional blood brotherhood canonically identified with Christian-Muslim
alliances that he had composed during the conflict and that he claimed was
still used in reconciliation events.
“When I made this drawing,” he said, “I was very moved. People’s imagination may be triggered by sentences but with pictures . . . It is good,” he
continued, if “there are pictures in the streets.”16 Their presence in urban space,
following Chris, would allow for “repetition” since people would pass by the
pictures on a daily basis. Adding to this insight on the effects of the pictures’
publicity, Chris confided that he hoped to enlarge his Jesus picture and display
it in places like Indonesia’s National Library where many people would see it.
Below, I discuss the drawing that Chris showed me when we returned to Ambon
and how he connected it to Indonesia’s national ideology Pancasila, or the Five
Points conveyed by the five Malukan children that he pictured in Christ’s
embrace. This proposed painting, like one by his father, Pak Nus, conjoins
symbols of the nation with the portrayal of a brown Malukan Christ and, in
doing so, proposes a connection between Christianity, the Indonesian nation,
and Malukan identity.
Given the interest in and deep commitment to the study of Malukan culture
on the part of both men, Christ’s portrayal as indigenous is hardly surprising.
Before his death in April 2020, Chris taught church music, liturgy, and Christian art, as well as Malukan culture, at UKIM. In 2015 he defended his PhD
at Amsterdam’s orthodox Calvinist Free University, titled “Contextualization
of Music and Liturgy in the Moluccan Church, with Special Reference to the
Protestant Church of the Moluccas.” In an interview at the time with a Dutch
Malukan magazine, a fellow minister recalled a service led by Minister Chris
in one of the region’s languages and how the women in charge of the collection
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wore clothing from Tanimbar, a southeastern Malukan island known for its
exquisite woven textiles.17
Like his son, Pak Nus dedicated much of his life to the study and promotion
of Malukan culture. Following his retirement in 1971 as the director of Seram
Island’s only prison, he devoted his life to the documentation of Seramese
culture. Until his death in 2017, he produced prolifically—building and expanding the collection of his Seram culture museum, specializing in portraits
and sculptures of headhunters and ethnographically inspired, if somewhat
sensationalist, scenes of the ancestral life of the island’s indigenous peoples.
In addition to his multimedia archiving of Seram’s ancient life, Pak Nus ran a
musical group, designed the costumes and props for performances, and exhibited his work in cultural events around Maluku. His fascination for headhunting
and claim to know “all its secrets”—knowledge he said he acquired during the
patrols he made as prison director in Seram’s hinterlands—fueled his ongoing
project of creative documentation: the statues, portraits of famed war captains,
and quasi-ethnographic cameos of native life depicting hunting practices, lice-
picking scenes, life-cycle rituals, menstruation huts, trophy heads, and even
marriage ceremonies centered improbably upon a skull as bridewealth.18 This
collection became the object of an iconoclastic attack around the time that
violence spread from Ambon to Soahuku on Seram Island. I discuss this event
elsewhere, the only one of its kind that I am aware of during the violence in
Maluku.19
When I first visited Pak Nus in 2005, he had only recently resumed his artistic work. Among the pictures of the partly renewed museum collection were
several portraying the violence as it had affected the predominantly Christian
town of Soahuku and Christians more generally. The most striking among
several Christian-themed pictures portrayed a brown Christ in a scene of religiously marked violence holding a burning church and a bible in his raised
hands (Figure 21). Apart from the brown Christ, the entire painting is rendered
in the colors of the Indonesian flag, known simply as the red and white. Another
painting showed people fording a river as Christ beckoned to them from the
opposite bank, a harrowing scene of displacement that recalled that of Pak Nus
and his family when they were driven out of their home by jihadis (Figure 22).
In what follows, on a tour of Ambon’s street gallery, I consider more closely
some of the street paintings—including the indigenous Christ drawing by
Minister Chris. Although Christ, especially his face, is a recurrent feature in
all of them, the pictures evidence the creative heterogeneity of Christian world-
making via these painted landscapes that sprung up in Ambon’s streets during
and after the war.

Figure 21. Indigenous Malukan Christ with his clothing and other elements rendered
in the red and white colors of the Indonesian national flag. Painting by Nus Tamaela,
Soahuku, 2005. Photo by the author.

Figure 22. Christian-themed paintings in the yard of Pak Nus Tamaela’s home in Soahuku, Seram Island. The picture at the center reads: “Oh God, please hide me from
the violence.” The painting on the left shows a mother consoling her child whose
father has been killed. The one on the right, titled “Tears Shed at Christmas,” enumerates the many sources of grief and suffering caused by the violence. Paintings by
Nus Tamaela, Soahuku, 2005. Photo by the author.
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Landscape I: Christian Enclave
Tucked away in a Christian neighborhood in the hills overlooking the city, the
minuscule prayer room in a Protestant minister’s home is painted entirely from
floor to ceiling. Forming a single, unbroken surface, it envelops those who
enter the room to pray within a miniature Gethsemane Garden.20 On the far
wall that is the room’s immediate focus when one enters, Jesus Christ prays in
profile against a shiny green background. Although lavishly sprinkled with
flowers and boasting luxuriant vegetation, incongruous rock formations, an
occasional palm or olive tree, and a few stiff, glossy sheep, the remaining three
walls are predominantly green. Not a single spot has been overlooked—even
the door to the room has been painted over to resemble a cave. Bent on ensuring its Gethsemane effect, the minister took care to plant leafy green trees in
his garden immediately outside the room’s only window. Since the room’s decor
is also minimal, there is little to distract one’s eyes from the painted surroundings so that the gaze tends to gravitate toward the quiet, silhouetted Jesus bent
in prayer. This directionality, along with the shiny seamlessness of the space,
may be one reason why the sense of closeness and of being physically held in
Christ’s hands is one of the room’s celebrated effects—and something the
minister, his family, and, reportedly, those congregation members who come
for counseling continually remarked upon (Figure 23).
The moment we enter the special room, the minister explained, it’s as
if we are in his hands. There are olive trees painted there. And there
is a painting of Jesus praying. And if we open the window, I planted
some green trees outside, so if we pray with the windows open one
feels as if one is praying in his hands. And my desire was like that,
Ma’am. I created an atmosphere in the prayer room like that of the
Garden of Gethsemane. . . . It happened that in the magazine Gloria
there is a photo of the Garden of Gethsemane with those olive trees.
I said, “Please paint like this. I want a picture with the atmosphere of
Gethsemane.”21
There is a strong sense here of a sacred landscape, a poignant, immersive surround dedicated to prayer and connected to the powerful scene of Christ
praying immediately before his arrest and martyrdom. Yet while some Congregationalists may be invited into the prayer room, the majority of those who
consult the minister do so in the reception room that one enters upon coming
into the house. On the wall opposite the door, an immense Jesus rises behind
some chairs with his arms extending to the viewer. When I first visited the
minister at his office at the GPM’s Maranatha church, he mentioned the
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painting, emphasizing how it is “truly full of love and care,” conjuring in a
somewhat different register another affectively potent scene. As we sat before
it in his home some weeks later, he expanded on this dimension:
After Jhon finished painting [the Christ wall], this room began to be
used for counseling and everyone who came here felt really pleased.
Before a person would even be involved in the counseling, as soon as
he sat down with whatever troubles he had, he would feel very relieved. “Pak Minister, the atmosphere is deliciousssss . . .” It was as if
the painting . . . helped him so that he felt there was assistance in an
indirect fashion.
Although the painting in the foyer has a soothing atmosphere, it pales by
comparison with the effects of the room set aside for prayer. To enter this special room is to leave one world behind and be enclosed in another, a Christian
elsewhere that bears only an oblique, tenuous connection to the first.22 The
existence and circulation of such Christian elsewheres and sacred sites or,
differently, those of other religious traditions, like Islam, are, in themselves,
not remarkable.23 During Ambon’s war, several Gaza Strips divided the city
into Christian and Muslim territories, while identification with Israel, in the
case of the former, and Palestine and, to a lesser extent, Egypt, in the case of
the latter, was a recurrent inspiration for graffiti and T-shirt designs, and a
common reference in conversation. Given that Scripture and Christian and
Jewish traditions carry with them a certain geography, it is natural for them to
employ this geography when they occupy the regions these describe.24 Along
with this inbuilt portable geography, the religious universality of Christian holy
places like Rome or Jerusalem, along with affect-laden sites such as Gethsemane, is one that moves them beyond any linguistic or geographical specificity,
making it “difficult for them to be circumscribed within entirely regional, not
to mention national, geographies.”25
Notwithstanding such mobility, what strikes one is the careful hedging of
such circulation, the carving out of a cave-like enclosure, and the creation of
a miniature Christian enclave cut off and framed apart from the world outside.
An inherently defensive stance animates the hermetically designed prayer
room—one that, highly efficacious, enables sensuous immersion in a purified
Christianity that can trigger the experience of being embraced by God. The
Protestant minister’s prayer room, or otherworldly enclave that lovingly encloses
and physically extracts those who pray within from the world outside, also
Figure 23. Composite image of a painted wall in the reception area of a Protestant minister’s
home overlaid with scenes of the adjacent prayer room, Ambon, 2006. Photos by the author.
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echoes the widespread, postconflict desire to turn time back, to reclaim Ambon
as a city with a “Christian impression about it,” one dominated politically, economically, and culturally well into the 1990s by Protestant Ambonese.26 But if
before the war a taken-for-granted and hence unmarked Christian hegemony
characterized the city, the restoration by Protestants of Ambon’s previous Christian look took place as a commanding, aggressively marked Christianity lining
its streets and sidewalks.
Apart from nostalgia and the effects of the recent war, the siege mentality
prevalent among Ambon’s Protestants had to do with the changing nature and
physical transformation of public space in Indonesia generally and, in particular, the enhanced public visibility—tantamount to a visibility contest27—of
the nation’s religious composition following the New Order’s end. Already from
the 1990s when the Suharto regime adopted policies promoting Indonesia’s
Islamicization,28 scholars began to write of a burgeoning “public Islam”—singling out its salient visible, audible, and physical presence in Indonesia and
beyond, beginning with the 1979 Iranian revolution and enhanced by more
recent events.29 In the streets of Ambon and across Indonesia, Islam’s indisputable presence registers visibly and audibly in the many new mosques being
built, the popularity of Qur’anic reading sessions and typical Muslim fashions,
the rise in the number of Indonesian Muslims performing the hajj (increasingly
at a younger age), the popular Muslim boy bands and celebrity preachers, the
resurgence of Islamic print media and the spread of Islamic economic institutions, the expansion of da’wa or proselytizing into new terrain like cyber-da’wa
and cellular da’wa, and the theatrical, public aggression of militant Islamic
groups like the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, or FPI).30 None
of this has been lost on Ambon’s Christians. Or, as the GPM minister with the
home prayer room volunteered, characterizing the city’s street pictures as a
direct parallel to this public Islam, “It’s the same. They don’t make pictures
much, but they wear headscarves as their own kind of special characteristic.
To show that ‘we are Muslims.’ Yes, that’s what stands out.”31
In his rationale of the Christian pictures—including, presumably, the painted
surround of his home prayer room—the minister marshaled a sea of Muslim
headscarves as that which “stands out” but also, by implication, that which the
pictures somehow counter. Indexical of the very fact of Muslim presence in
Indonesia, the myriad headscarves enfold a host of Christian anxieties and
concerns, including the overwhelming numerical dominance of Muslims in
the country (some 90 percent of the total population), the visible dominance
of Islam around the archipelago, the substitution of Muslims for Christians
in Ambon and Maluku province’s civil bureaucracies, and the widespread
conviction among Christians during the conflict that they were the target of
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a Muslim-driven genocide. But this image also reveals a secondary order or
invisible backdrop that needs to be taken into account as a force feeding and
energizing the affective intensities and enormous investment of Christians in
the scenes with which they surrounded themselves and took solace during and
after the war. As has been suggested for colonial photographs, backdrops may
be twofold: the first a visible backdrop and the second an invisible one, a secondary order that shapes the interpretation of the image’s intended audience
or addressees.32 It is the latter, the secondary backdrop of sheer Muslim domination and numerical force in Indonesia, briefly made visible in the minister’s
evocation of a sea of headscarves, that haunts the prayer room and that it is
designed to invisibilize and keep away.
To pray in the miniature Gethsemane Garden is to enter into a kind of tête-
à-tête that realizes itself through the embodied mimicry of the painted God’s
gestures on the part of the person praying and can lead to being swept up in
this physical exchange by the incredible sensation that one is caught protectively in his hands. Together with the unbroken seamlessness of the space, this
sensation seems to be an effect of being momentarily suspended and closed
off from any outside surroundings. With leafy trees planted immediately outside
the prayer room’s windows, even the city’s invisible backdrop can briefly be
held at bay. In its place, a delicate and moving closeness comes to the fore that
the minister’s wife was at a loss of words to describe—one in which the room’s
painted backdrop forecloses the invisible one pressing in from the outside,
thereby allowing those praying in the foreground to merge tenderly with the
affectively powerful Christian scene.
I began this tour of Ambon’s urban gallery with the minister’s home prayer
room because it offers the most condensed and, in some respects therefore,
clearest expression of the larger Christian landscape that spread more diffusely
in the city, carried by the pictures that arose in Ambon’s streets. It is one in
which Ambonese aimed to gather an affectively charged visual Christian world
around themselves, hence the comments I often heard that singled out the
pictures’ “comforting” or “soothing” nature as well as the need for their multiple large-scale presence and ongoing reiteration. Itself an image, this landscape
is mediated by a Christian canon that, while formerly identified with intimacy
and interiority—indeed, the prayer room enhances, even exaggerates these
effects—and, as such, a long-standing conventional feature of the city’s more
domesticated Christian spaces, was stood on its head when Protestants began
to picture Christ in Ambon’s streets. It is worth considering how the pictures’
prior association with the more intimate spaces of the Christian everyday
may have contributed to their appeal. As the images moved out of houses
and stores and grew in size, they did not displace the earlier calendars, posters,
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or embroidered Last Supper scenes but merely supplemented them. Given this
trajectory, the pictures in the streets and in the prayer room may still somewhat
retain the promise and buttress the performance of a Christian Ambonese
subject as visually construed in familiar, comfortable, and essentially interiorized surroundings—even as these surroundings were stretched in entirely new
directions. At issue, then, in some basic sense, would be a new acute awareness
of the subject’s emplacement within a field of vision.33 It is even possible to sense
this awareness in the paintings of Christ hovering over the embattled city,
since there, too, the desire is that his partisan gaze will recognize and protect
the Protestants. In this example, as in the defensive stance evidenced by the
prayer room, this awareness is also one that acknowledges, explicitly or implicitly, the precarity of this emplacement. At the same time, the prayer room offers
a specific sense of refuge from the war-torn environment and even communion
with the Christian God.

Landscape II: Pancasila Jesus
If the previous landscape was faithful to globalized Christian print culture,
the following on this truncated tour of the painted postwar city departs explicitly from the canon that, by and large, figured as the reference for Ambon’s
new pictures. This landscape is deceiving in its simplicity—“just a sketch on
an A4 sheet of paper” made at the height of the war by the GPM minister Chris
Tamaela. “It was 2002, Ma’am, Good Friday,” Chris began. “The war was going
on and I made this. I drew this at the time.”34 Rendered in charcoal, the drawing shows a cluster of six figures at its center, boldly outlined against the white
page—a swarthy Christ bends over protectively, enclosing five children in his
arms, clothed in traditional Malukan dress. One or two are possible to identify
with specific regions; others evoke a more generic sense of custom (Figure 24).
The drawing is captioned in Ambonese Malay: “Our Sweet Father lovingly
embraces the children of Maluku.” Echoing the conversation we had in Seram
when the drawing first came up, Chris highlighted the Malukan appearance
of Christ:
Why did I depict Jesus as a Malukan? Because I thought this Jesus
would be closer, we would feel his presence more in our lives, more in
us. . . . There is no problem even if Jesus has a European face. I can
see this is my God, my Jesus. But I thought, well, maybe, maybe also
. . . I can feel the presence of Jesus with the face of an Ambonese. I
feel that Jesus is really concerned with the lives of us Malukans. Jesus
knows exactly what Malukans are like—their attitude, their lives, the
way they live. So I believe that Jesus can know our Malukan language;
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he can speak Ambonese Malay. If we say “to embrace” in Ambonese
Malay he understands [that we mean] “to embrace” in Indonesian. I
know that Jesus can know all of our languages. Jesus also knows how
to eat cassava. Jesus knows how to eat sago; we eat sago porridge together. Jesus knows how to eat the pickled vegetables like the ones
Ma’am eats. So Jesus can feel the hunger of Malukan children. When
we cry, we call out to Jesus in our own language. We suffered from the

Figure 24. Pancasila Christ. Drawing by Christian Izaac Tamaela, dated “Good Friday.
31-03-2002.” The caption in Ambonese Malay reads: “Our dear God embraces the children
of Maluku.” Photo by the author, Ambon, 2005.
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violence. Jesus embraces us, he cares for us. So this is what I think. . . .
I already did this with music.35
And he broke into a song about the Holy Ghost, with refrains in Ambonese
Malay. As Chris spoke, visibly moved, he wove song, drumming, myriad voices
and local expressions, costume pieces, and other custom-marked paraphernalia
through his multiply mediated performance, creating, in so doing, a deeply
embodied, sensually vivid, vernacular Malukan world. Set off and reiterated
by the drawing, this world unfolded and expanded narratively as Jesus’s name
became sutured to predicates that in quick succession mapped this world by
drawing the Christian God near and folding him into “the lives of us Malukans.” With extreme tenderness, the performance developed a far-reaching
physiognomic and physical identification with a Malukan Christ, the image
of which looked up at us from the floor. In Chris’s rendition, this Christ is one
who not only resembles you physically but, with a breathtaking intimacy, knows
and tastes the food in your mouth, has your language on his lips, feels the
weight and texture of your clothing on his skin; he is someone who moves,
breathes, and lives alongside and within you.
Different from though echoing the physical tête-à-tête of the prayer room,
this poetic world-making issues not in any enclave but in a densely knit landscape conjoining God and humans, accomplished by riveting Christ as an
“inner presence, present during the violence, quite internal to me” at its core.
It is exemplary of the intimate, affective, libidinal dimension that makes the
divine accessible to devotees “as an empathetic presence,” something that other
painters evoked in their pictures, if not always as explicitly or in such localized
terms.36 Yet Chris’s ambition, articulated the same evening, to disseminate his
drawing widely, to blow it up to a grand size and display it in Indonesia’s National Library in Jakarta, belies or at least complicates this inward-looking,
small-scale vision, as does his understanding of the children caught in Christ’s
embrace. While Malukan in appearance, this drawing also folds the state ideology of the Five Points (Pancasila) within this image of local tradition and
paternal shepherding. Pointing to the drawing, Chris indicated how the children number five and thereby invoke not only Pancasila but especially its first
point, the belief in one Supreme Being, and, through it, the obligatory allegiance for Indonesian citizens to one of the five allegedly monotheistic religions recognized by the state: Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism,
and Buddhism.37 Not coincidentally, the New Order state threw up large billboards around the archipelago, showcasing religious harmony as the benign
cohabitation of the five religions. From this perspective, the picture with the
emblematic little group boldly outlined in charcoal as a unitary form presents
an unambiguous image of a state-endorsed Pancasila Christ.
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Yet for Chris, not only the portrayal of state-endorsed religion or the richness
of Malukan tradition had motivated him but especially the quality of the relationships between Christ and the children, as well as among the children
themselves:
Ma’am, see how they face each other, the one looks at the other, not
all are looking ahead. They are asking each other, their faces—one
smiles, another looks a bit wary. “Why? Why must I suffer? Why must
I become a refugee? I have done nothing wrong.” My father is wrong,
the government is wrong, or the church is wrong. Or our congregation. Don’t blame them [gestures to his sketch]. But then there is one
who smiles. Another is like, “Well, we have to be patient.” Yet another
says, “Quiet!” To give hope, still another is like, “OK, then I will have
to be patient.” And another looks ahead, full of hope . . . And this is
characteristic . . . I intended to blow this picture up to remind [people],
I wanted to put this everywhere to show that this Jesus is a universal
Jesus. How can we divide Jesus’s good will—yes, his good intentions
toward everyone?38
What I especially want to highlight is the multiplicity of perspectives—indeed,
of opinion and experience—the diversity of temporalities and directions, and
the movement among widely divergent scales envisioned in Chris’s interpretation of his drawing. Besides Christ’s enveloping embrace, the picture’s Ambonese Malay caption would anchor, in Barthesian fashion, the circuit of visual
exchange, mutual gazes, and dispersed looks and tie these to a tradition-bound
local world.39 Yet even at this tightly contextualized level, Christ contracts and
expands simultaneously as he inhabits the Malukan subject’s image and invokes
the objects—language, food, clothing, and custom—that progressively materialize a Malukan lifeworld that, mediated by Christ, appears limitless, even
universal. As for the children, their own diversity—underscored by Chris when
he noted the divergence in their gaze, attention, attitudes, and aspirations—
threatens to overrule or at least displace the unity that keeps them together.
Admittedly, this is my interpretation and one that I doubt Chris would have
shared. Still, his insistence on such divergence is striking.
If, in part, this Pancasila Christ stands in for the Indonesian state—visualizing the political theology of the paternalistic authority encompassing innocuous diversity on which this state, especially under the New Order, was
based—the binaries of state and citizen, unity and diversity, Godhead and
religious subject neither neatly subsume nor summarize the relationships or
visual field at issue here. Christ’s gaze may be steady and close, but those of
his children are more dispersed—they look at each other but also away; one
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appears wary, another hopeful, still another waits patiently, her eyes on the
future. If recognition by authority—albeit as a loving, empathetic presence—is
visualized here, there also appears room for imagining a less hierarchical exchange that not only acknowledges a diversity of experience and subject positions but is neither exclusively dependent on nor mediated by authority.
In this respect, Chris’s drawing may be described as both foundational and
discreetly revolutionary in its novel vision of a Pancasila-informed Indonesia.
This is so because the visuality that figures centrally in this drawing is multidirectional and open-ended: folded into some elastic version of the Malukan
local, it stretches the regional through the national and toward the universal,
spilling over the mobile borders of this loosely centered visual field with an
indeterminate excess. Nor is the excess that I identify in the drawing all that
different from the future that the children, following Chris, embody or from
the multiple scales and directions—and therefore, too, signifying capacities—
that are mediated by the Pancasila Christ. Put otherwise, if Chris’s Good Friday
picture has anything to do with the Indonesian state ideology of Pancasila,
then it is one that—unwittingly perhaps—is being submitted to a radical re-
vision, one that intimates a shift from a vertical authoritarian model of connection to another that envisages a horizontality issuing in an expanding array
of subject positions and more empathetic mutuality.40

Landscape III: Sidewalk Citizenship
In the third stop on our tour, I turn to the street where the large majority of
Ambon’s Christian pictures emerged. The painted landscapes that I have considered thus far—the prayer room and the Pancasila Jesus sketch, both the
initiative of GPM ministers—are more inward-looking than those in the streets,
although the latter share their interiorizing impulse. Not surprisingly, however,
the hijacked billboards and public walls tagged along Ambon’s highways and
at Christian neighborhood gateways decidedly win in spectacularity. In Indonesia, this is also due to the startling publicity that the pictures accord to religion. In Ambon, specifically, what stands out as especially provocative within
the volatile conditions of the postwar is the explicit promotion of Protestant
Christianity, along with the pictures’ immense scale and direct, in-your-face
mode of address. Also remarkable, as discussed in the previous chapter, is the
acute combination of territoriality and mobility condensed in the loci where
the public pictures first arose, notably the motorbike stands and neighborhood
gateways that mediate between what, for all practical purposes, are gated
Christian enclaves and the larger city and island beyond. It is worth pointing out
that neighborhoods in Muslim areas, even as they often had their own motorbike
stands and gateways, did not brand themselves religiously in the same way.
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This is hardly surprising, given that among Muslims there was neither an aim
to recuperate a position of dominance nor the same urgency to be recognized
and seen as among the Protestants.
Like the minister’s prayer room, the street pictures conjure a series of elsewheres or “comforting,” exclusively Christian scenes that efface the Muslim as
they bring the Protestant Christian forcefully and unequivocally into view. Yet,
unlike the minister’s prayer room, these images are out in the street in full view
of everyone who passes them by. And they are impossible not to see. This assertive public presence has several important implications. Representationally, the
Christian scenes imaged on city walls articulate a desire on the part of their
makers to fence themselves off from the surrounding world as they gesture to
an elsewhere of Christian recognition and redemption entirely devoid of Muslims. At the same time, as material artifacts and potent ideological statements,
the pictures open themselves up to the world around them and, by extension,
to risk and contestation. What comes to mind here is less a Christian enclave
sealed off from alien surroundings than something more akin to the decor of a
bike stand envisioned by a motorbike-taxi driver for the upcoming Christmas
celebration: not only were the mural and adjacent Christ billboard due for an
annual “refreshening,” but cords of lanterns would be strung along the road
leading up into the hills “to the left and to the right like the lights on either side
of an airport runway.”41 This exuberant vision of the bike stand as a point of
departure for an expansive, spectacular mobility belies its more commonplace
status, both prior to the war in Ambon and around the archipelago where, taken
for granted, the descendants of the Javanese guardhouse tend to blend into their
surroundings and remain, by and large, even for scholars, minute constructions
at the margin of the architecturally monumental.42 In Ambon, however, the
Christian guardhouses-cum-motorbike-taxi stands—flanked by monumental
pictures and, in the mid-2000s, still reminiscent of the interreligious war—ran
little risk of being overlooked. Most importantly, once they were out in public
demanding attention, the pictures opened themselves not only to all kinds of
risks but also to refiguration. In the imagination of at least one biker, the airport runway he envisioned held the possibility of a dramatic takeoff and tantalizing journey beyond the everyday troubles and pain of the postwar.
Such striking openness also marks the other street pictures. I consider first
one example that, owing to its complexity, helps to highlight the tendencies of
others in the street. The cluster that I call a triptych—three adjacent paintings
comprising a mural with a series of canonical scenes summarizing Christ’s
life, a huge cameo portrait of Jesus as a young man, and a billboard showing him
looking down on a globe turned to Maluku—faces the motorbike-taxi stand
opposite at the crossroads of a road leading into a Christian neighborhood and
a busy highway that skirts the city’s coast (Figures 25 and 26). Reflective, in this

Figure 25. Painted billboard of Christ overlooking a globe turned to Ambon and the neighboring islands, which previously faced a motorbike-taxi stand, Ambon, 2005. Photo by the author.

Figure 26. Crossroads with the motorbike-taxi stand where the billboard once stood next
to a painted mural of scenes from Christ’s life and a portrait of Jesus, Ambon, 2006. Photos
by the author.
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respect, of the motorbike stand’s general environment and the urban crossroads
at which they stand is the strong sense of movement that animates these images.
The hijacked billboard conjoins the movement of the rotating globe with that
of God’s eye homing in on an acute situation. It recalls the establishing shot
of many a news feature—including the Indonesian national television station’s
primetime news program under Suharto—in which the image of a globe turns
to zoom in on a particular location or hot spot where something newsworthy
is taking place. The wider sense across the nation that, following Suharto’s
resignation, the eye of the international community was upon them also appears to inform this image,43 as does Ambon’s intense wartime mediation by
national and international media representatives, humanitarian aid workers,
NGOs, and other visitors to the city. Seen in this light, it is perhaps telling that
the picture that captures the precise moment in which Maluku visually enters
the Christian world stage, showing Christ looking down on the globe as Ambon
Island has seemingly just rotated into view, was cast by the stand’s motorbikers
as the city’s first one.
By the time I arrived in Ambon in 2005, this billboard had been removed
from its scaffolding and propped up at the end of a private driveway. Two reasons were given for its removal: the scaffolding had rusted but the time had
also come for more “soothing” public scenes, ones that did not, in other words,
directly reference the war. The narrative of Jesus’s life counts as such a soothing
scene due to its contrast with the pictures preceding it, whether those showing
Christian Ambonese under siege or incendiary wartime graffiti sprayed on city
walls. But this narrative is also soothing because, as I suggested before, its canonical images inflect the Christian interiors that they relinquished for the
street. Equally importantly, the visual unfolding of Christ’s life along familiar
lines is similarly soothing in its normative predictability. It is for this reason, I
suspect, that the scenes out of which the mural is composed did not change
their general outlines but were commonly retouched or underwent a change
of color in anticipation of the Christian holidays.
What did change, and was a privileged object of attention, is the Jesus portrait that is either inserted into or superimposed onto the visual narrative of his
life. Thus, I have photographs of different portraits dating from 2003 and 2006,
respectively. While both visually mark their difference in relation to the canonical backdrop, the first, from 2003, achieves this effect through the portrait’s
carefully painted serrated frame, while its successor appears frayed at the edges
(Figure 27). The painter Jhon invoked the worn edges of old parchment to
explain this distinctive feature. Specifically, he recalled how Romans in films
present their official proclamations on unfurled pieces of parchment that are
read out in public. Indeed, Jhon took me to see faded walls around the city
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Figure 27. Painted mural with portraits of Jesus Christ, Ambon 2003 (left) and 2005 (right).
Photos by the author.

where, early in the conflict, he had painted Christ surrounded by Roman soldiers. But whether visually explicit or implicit, the Romans—or state power
and authority—remain part of the picture. Equally importantly, the parchment
model is a fitting one for Ambon’s monumental Jesus pictures. What this comparison makes clear is how the enormous Jesus faces in Ambon’s streets authoritatively proclaim to all passersby, “This is he—and, by the same token,
this is [the Ambonese Christian] me.” What these cameos codify, in other
words, is the precise moment of recognition, the dramatic “That’s him!” of
identification.44
This interpretation is supported by the painter Jhon’s spontaneous exegesis
of the cameo Jesus face—revealing specifically how this face, while inevitably
European, is nonetheless caught within a crucial relay based on its likeness
with that of Protestant Ambonese.
There are many different versions, no? In Europe they say his face
looks like this, in America they say it looks like that—maybe different.
There are many, many appearances, right? . . . Earlier I said that we
humans are created alike and in the image of God. This means that
his nose, his mouth, his eyes are like ours. It doesn’t matter then what
kind of appearance [it is]; maybe it’s not like mine, but the important
thing is that it is alike and in our image. This is the essence for me,
this in itself is what makes me paint. So sometimes people say, “Hey,
here Jesus has a different face, this Jesus face is different,” [but I answer] “No, that’s not true, that face is also like your face, right? It also
has a nose, it also has a mouth, it also has eyes, the point being: the
face of Jesus is like your face.”45

Figure 28. Painted mural with scenes from Jesus Christ’s life, Ambon, 2003. Photos by
the author.
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Invoking the Biblical dictate that God created man in his own image, Jhon
inverts its directionality—the Christ face, he insists, “is alike and in our image.”
This is a departure from the biblical formulation in Genesis that he invoked
in the same conversation: “Then God said, Let us make man in our image,
after our likeness” (Genesis 1:26). Yet, in his rendition of this formulation, Ambonese do not appear in the image of God. Tellingly, the image of God is
“alike” and in the image of Ambonese. This identification of God with Ambonese is so important to Jhon that he claims that this is what makes him paint.
At the very least, his insistence reveals the desire to establish a tight relay between God and Ambonese that Jhon claims performatively against a host of
imagined objections—from persons who claim Christ’s European face is unlike
“our” Malukan face, to others who marshal the sheer diversity of available
Christ images from around the world, to the existence of European versus
American representations of Christ’s appearance. All such potential objections
destabilize Jhon’s effort to posit an unequivocal identification based on the
recognition of similitude connecting the Christian God to the city’s Protestants.
If the basic purpose of realistic portraits of persons and landscapes is that of
establishing likeness—specifically here, a true likeness connecting Ambonese
and the Christ portraits in the street, which were held, as far as I could tell, to
be realistic portrayals by ordinary Protestants—then Jhon’s imaginary exchange
served to buttress the closure that would prevent any skepticism from intruding
between Protestants and the God in whose image they alleged themselves to
be made.46
Yet, what Jhon’s unwitting reversal of the biblical formulation intimates is
an equivocation in the place of authority. Rather than authority being there
to acknowledge Ambon’s Protestants as “in our image, after our likeness,” Jhon
can only insist that “the face of Jesus is like your face.” But his assertion involves
hedging a slew of doubts that might be raised vis-à-vis this claim. What the
reversal between God and Christians, original and copy, hints at is the mounting uncertainty regarding the place and futurity of Protestants in Indonesia,
one that ensues from a troubling equivocation or looseness in their long taken-
for-granted source of identity and recognition.
This is probably why the identificatory circuit that Jhon aimed to establish
between the Ambonese Christian man-in-the-street—not the least the motorbikers themselves—and a transcendent authority via his Christ portrait appears
to be modeled on the Indonesian citizen’s identity card (Kartu Tanda Penduduk,
or KTP). A critical material token of proper belonging, the KTP lists not only
the requisite religious affiliation but also, under Suharto, things like the officially designated “former political prisoner” that marked people for life as
politically suspect. The KTP identity photograph, until not too long ago the
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only one that people might have of themselves or a loved one, served as a key
authenticating token of state power, one that determined who was a citizen
and who, in various problematic ways, was not.47 Among numerous possible
examples, the violence of this equation was evident in the Aru Islands in the
mid-1970s, when forced conversions to one of the five religions recognized by
the Suharto state were common. In anticipation of the 1977 national elections,
zealous members of the Central Malukan civil bureaucracy visited the pearl-
diving communities scattered off the east coast of Aru’s main islands to bribe
and coerce the animist population to convert to one of the New Order’s authorized religions. Doing so would entitle them to a KTP that, in turn, would
enable their participation in the upcoming elections.48 This close, continually
reiterated connection between religion and the Indonesian nation-state was
also explicit in Pak Nus’s painting of a red and white Christ and in the Pancasila
Christ charcoal drawing of his son, the GPM minister Chris.
Given the brutality with which the Suharto state imposed itself on Indonesians, it is not surprising that state authority and forms of governmentality haunt
these pictures and become enfolded within religious representations or that
the depiction of identity mimics the shape and logic of the national citizen’s
ID card. Given, too, the prevailing sense of abandonment by the state among
Ambon’s Protestants, many of whom were civil servants, it makes sense that
they would look elsewhere for recognition. Religion in Ambon, perhaps especially among GPM Protestants, was the obvious candidate. It signaled an alternative to the state, while remaining authorized by it, and to the nation within
Muslim-dominated Indonesia. But, in many respects, the GPM also resembles
the state, being by far the largest nongovernment organization in the province
with “a structure that exactly parallels that of the local government.”49 From
this perspective, it is possible to see the Romans as stand-ins for a state authority
that gestures beyond globalized Christian print capitalism and sacred geography to Suharto’s authoritarian governmentality, with the painted Christ identity
photograph doubling as the crucial token of visible legitimacy, recognition,
and authorized belonging (Figure 29). But it is also possible to see these images
in motion by noticing how, over time, between the early and mid-2000s, the
Romans recede into the background, disappearing altogether from view as
Christ’s monumental face comes to the fore. “Closer is better,” Jhon explained,
“because it is clear from his face that he is suffering, the face is clearer, there
are more details so that it will be clearer, more clear,” a phrase he kept repeating. He gestured to a section of the mural across from the bike stand where we
sat. This image—a close-up of Christ in profile wearing a crown of thorns and
shouldering a cross—replaced an earlier one, he explained, of a full-length
Christ “with his feet showing” hemmed in by Roman soldiers.50
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Figure 29. Faded mural painting of Christ and Roman soldiers, Ambon, 2003. Photo
by the author.

Seeing these pictures in motion means entertaining the possibility of a shift
in which the emphasis changes from a focus on authority and modes of state
governmentality to the possibilities conjured by the citizen’s identity card in
postauthoritarian times. It intimates a move through which the visible token
of the exchange between state and citizen, the identity photograph, is pried
loose from the state forms in which it was previously moored and opened up
to circulation.51 While this may not seem a momentous change, it offers a way
of seeing the Christ face as a landscape in its own right, a heterotopia or Deleuzian deterritorialized world that potentially makes all the difference.52 Although
huge, painted faces rather than cinematic close-ups are at issue here, it is possible that the sheer size of the Christ faces standing like sentinels along Ambon’s
streets facilitates the kind of projection and identification that has been argued
for film. Whatever the case, this Christ face/landscape is mobile and relatively
open-ended, pushing beyond the familiar terrain of the nation-state to venture
into new territory that may not be either straightforwardly Indonesian or perhaps even Protestant Christian. What this huge face seems to put in place is a
call for recognition, in which those voicing the call await, as it were, the arrival
of some authority here who would acknowledge the Christian Ambonese as
alike and in his image. Caught in this suspended state of desire and uncertainty,
the Protestants can do nothing other than insist that the face of Jesus is like
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their own. At the same time, the emergent gap between identity and recognition potentially opens a space for a (male) horizontality that moves away from
hierarchical authority into the kind of loose fellowship characteristic of the
motorbike-taxi groups that set up the street pictures in the first place. Besides
the gendered male camaraderie of the streets, female networks based on mutual
hospitality and calibrated to church activities and weekly prayer meetings
closely knit and ordered GPM neighborhoods, providing an institutionalized
counter to the action of the street (see Chapter 4).
Apart from the open-endedness of the Christ face/landscape and the equivocation in Jhon’s description of the similitude between Christ’s face and that
of Protestant Ambonese, the triptych combines different directionalities and
subject positions, while also remaining indebted to diverse media forms. As a
trio, the mural, portrait, and billboard visualize and reimagine the ties that
bind Ambonese Protestants to both religion and the nation-state, two powerful
sociopolitical entities that in Indonesia, especially under Suharto, were nearly
impossible to prize apart. Besides being creative forms of self-publicizing on
the part of the motorbikers, Ambon’s street gallery showcased the influence of
diverse media—from Christian print capitalism to state forms of governmentality and national television.

Landscape IV: Witnessing the End-Time
To conclude this truncated tour of the painted Christian city, I turn to the
academy-trained Pak Joseph and to two examples of the “surrealistic” style he
adopted following his conversion from GPM to Pentecostal Protestantism. The
first example is one Pak Joseph singled out for commentary during one of my
visits. The second, an enormous triptych of the apocalypse, was commissioned
by a Chinese Indonesian who some people referred to as a minister but who
for me most recalled a prophet in the wilderness, for reasons I explain below.
In contrast to the enclaved prayer room, the Pancasila Christ, or his cameo
portraits, these paintings visualize the violence, devastation, and divided realities that I foregrounded at the beginning of this chapter.
At its most straightforward, the painting Pak Joseph spoke about is a record
of Christ’s service. It is challenging to take this picture in all at once since its
many scenes pull the viewer in different directions, shattering the sense of a
readily accessible whole. Composed of fragments of image and text, the painting resembles a dream in the way it juxtaposes contrasting scenes of ruin and
salvation with citations from scripture dispersed among painted vignettes
(Figure 30). In the canvas’s upper right-hand corner, Christ’s hands bathe a
disciple’s feet in a display of the Lord “humbling himself,” the painter explained.
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Below, miniature scenes show a nurse bent over a hospital bed, a prison’s barred
cell, and a ship at sea. To contemplate these vignettes, the viewer must draw
close to the canvas, inviting a physical intimacy that absorbs what Pak Joseph
called the painting’s “witness” into the interiority of the tiny scenes as if she
alone were privy to what they portray.53 Several large footprints stride boldly
across the vignettes of dedicated service to humankind, signaling another way
of entering the world of this “surrealistic” vision—namely, through mimicry
of the Christian God. This became clear to me when, invoking Matthew
12:19–20 (“Thou shalt follow in my footsteps”), Pak Joseph elucidated what he
described as the picture’s “symbol”: “If you want to be an important person,
you have to humble yourself.”54
Pak Joseph’s witnessing encloses the viewer in the world of his picture, disavowing any possibility of remaining at a distance or outside it. Put otherwise,
with respect to the painted scene of evangelical witnessing and “surrealism’s
influence,” the viewer is either saved or located somewhere on the road to

Figure 30. Painting of Christ’s service to mankind, with close-ups. Painting by Lamberth
Joseph, Ambon, 2005. Photos by the author.
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salvation.55 For Pak Joseph, witnessing this particular painting, as well as being
witnessed by it, means actively entering Christian service and, with it, having
the path to salvation visibly laid out in advance—all the witness needs to do is
follow humbly in Jesus Christ’s footsteps. Prophetic and perspectival at one
and the same time, the picture not only installs the viewer as a subject of witnessing but also performs the act of witnessing via the painting, demonstrating,
in so doing, what Pak Joseph called the exceptional power of pictures.
This particular power was unequivocally brought home to me when I was
taken to see Pak Joseph’s painting of the apocalypse (Figure 31). Apart from
what the painting actually showed, this power had everything to do with how
the gigantic triptych leaped into view—startling and taking me aback, exhibiting a force of which the makers of Ambon’s street pictures are all too aware.
I had been taken to see the painting, stored in a warehouse on the outskirts of
Ambon, by a person I will call Minister Ho, a wandering prophet who I met
with regularly when he was not evangelizing around Ambon or on neighboring
islands. Jhon, who introduced us, always referred to Ho as a minister, spoke
about him with some reverence, and, whenever possible, joined him on his
excursions. Others, including a GPM minister, spoke with admiration of Ho’s
devout religiosity and dedication to the promotion of the faith, pronouncing
him an “ecumenical man.” Upon meeting Minister Ho, this self-described
“militant Christian” and former Buddhist “worshipper of statues” related how,
following a personal crisis that occurred before the war, he converted to Christianity. He told me that he was baptized in Makassar by a fellow Christian
convert, a man he called Minister Muhammed, an ordained minister and
former Muslim. Since then, having turned over his business to relatives, Minister Ho dedicated much of his time to spreading the word—preaching, handing
out bibles, and running religious revival sessions, often in collaboration with
local churches. As a Chinese Indonesian, but also because his wife was a
Christian before him, the possibility of conversion had been there all along.
Before he converted to Christianity, his home had harbored two altars—one
Buddhist with statues and another, presumably sparser, Protestant one. Now
fully Christian, their house had a painted Christian prayer corner and, next to
the front door, a larger-than-life painted Jesus depicted knocking on a door,
both the work of Jhon.
Prone to prophetic visions, Minister Ho had a dream that he claimed predicted Ambon’s religious violence, which he had committed to canvas. One
Saturday, accompanied by Jhon and Ho’s son-in-law, we drove to the warehouse
where Pak Joseph’s painting was stored, which Minister Ho had already described to me. Still, I was by no means prepared for the apocalyptic scene that
jumped out of the dark when Ho and his son-in-law slid back the warehouse’s

Figure 31. Painting of the apocalypse, with close-ups. Based on a prophetic dream, the painting
is dated January 10, 1999, or nine days before Ambon’s conflict began. The text on the left
panel reads: “Father, forgive them for they know not what they do (Luke 23:34).” Painting by
Lamberth Joseph, Ambon, 2005. Photos by the author.
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heavy metal doors to reveal the triptych propped up against some furniture.
Or, for that matter, for the date “10 Jan 1999,” inscribed in luminous white
brushstrokes above the artist’s signature, documenting the work’s completion
only nine days before Ambon’s conflict broke and authenticating the painting’s
visualization of Ho’s prophetic dream.56 Unfolding across causally integrated
scenes, Minister Ho led me past the three panels that materialized his vision
as he tacked back and forth between the biblical story of Jericho’s destruction
and Ambon’s own devastating violence. On the left side a panoply of sins—a
hand gripping a bottle, another brandishing a deck of cards, others holding
machetes, knives, a pistol, and a spear—fanned out from under Christ’s bloodied feet on the cross. To the immediate right of this scene, the triptych’s wide,
central panel showed Jericho’s fortifications collapsing under siege while its
inhabitants circumambulated the town below with raised trumpets and tambourines. Against an ominous sky, the adjacent symbols of the Christian cross
and the Muslim crescent moon and a star, flanked by a church and mosque
pair in flames, float above the city. Presiding over all of this, the face of a fierce
Christian God rides the storm. The triptych culminates in a third panel on
the right depicting salvation: a multitude of minute, white figures streaming
from all corners of the globe converge upon a cross that juts out from the earth
to form a bridge over an abyss leading to heaven’s wide-open palatial gates.
Painted by Pak Joseph, the distinctly Pentecostal cast of the painting thematizing sin, apocalyptic punishment, and salvation for the elect was hardly
surprising. Ho insisted that the painting rendered his prophetic vision faithfully,
while his Christian militancy positioned him closest in doctrinal terms to the
Pentecostals. Presumably, the painting had been stored in his family’s warehouse since it would have caused offense after the war, both through its reminder of the violence and its partisan Pentecostal Christian perspective. Yet,
unlike Pak Joseph, who belonged to one of Ambon’s charismatic churches, the
self-proclaimed minister Ho remained unaffiliated with any church. A bona
fide prophet in the wilderness, Ho modeled his evangelizing after that of Jesus
Christ, who, much like himself, he claimed, did not found any church but, in
helping people, “worked with different churches.”
I began this truncated tour of the painted Christian city with the enclaved
prayer room as the clearest attempt to consolidate a fully Christian view and
ended with an apocalyptic vision of exploding violence, fragmentation, and a
world in the grips of its radical unmaking. Chronologically, the home prayer
room and the regal Christ behind church altars follow those in the streets. In
some respects, it would have made sense to reproduce this trajectory—beginning
with the premonition of apocalyptic violence and fragmentation that I evoked
at the outset of this chapter, tracking the search for visibility and recognition
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in Ambon’s streets, and ending with the defensive turning inward exemplified
by the prayer room. In choosing not to develop my narrative in this way, I aimed
to expose a logic that holds just as much for the street as the home prayer room,
even if in the former is it only diffusely present. As the most extreme expression
of the Protestant search for solace and refuge, the tiny prayer room exhibits
with utmost clarity the defensive stance that, to a greater or lesser extent, is the
point of departure for all the Christian pictures that emerged during the war.
But it is also the purest expression of the envisioned desire for an affectively
charged, new proximity to God, one that departs from the flat surfaces of mere
pictures to install something more like a potently atmospheric sacred landscape
marked off from overwhelmingly brutal surrounds. In this respect, if the paintings are any witness to the affective stance of the city’s Protestants, then it is
one that remained in place for at least a decade after the war.

Frames at War
“Imagine the damage caused by a theft which robbed you only of your frames,
or rather of their joints, and of any possibility of reframing your valuables or
your art-objects,” writes Jacques Derrida, inviting us to consider an enormous
calamity.57 His provocation draws attention to the significance of frames, or of
processes of enframement, in the generation and circulation of images.58 Even
more, he asks us to consider the immense damage incurred when the frames
that sustain a particular understanding of the self or those that uphold the
parameters of one’s existence and safeguard what one holds dear—a host of
certainties regarding personhood, fellowship and belonging, expectations of
kindred and adversarial others, and the aspirations one has with respect to life
and the future—no longer apply. To make matters worse, Derrida does not
simply evoke a situation of framelessness or, more provocatively, out-of-jointness
but identifies this with a thorough, irreparable dispossession, the result of a
bizarre theft that wreaks havoc at the very core of one’s being. I propose that
this imaginary situation is not that different from the profound sense of dispossession and disorientation that suffuses Ambon’s Protestant pictures. At the
same time, the pictures are a response and attempt to repair this situation.
Perhaps more than any other factor, the urgency of this response infused the
energetic presence of the painted Christian landscapes populating the beleaguered city. As performative stakes in a changing world, the pictures struggled
to bolster a Christian perspective on things. And they did so by putting in place
the out-of-joint frames of Ambon’s shattered Protestant lifeworld, delineating
and making visible the borders of the images without borders that give this
chapter its name. This accounts for the hypervisibility of the Protestants’ acts
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of repair that assumed the form of huge public Christian scenes. Representational redress meant coming out demonstrably, making visible to all the process
of enframement, hitherto out of view. This occurred at precisely that time
when the structures that had kept these frames in place, allowing them to be
taken for granted, relinquished their force.59
How might we assess the function of a frame in such circumstances? Or
even more, that of its joints—those unseen connections that brace and stabilize
a frame? In Frames of War, Judith Butler explores how frames not only validate
a view but also enfold within themselves an entire normative repertoire. Her
concern is with photographs of torture—notably those from the Abu Ghraib
prison—and how their frames adjudicate between what counts as the human
and is deemed recognizable versus life that is not recognized and therefore not
grievable.60 Exemplary of what she calls “frames of war,” these frames harbor
“broader norms that determine what will and what will not be a grievable life.”61
While Butler’s concern departs from my own here, as does her singular focus
on photography, her general insights are relevant. What her perspective allows
us to see is how not just the reproduction of the canon but also the individual
pictures install a Christian point of view. In the latter, this view is conveyed by
elements of composition, angle, and by the explicitly imaged, partisan God’s-
eye view, whether He is depicted floating above the city or authorizing canonical
Christian scenes that stage an exclusively Christian world as if it was the only
perceptible reality around.62 Still, it is important to recall that the Christian
work on appearances that took place via the Protestant pictures was never simply a matter of reproducing elite privilege. From the outset, these pictures
operated within a force field where the reproduction of a Protestant privilege
under siege evolved in interaction with other things—first and foremost, the
uptake of state forms of governmentality, masculine youth culture, commercial
advertising, the wider visual ecology of the city, and the devastation and changes
wrought by the war.
Previously, the Dutch colonizers provided the frame that authorized and
secured Ambon’s Protestants’ view of themselves: their sense of entitlement
and assumed dominance of the municipal and provincial state bureaucracies
and the special treatment they enjoyed compared to the other colonized peoples of the Netherlands East Indies. One way of understanding the Protestants’
frequent identification with Israelis during the war is that this claim confirmed
the view of themselves as a chosen people, an echo of their status as Black Dutchmen under colonial rule (see Introduction). Following Indonesia’s independence
and the suppression of the RMS separatist movement, this close identification with the Dutch needed to be revised. Still, if the historically accumulated
privileges of the Protestants in Ambon suffered somewhat, especially during
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the Japanese occupation of 1942–1945, they still remained largely in place until
the 1990s.
If the power to impose a shape on oneself is intrinsic to that of controlling
and maintaining identity—of oneself but also others—then the loss or diminishment of this power causes intense disorientation and distress.63 It can also
mean, as in Ambon, seizing upon potent forms like that of the Indonesian
citizen’s ID and bending it away from the state and toward the Christian self
or piggybacking on commercial billboards to brand and consolidate community. This suggests that the proliferation of the Christian pictures and reiteration
of Christ’s stereotypical face was all about reinstating a visual economy or an
effort to secure the frame that was authorized under the Dutch colonizers.
Pursuing this metaphor, it is as if during the violence, the frame that for long
had sustained Ambon’s Christians’ view of themselves shattered into a collage
or the scenes of wreckage and fragmented realities with which I began this
chapter.64 This may also be why, with few exceptions, Protestant Ambonese
have clung with such fervor to the colonial-derived image of a white, European
Christ, resurrecting and monumentalizing him in times of rampant uncertainty
in their neighborhoods and along city streets. Yet, even as they held onto a
disappearing world, they created a new one populated by alternative visions,
imaginary landscapes, and heterotopias markedly different from what had been
seen before.

A Frenzy of the Visible
There are times, Tom Gunning writes, marked by “a frenzy of the visible,” a
formulation he borrows from the film historian Jean-Louis Comolli.65 The
latter’s interest lies in the “machines of the visible” that helped spur such frenzy,
although he situates their emergence within the momentous historical and
sociopolitical transformations associated with capitalist modernity. Here is
Comolli’s characterization of what is probably the most celebrated moment
identified with “a frenzy of the visible”:
The second half of the nineteenth century lives in a sort of frenzy of
the visible. It is, of course, the effect of the social multiplication of images: ever-wider distribution of illustrated papers, waves of print, caricatures, etc. The effect, also, however, of something of a geographical
extension of the field of the visible and the representable: by journies,
explorations and colonizations, the whole world becomes visible at the
same time that it becomes appropriable.66
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Frenzy, in this example, involved an intensification in the mechanical reproduction of images and the media and modes of their distribution. It resulted
in an enhancement of visibility as a means of encountering and knowing the
world and the extension of the terrain of the visual in myriad ways. Notable
were major shifts and interventions in the visual environment—from the alteration of landscapes and the emergence of towns and metropolises to the way
the development of public transportation increased opportunities for people
to see others for extended periods of time.67 Structures of feeling accompanied
and sustained this process from the fervent desire foreshadowing photography’s
invention to the investment—emotional and financial—in the question as to
whether a galloping horse ever has all four hooves off the ground simultaneously.68 In the midst of such frenzy, people become confronted with and experientially immersed in a perceptibly different environment that opened new
possibilities for the imagination. As posters proliferated, for instance, during a
craze that took hold of Europe and the United States in the 1890s, many of
these depicted the nouvelle femme of nineteenth-century Paris, offering new
images of women and an expanding sense of what they might be.69 Resistant
to conventional ways of seeing, such images may, in other words, also help to
change them.
Another moment, more relevant to Maluku, swept up in a frenzy of the
visible is that of the seventeenth-century Netherlands, what the Dutch call
their Golden Age. This was a time of wonder and violent encounter with new
worlds—most notably the famed Spice Islands or what is today Maluku—of
scientific and artistic experimentation, including the crafting of optical devices
and the depiction of Dutch light—pale daylight spilling from a window onto
a milkmaid’s hands, the illuminated whitewashed interiors of Calvinist churches,
the variegated gray composing a Dutch sky.70 Like any other such moment, the
Dutch frenzy of the visible was unique, inflected by its particular place, time,
and culture.71
Ambon, around the turn of the millennium, was not in any straightforward
sense part of today’s frenzy of the visible while access to digital technologies,
to which much of the current frenzy is attributed, was limited in the early
2000s. But when war arrived to the city, it introduced new machines of the
visible that gave value to visibility, a value enhanced by the reverberations of
the Reformasi discourse on transparency and its demand to bring things hidden
into view at this eastern end of the archipelago. Considered up close in this
chapter, I have given a sense of the interaction between the urgent experimentation and hubris in the city’s postwar streets and the structure of sentiments
that coalesced around the new Christian images as they did, if differently,
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around other ephemeral mediations of Ambon’s war like rumors, graffiti, and
VCDS, discussed in Chapter 1. At the same time, I have aimed to keep in view
how the street painters’ professed loyalty to the Christian canon depended on
a particular economy that became challenged—if only in part—by the Protestants’ unprecedented embrace of picturing. It is within this larger force field
where a frenzy of the visible converged with the more long-standing visual
economy of globalized Christian print capitalism that Ambon’s oversized images sprung up in response to violence and loss rather than capitalist modernity’s
dislocations and colonial expansion. They did so, among other things, as witnesses to far-reaching transformations in the city, including that of urban
religion.

4

Religion under the Sign of Crisis

At the height of Ambon’s war, a small stone surrendered by a Muslim to a
Christian on an urban battlefield circulated with stunning effect in a Christian
prayer group. Within no time, it infected this core scene of Christian worship
and community, triggering illness and possession, turning the group’s prayers
into a Qur’anic reading session, and inserting the spectral presence of a North
Malukan sultan’s daughter into its midst. This scene of haunting and radical
displacement sums up so much of Ambon’s traditional Protestant community’s
dilemma. At the same time, it gestures, if obliquely, toward the possibility of
generosity as opposed to hatred toward one’s others, of moving beyond the
friend-enemy dyad to include a third term, that of the neighbor. Apart from
what Ambon’s possession reveals about religiously defined subjects during the
conflict, it also attests to the erosion of the carefully policed difference between
magic and religion by church and state. In this chapter, I pay special attention
to the sites where the defensively upheld distinction between Muslim and
Christian broke down and to the capacious waywardness of things as symptoms
of a world in the grips of dramatic change. In doing so, I rely on a symptomatology of crisis to track the shape-shifting movements of subjects and objects
and the ways in which religion in the city became dramatically refigured.
Following the previous chapter, Ambon’s scene of possession may come as
a surprise. It may require a leap of imagination to recall that, besides Christians,
and in particular Protestants, others also exist in the city. The painted landscapes—the Christian enclave folded in upon itself, the Pancasila Jesus stretching diversity under the sign of the Christian universal, or the masculine street
culture congregated around its newfound Jesus icon—equally banish whole
parts of urban sociality to the pictures’ invisible, if energizing, backdrop. With
157
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what can only be considerable effort, they elide any hint of a Muslim presence
but also of any locations, settings, or situations where Muslim and Christian
women, men, and children willingly or unavoidably commingle—whether in
the transactions of everyday living, in banal or extreme violence, or in settings
of mutual hospitality and joy. If not the paintings, then, the synopsis with which
this chapter begins intimates other spaces where Muslims and Christians
meet—however problematically—here, around a venomous object that indexes
practices that may not be embraced by all but are undoubtedly understood.

Times Rich in Demons
This chapter is about the terrain that Muslims and Christians inhabit together;
it assumes that, living in the same city, they are part of a common world, where
they make up Ambon’s urban crowds, walk and brush shoulders in its offices,
schools, and streets, that they communicate in the same vernacular Ambonese
Malay, share numerous habits and traditions and, by and large, even the same
food. It is also about the terrain that these Ambonese share with the many
migrants who also dwell in the city, the large majority of whom are economic
migrants and Muslims from, predominantly, South Sulawesi. By extension,
the chapter addresses the diversity among coreligionists themselves that, thus
far, I have glossed, for the most part, simply as Muslim and Christian.
Yet, this chapter also explores how this terrain in common is not as straightforward as this brief description makes it seem and how, in this, as with much
else in this book, we may take a cue from the city’s street pictures. The argument of this chapter is that the project of cohabitation, while deeply fraught
in the aftermath of war, is under any circumstance a project rather than a
simple empirical given. Or, in other words, that beyond the powerful pragmatics of living together, cohabitation needs to be imagined in particular
ways. The Christian pictures foreclose any such imagination. Rather, they
reveal how complicated and contested the project of cohabitation can be,
especially in the wake of war. Still, to go by their evidence alone would mean
missing the myriad ways that cohabitation manifests itself in Ambon City,
obscure as well as more obvious. I explore this proposition by homing in on
a number of contact zones and conjunctures where Muslims and Christians,
in communication and exchange, avoidance and aggression, have shaped
their lives together, side by side and jointly, today and in the past, in Ambon
City, on the larger island, and on neighboring ones. As an especially radical
instance of Muslim and Christian cohabitation, the scene of possession with
which this chapter began has the virtue of raising a number of the most salient
issues I address here.
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Sometime during the war, a spate of possessions afflicted some among the
city’s Christian population. A brief account of these happenings, told to me
by the GPM minister whose home prayer room I discussed in the previous
chapter and who acted as exorcist during the events, will suffice. The account
forms part of a longer narrative in which the minister railed against the widespread recourse to magic by Christians and Muslims alike during the war.
The possessions began in a Christian prayer group of five persons when the
protagonist of the story—a migrant Muslim convert to Christianity and city
resident—introduced to the members a small stone that had been given to her
by a Muslim woman clad solely in black, a feature that marks this woman as
foreign to Ambon. The Javanese Christian convert obtained the stone from
the Muslim following a fight between the two within the context of a larger
confrontation between Muslim and Christian forces in the city’s Ahuru neighborhood. When the Javanese woman prevailed, the Muslim war leader surrendered the stone to her opponent. Once it began to circulate within the Christian
prayer group, strange things began to happen. Whoever held the stone fell ill.
More unsettling, though, was that whenever the group sat down to pray, they
found that they could not, or felt themselves lifted out of place, or prayed as
Muslims with their hands held out flat and open in front of them.
The first to be possessed was the Javanese convert at the refugee camp to
which she had fled as the latest in a series of similar displacements; the other
group members quickly followed suit. Exorcism conducted by two ministers
at the GPM’s head Maranatha church and backed by the congregation, alternating between prayer and song, disclosed the following: the spirit possessing
the Christian convert identified herself as Yanti, the Muslim leader against
whom the Javanese had previously stood in battle, but Yanti was merely her
Ambonese name and personality. According to the spirit’s own declaration,
Yanti was none other than Salma, the Muslim daughter of the sultan of the
North Malukan city of Ternate.
For many of those in Ambon with whom I spoke in the mid-2000s, these
were “times rich in demons.”1 One way of understanding them, in Michel de
Certeau’s terms, is as a “diabolical crisis.”2 The import of such crisis, he offers,
lies in its disclosure of the fault lines and imbalances permeating a culture, as
well as in the way it hastens this same culture’s transformation. In situations
like that of Ambon during the war, where uncertainty reigned supreme, the
taken-for-granted social arrangements and values of everyday existence were
shot through with suspicion and hollowed out, and the world shifted intolerably
under one’s feet, deviltries abound as both symptoms and transitional solutions.3
Ambon’s possession appears to lay bare the fault lines of a highly fraught, religiously mixed urban society under radical revision. It came via a migrant Muslim
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convert to Christianity, turned a Christian prayer group into a Qur’anic reading
session, and introduced into the core of Christian worship the formerly powerful, ancient North Malukan sultanate of Ternate, which, significantly, had
become the new capital of an almost wholly Muslim North Maluku province
in October 1999. At the story’s center is a confrontation and a treacherous object
issuing in a poisonous transaction between its two women protagonists, a
Muslim war leader, on the one hand, and a multiply displaced Javanese Christian convert, on the other.
One part of this story unfolds into a larger account of this societal revision,
comprising, among other things, the changing status and location of religion
today, not just in Ambon but more broadly in Indonesia and beyond.4 Here, I
consider the wide-ranging transformation of religion’s terrain in the postwar
city via the narrative of cross-religious spirit possession. In the most immediate
sense, the public drama of Christian erasure and usurpation of place betrays the
anxieties, shared by many of his fellow clergy, of the GPM minister who recounted
it: anxieties regarding the waning of the power of Ambon’s oldest church and,
with it, that of the city’s traditional Protestant Christian elite. Relatedly, the minister’s account appears to register the fears and dismay of many Christians regarding the split, under Indonesia’s new decentralization laws, of the former
province of Central Maluku into a truncated, religiously mixed Central province
and a new, predominantly Muslim North Maluku one. Intimated as well in the
occurrence of possession among members of the minister’s congregation, and
even more in the exorcism held in Ambon’s Calvinist Protestant church, is the
insidious Pentecostalization overtaking the GPM from within.
Witness to an unhinged, tumultuous world, the minister’s account identifies
the threats to church and congregation from without but also, equally disconcertingly, those from within. The profound disturbance at its core, suggested
by the cross-religious character of the possession, raises questions about the
religious integrity of the subject possessed, the nefarious exchange precipitating
the possession, and the contagious force it unleashed, along with the larger
uncertainties and turmoil that infuse the story as a whole. These questions
include: What does it mean when a Muslim spirit—a force that cannot be
ignored—seizes upon and usurps the place of a Christian subject? What kinds
of concerns might be at play when such Muslim agency can interrupt the space
not only of an individual Christian but of the larger Ambonese Christian community by infiltrating its most intimate sites of worship? How does the status
of the event’s protagonist—both a migrant outsider and a Muslim convert to
Christianity, and thus a multiply split subject from the start—complicate the
scene of possession? And what, by the same token, should we make of the doubled spirit of the Muslim war leader who overlays the Ternatan sultan’s daughter?
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Why is the societal and religious displacement identified with women and
rooted in the material transaction of a moving stone? What might these multiple layerings and porous cohabitations and inhabitations tell us about the
disjunctures, interfaces, and entanglements between the city’s heterogeneous
Muslim and Christian populations, between native Ambonese and migrants,
or, indeed, among coreligionists themselves? Lastly, if most urgently, what
might this suggest about how the inhabitation of possession might contain or
not contain possibilities for a future cohabitation of Ambonese Christians,
Muslims, and others in this historically mixed and migrant city?

Conversion’s Unstable Alchemy
If conversion can be understood generally as a narrative through which persons
apprehend and describe radical change in the significance of their lives, then
the collapse here of conversion and possession into each other proclaims even
more dramatically not only the presence of radical change but also the enormous difficulty in grasping or making sense of it.5 To be sure, conversion takes
many different forms and is often a highly fraught and complex process with,
among other things, implications for people’s sense of history and the experience of rupture or continuity in ways that depart from this Pauline model of
conversion.6 When conversion is understood as a singular, momentous act, it
may also cause profound confusion and distress, all the more so when this is
carried out under duress.7 At issue here, however, is less the experience or process of conversion than its rhetoric in the context of Indonesia’s, and especially
wartime Ambon’s, complicated religious plurality. Outside of marriage, where
the woman commonly “follows the husband” and adopts his religion, conversion in Indonesia is especially charged since it often goes together with accusations of alleged proselytization on the part of either Christians among Muslims
or Muslims among Christians. Not only are the Indonesian terms for proselytization (Kristianisasi and Islamisasi or Christianization and Islamicization)
much more loaded than their English equivalents, but they also circulate widely
in both secular and religious media, as they did repeatedly and provocatively
during Ambon’s war. Conversion’s representation as a dramatic scene of enlightenment has also been a recurrent theme in several highly popular contemporary Indonesian films.8
“Baptismal children of mine,” the minister claimed, “who have converted
from Islam to Christianity, generally speaking, see an apparition [of the Lord’s
face]. I always tell them, ‘When you pray, ask the Lord to see His face so that
you will be convinced.’ And finally they get it. He comes and blesses them. It’s
extraordinary.”9 Whenever converts came up in conversation during my
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fieldwork, as they did from time to time, it was with an analogous sense of the
miraculous, as if a singular species of being was being invoked. Occasionally,
converts were pointed out to me—all Muslim women who had married into
Christian families—commonly with a lowered voice, but such persons were
few and far between.10 Not only were they often spoken of with a certain reverence but, along the lines of the minister’s claim, singled out from their coreligionists for signs of divine attention. Of a woman from “the other side,” for
instance, who ran a bustling lunchroom, it was said that only God’s blessings
could explain her remarkable business success. By the same token, these examples suggest that converts enjoy special scrutiny—and, presumably, even
more during Ambon’s religiously inflected war. As in many religious traditions,
converts encode a risk, whether this is conceived of as an inherent potential
for duplicity, the dangers of “backsliding,” or as an ever-present reminder that
any claims to universality are always already contested. Since it is women and
not men who convert upon marriage, it is women, too, who are most suspect,
as the confrontation between the Javanese convert and Muslim war leader
suggests. If the former publicizes the perils of backsliding in an especially
dramatic form, the latter gifts a poisonous stone that potentially endangers the
entire congregation.
But the possessed Javanese convert is less important for any resemblance
she bears to the handful of Muslim women in Ambon who became Christians
than to the potentially treacherous, unstable alchemy that conversion evokes.
Folded into the fraught, affectively charged figure of the Javanese convert, it
is possible to discern not only an interreligious interpellation but also the perceived threat of the GPM’s eclipse by alternative religions: on the one hand, the
Christian’s unavoidable haunting by the Muslim, a form of radical cohabitation,
to which I will return, on the other, a matter of great urgency and, arguably,
one of more immediate concern for the GPM than the Muslims after the war.
This matter is that of the numbers of GPM Christians, augmented during the
conflict, who abandoned their church for what they deemed more promising
alternatives, in a wave of “conversions” away from the GPM. Put otherwise,
the figure of the Javanese convert doubly incarnates the threat of displacement
for the Ambonese Christian subject—conjuring, at one and the same time, a
usurpation of place by one’s others and an abandonment by those akin to oneself in favor of more compelling options. Both the Javanese and black-clad
Muslim war leader are not only marked as other but as foreign—the first being
a migrant and the second, visually, akin to the jihadi women who, at the time,
were only recently seen in Ambon.
Beyond conversion, I home in on the treacherous instabilities afflicting both
subjects and objects in the minister’s account and, more generally, of appearances
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in a world in devilish disarray. In ordinary times, the manner in which other
people appear to you and the knowledge you have of them remains largely
underscrutinized. Similarly, the things that make up one’s daily environment,
including the cast-off refuse of city life, figure for the most part as unexamined
fixtures of everyday existence.11 In the decade or so under consideration in this
book, difficult years marked by conflict and the myriad efforts to move beyond
it, the ways in which persons and things manifested themselves, and especially
the trust in such manifestations, often faltered. Not only might their familiarity
be deceptive, triggering the aesthetics of depth I discussed in Chapter 1, but
any sense of certainty tended to dissolve, as I show below. The implications of
such alterations in subjects and objects are potentially much more than phenomenological. In such circumstances, the prevailing semiotic ideology or
historically grounded background assumptions that constitute and organize
people’s experience of the materiality of semiotic form may come into question
such that this materiality itself may become a significant provocateur of historical change.12 While it would be a stretch to describe the stone at the heart
of the minister’s story as an agent provocateur of such magnitude, it is still
possible to see it as an augur of some of the momentous transformations that
took place in Ambon at the time—in urban religion, generally, but here specifically from the vantage of the GPM, as told, admittedly, by one of its more
maverick ministers.
In what follows, I deploy a symptomatology of crisis, attending to the shape-
shifting, death-wielding movements of persons and things and the discourses
that surround them as an entry into urban religion’s reconfiguration and the
diffuse transformation of appearances, both being among the most significant
changes wrought by Ambon’s war. This symptomology operates by taking the
signs and material disturbances of a violent situation—including outward appearances that seem at odds with and peripheral to the more serious business
of war and were, indeed, often experienced as anachronistic or heterotopic—as
core symptoms that betray just how much violence and destruction came to
suffuse and rework from within the everyday experience and lifeworld of ordinary citizens.

Religion under the Sign of Crisis
Let me begin by looking more closely at the rolling stone that first shifted hands
on an urban battlefield, setting this story in motion and contaminating Christianity from within, triggering possession among congregation members, and
substituting Christian with Muslim practice. A token of the treacherous magic
that, following the minister, untold numbers of Muslims and Christians would

164

Religion under the Sign of Crisis

have relied on in the violence and that, beyond it, would exercise a diffuse
influence in everyday Ambonese life, the story of the stone served as an example
of the dedicated spiritual warfare conducted behind the conflict’s battlelines.
In his pastoral work with “broken families,” acts of aggression, overwhelmingly
sexual in nature, alcohol abuse, and gambling could often be traced back to
potent baths given to baby boys, he told me, or to talismanic cords tied around
infants’ waists, meant to instill them, early on, with the requisite qualities of
male prowess and hypermasculinity.13 Indeed, he attributed the tenacious ferocity of Ambon’s conflict to the widespread deployment of what he occasionally
called, in English, “magic” or “occultism” on both sides. Symptomatic of a
much larger problem—the sway of pagan, tribal religion over the local population—this would have manifested itself in the recourse to magic on both sides
during the violence—whether to protectively “seal” their villages against enemy
assaults, summon fierce Malukan war captains of bygone times to their side, or
otherwise activate the martial prowess for which Malukans are renowned in
Indonesia.
Relating how members of his congregation betrayed their engagement with
such hidden forces, the minister detailed how, during the multiple wartime
prayer sessions convened at the Maranatha church, they surrendered en masse
the talismanic cords and amulets that they tucked within their clothing:
During the violence, I held a service every afternoon at 3:00, there at
the Maranatha. It went on like that for four years, every afternoon.
From the year 1999 until 2003 when things were somewhat quiet. We
did this every afternoon without fail and during the first four months
alone we collected four large boxes of cloth cords [A.M. tali kain].
We did this during the service, and they voluntarily surrendered
them—four boxes of cloth cords. Actually, I had a prayer team, there
was a prayer team. So we always prayed and asked people to do this
voluntarily after they had received the prayers and words of the sacrament. After that they would come, “Sir, I would like to surrender this,
please pray over it so it can be removed.” There were people who wore
them to avoid the violence and put a distance between it and themselves, while others [engaged in the fighting] felt, “If I wear this, then
later I will be killed [on the battlefield], so it would be better if I
turned it in.” Yes, it was like that. “It would be better if I depended on
God.” So it was really extraordinary, ma’am. For four years, we held
those afternoon services. It had quite an impact on changing things for
the better. Young people who liked narcotics or alcohol would come
and surrender themselves. Women with shattered family lives, like one
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who came devotedly for an entire year and then came to inform me,
“Sir, my husband has come home. Because of the minister’s and my
own ceaseless praying.” She came every afternoon.14
Magic across Indonesia’s extensive territory is remarkably diverse, rooted
primarily in local practice, and shaped, among other things, by its interaction
with official religion and statist discourse on modernity and by the relatively
urbanized or rural character of the setting in which it occurs. At the same time,
the wide currency of familiar terms deriving from different localities, the interregional Malukan trade in protective amulets and medicines involving
migrants from beyond the province, and the GPM minister’s invocation of the
English terms magic and occultism suggests how widespread the relatively
underground traffic in magic is in a country that officially bans the sale of
magical spells and artifacts.15 If the minister’s use of English underscores magic’s mass mediation and, more specifically, the popularity in post-Suharto Indonesia of supernatural horror films and television serials and of books like
Dan Brown’s Da Vinci Code, which circulated among educated Christians
and which he claimed to have read, North Maluku’s magic trade and terminology evince a similar if, generally, older cosmopolitanism.16 “People are as
likely to refer to sorcery by the Javanese term santet, by the general Indonesian
terms guna-guna or ilmu hitam, or by the English term black magic as they
are to use local terms as doti, bodiga, or fiu-fiu.” Trade in the objects of magical
protection in North but also Central Maluku comprises “spells (syarat), amulets
(ajimat), or magical objects such as magically empowered semi-precious stones
(batu dalima), herbal roots, miniature versions of the Qur’an, or antique Javanese knives (kris)” and is carried out “by a steady flow of predominantly Javanese
and Buginese healers [who] arrive in . . . Maluku to sell their protective medicines.”17 In Indonesia generally, forms of magical protection are known to be
rampant among the Indonesian police and military—with bracelets made of
jet black coral especially popular—as well as prevalent in politics, from the
lowest to the highest levels.18
In Ambon, the minister reminded me, men and boys would often be ritually
bathed before heading into battle, a practice intended to instill invulnerability
to bullets and other weapons that recalls the potent baths given early in life to
Malukan boys.19 A journalist from a North Malukan newspaper recalled in
2008 how he had stood among a crowd of men waiting to be doused with water
and struck on the back with a machete to achieve this effect,20 while a former
Muslim child soldier from Ambon told a Dutch Malukan documentary filmmaker how they would pray and be bathed by an older male relative to purify
themselves and to foster invulnerability before battle.21 The young man also
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mentioned red cloth cords that served as protective amulets, were incanted
over by a specialist in local custom, and had to be worn invisibly under clothing
“since otherwise others might take you for a Christian since they also use red
cloth.”22 The powers and agencies of these and other objects like magical stones
circulated profusely in discourse—rumors, ordinary conversation, and apocryphal accounts like that of the GPM minister—that attested to and elaborated
upon their doings and effects, thereby not only substantiating “the ubiquity of
supernatural belief as interpretive practice in contemporary Indonesia” but
also consolidating the “narrative experience” particular to Ambon’s war.23
Not surprisingly, such powers are controversial and suspect. If former Muslim soldiers were wary of speaking of “black magic,” calling the topic sensitive,
a Christian described how he had fought alongside a man who appeared invulnerable to bullets and machete attacks until he lost his cloth cord. “Then
he was hit by a bullet. This is how we knew that Christians also used these
things.”24 What strikes one in the brief enumeration of objects affording supernatural protection is how—notwithstanding the careful hedging of religion,
whether Christian or Muslim, against magic—a miniature Qur’an (or, for that
matter, bible or Catholic prayer book) could operate comfortably alongside an
amulet or potent stone. Similarly, men, boys, and occasionally women who set
off to battle might magically fortify themselves but also pray beforehand with
their coreligionists in a church or mosque. Notwithstanding such accommodations, the resurgence in a reliance on sources of magical protection “signaled
a departure from religious and modernist standpoints that were abandoned as
young men turned to the magic of their village elders before heading into
battle.”25 For city dwellers in particular, especially Christians, the uncanniness
that always accompanies the supernatural’s appearance would have been enhanced, given its overall banishment to the edge of urban existence for a long
time. Sorcery in the city is also uncanny since it turns the everyday materiality
of village life, things like sago pith and thorns, into lethal weapons.26

Simplifications
To return to the minister’s account, beyond pagan magic’s destructive inroads
into the GPM congregation, it is the fact of interreligious contagion that absorbs
him most. Anxieties about church members whose allegiance is in crisis and
identity uncertain, who may be swayed by alternative sources of power or drawn
to a rival religion animate the tape from our conversation. It is worth recalling
that the minister who related Ambon’s wartime plague of possessions is the
same who cordoned off a prayer room in his home. At work, much as at home,
his ideal horizon is seamlessly Christian, his primary concern pastoral, and his
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overriding objective that of securing religious identity uncompromised in its
proper place. Yet however one looks at it, the Javanese protagonist of the minister’s account who sets the calamitous stone rolling augurs anything but that.
Rather, she is a figure of religion shot through with competing forces and
dangerously on the move in a city where Christians and, especially, GPM
members were highly cognizant of how much less powerful and prominent
they now were, while many also foresaw their genocide at Muslim hands. Inherently duplicitous, she spectacularly discloses the inability of the GPM to
control or even gauge the shape of the Christian self, a self that, in so many
ways, appears compromised from the start.
For a host of reasons, not the least because of the way it foregrounds his
heroic engagement with the demonic forces assailing Ambon, the minister’s
account should be understood as highly mythologized. Nonetheless, the reference to Ahuru as the location of the standoff between the Muslim and
Christian women and the site of transfer of the infected stone places these
events temporally around June 2000, when a large confrontation and mass
exodus of Christians—including Catholics—took place in that neighborhood.
This was also the time when jihadis from Java began to make their presence
felt in Ambon, having begun to arrive in the city the previous month, so that
fears among Christians could be expected to have intensified exponentially. It
is also a key factor that helped to draw the Catholics into the conflict, since
the jihadis targeted Christians indiscriminately, making no distinction between
Protestants and Catholics. Their presence was highly visible—male members
of the theatrical, media-sensitive Laskar Jihad could be easily recognized due
to their white robes and untrimmed beards.27 When women joined them—often
Ambonese Muslim women who “converted” to the group’s strict neo-Salafi
lifestyle—they commonly covered themselves in black, looking much as one
imagines the female war leader in the minister’s account.28 Besides mention
of the Maranatha church and Ternatan sultanate, the inclusion of the telltale
Ahuru, with all that this place name could be expected to evoke among both
Protestants and Catholics, makes more palpable even the sense of violent usurpation motivating the minister’s account.29 A figure of terrifying disturbance
at the center of a scene of erasure, the Javanese convert’s seizure subsumes a
number of displacements that summarize the Malukan conflict as a whole.
First and foremost among these is the displacement of anxieties about the
“incompleteness” of religious identities, boundaries, and hierarchies prefiguring
the outbreak of violence, while the forced displacement of neighborhoods and
villages by armed groups across the religious divide promoted the spread,
transformation, and, finally, de-escalation of the violence.30 Indeed, as internally
displaced people, or IDPs, fled violence, their arrival to would-be sites of refuge
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often portended and could precipitate violence in these places, creating a deadly
contagion effect. Gradually, however, “the violent eviction of people from
neighborhoods and villages also effected the spatial segregation and simplification of Christian-Muslim communities seen in other sites divided by inter-
religious violence elsewhere around the world, producing an ‘interlocking binary
spatial grid and inside/outside polarities,’ with the ‘proliferation of interfaces,
the barricading, and the influx of refugee populations’ reorganizing towns and
villages into a highly militarized and religiously coded topography.”31
Resistance to displacement occasionally took place, but then only by giving
in to conversion. In the face of impending displacement, some Muslim families
who lived in neighborhoods where they represented a minority, like Ambon’s
Batu Gajah, opted to convert to Christianity rather than relinquish their homes
and horticultural plots to Christians.32 Much more common on both sides were
circumstances where people were simply driven out or compelled by the violence to abandon their neighborhoods, leaving their property and possessions
behind. Several Christians told me that after the war, Muslims would sell their
homes cheaply to Christians in areas that had become religiously homogenized,
an outcome of the conflict they deemed favorable or “nice,” in the sense of
economically advantageous.33 Presumably the same circumstance the other
way around resulted in the same solution. Given that Ambon’s cadastre burned
down in 2004 and the understandable—in these circumstances—pragmatism
of city officials in resolving property and land disputes, much remains and
presumably will remain unsettled for many years to come, if not, indeed, forever. Apart from the violence that accompanied it, the “simplification” of large
parts of Ambon into religiously defined enclaves often had disconcerting and
jarring results. In a city emerging from a conflict waged in religion’s name,
“houses of worship in the wrong place,” such as mosques arising in what today
are Christian neighborhoods or churches abandoned in what have become
Muslim ones, are now traces of a recent, wrenching past.34
Overlooking the city’s rearranged, religiously coded topography in the immediate postwar years, Ambon’s street paintings may be seen simultaneously
as signposts and effects of simplification. To understand why this is so, we need
to return, briefly, to the years immediately before the conflict. At this time, an
anthropologist working in one of Ambon’s most cramped, impoverished, and
largely illegally settled neighborhoods registered an excess of protective amulets
tacked above the doorways of migrant homes.35 The proliferation of such overt
signs of animosity and suspicion were an expression, as he saw it, of the “dangers of living so close by those who were ‘strangers’ in significant cultural and
social terms.”36 In retrospect, this would have fed the mob response and vengeful
strikes on Christian Ambonese neighbors “who had demonstrated their sense
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of privilege and superiority in various ways over an extended period.”37 Important, too, was the sense of alien but proximate space, something that was felt
on both sides of the conflict.38 Unfortunately, the fears of the many migrants
who clearly did not take their presence in Ambon for granted were borne out
during the first days of the war when migrants from South Sulawesi—Buginese,
Butonese, and Makassarese peoples, or the derogatively collectivized BBMers—
became the target of mass aggression and fled the city in droves.39
It would not be a stretch to see the Jesus billboards and murals standing
guard at Christian neighborhood entrances, along similar lines, as huge amulets aimed at Muslims and other potentially hostile strangers. Much like an
amulet, the material presence of God’s image served the community as a shield.
In soliciting God’s presence and bringing him into vision here in Ambon, the
street pictures seemed to fulfill a protective function analogous to that of the
dried seahorses and medicinal phials adorning the lintels of Butonese homes,
or those migrants especially reviled by both Christian and Muslim Ambonese.40
Beyond mere analogy, the paintings can be seen as successors of a sort to the
magically potent phials and seahorses. Insofar as the violence succeeded in
religiously and ethnically purifying a large majority of Ambon’s neighborhoods,
blocking the city into homogeneous swaths of red or white territory, it would
make sense that the signs erected against threats from hostile neighbors
within—dried seahorses and the like—would shift to the neighborhood’s external boundaries to face the threats now directed (in principle) exclusively
from without. So, too, does the substitution of Jesus’s gigantic face for the tiny,
if public, tokens of a more traditional power accord to the logic of a conflict
that came to be carried out, already early on, in religion’s name. Such religious
or magical gating in the physical space of the city exemplifies the material ring
fencing that often prevails in a field of competing religious discourses.41
Still, more than any of the above, it is the Javanese Christian convert’s serial
displacements that best summarize—and complicate—the process of “simplification” fought out in Ambon’s streets. From this perspective, poetic justice
may explain why when, following successive flights, the convert finally arrives
to a place, this place is a refugee camp. Not only is this setting emblematic of
one of the war’s most devastating forms of social dislocation, that of the IDP,
but as such it offers a fitting mise-en-scène for another aspect of the Christian
subject’s radical dislocation—it is in the refugee camp, after all, where the serial
possession of GPM congregationalists takes place.42 Yet the particular form
taken by the displacements in the minister’s story also confounds this process
by hinting at how simplification generates not only stark separation along religious lines but also porosity, admitting points of passage between Muslim and
Christian and making it less absolute than it may seem. In what follows, I consider
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points of passage between Christians and Muslims and among coreligionists,
along with the efforts to control them.

Terms of Coexistence
“Coexistence,” following Benjamin Kaplan, a historian of the religiously mixed
societies of early modern Europe, “exposed members of each group to rival
beliefs and practices, and with that exposure came temptations, pressures,
knowledge of alternatives and the possibility of choice. . . . Life in a mixed
society presented rival groups with both opportunities and perils—the opportunity of gaining members, the peril of losing them.”43Already before the war,
the GPM had begun to feel the competitive pressure of other, primarily charismatic, churches that are relatively recent in Maluku. Many of these, like the
popular Pentecostal churches, appeal especially to Ambon’s many young
people,44 who are drawn by their lively prayer sessions, musically and technologically supported religious services, their outreach programs, and to a not
negligible extent, their cosmopolitan allure—in short, by their general ambiance
of conviviality, fun, and modernity. By comparison, the GPM had begun to
feel stiff, formalistic, and out of touch with young peoples’ lives. The possibility
of choice, present in principle in any situation of religious plurality, became
an urgent one during Ambon’s war when the sureties of everyday existence
seemed to evaporate and the need for security, protection, and community
became enhanced, forcing people to confront and evaluate their alternatives.
Choice can only be understood within this context and is not, in other words,
assimilable to an individualist consumerist position—the kind often identified
with conversion—or to that of an individual consciously, willfully, and “freely”
articulating her choice.45 Stories of conversion from Ambon suggest a much
more complex reality—commonly, a process of gradually coming to conversion,
even if it is storied afterward as a singular momentous change. There were also
some group conversions of families or, more spectacularly, the conversion to
a stricter neo-Salafi form of Islam that was entailed in the mass wedding ceremonies in which local women married jihadi soldiers during the war.
Unlike many of the converts I met in Ambon who had left the GPM for
another denomination due to a personal experience with violence or a general
disillusionment with the role of the city’s traditional church during the conflict,
a young woman who I will call Feby had been drawn to Pentecostalism before
the war. In this respect, she was part of a slow trend that was already underway
when I first visited Ambon in 1984. Having taught herself some English, repeatedly befriending and offering her services as a guide and translator to the
foreigner researchers and visitors who came to the city, Feby seemed especially
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taken with the cosmopolitanism that characterized her church. Whether a
coincidence or not, the English acronym ROCK of the Representatives of Christ’s
Kingdom church, with its evocation of not only foundational solidity but also
Western popular culture, does seem designed to appeal to Western-oriented
youth. Besides its name, the church’s international orientation comprises regular visits from foreign preachers, singing in English, images of traffic-swollen
urban highways or San Francisco’s Golden Gate Bridge projected onto huge
screens during select religious services, and a sizeable contingent of foreign-
marked Chinese Indonesians among its members.46 As one loyal GPM member
put it when speaking derogatively to me about Ambon’s Pentecostal churches,
“They are full of big people, moneyed people, with lots of Chinese.” She went
on to complain specifically about ROCK, alleging that it paid people to become
members, that they offered a lavish service, then summed up her grievances
by claiming that the GPM disapproved of these churches because there were
“outside of the GPM.”47 If nothing else, her blunt remarks demonstrate how
much, beyond any denominational differences, the mere fact of competition
was a problem for the old Protestant church.
In addition to her church’s cosmopolitanism, what also appealed to Feby
was the less hierarchical, more intimate relation this institution envisioned
with God as compared to the GPM. In one of our conversations about religion,
Feby spoke not only of how the GPM was changing due to competition from
the Pentecostals but of the difference between the old church and ROCK.48
Striking a rigid military pose with her arms pressed firmly to her sides, Feby
evoked the stiff, immobile attitude of the GPM as she related how even these
Protestants had begun to depart from their characteristically formal liturgy by
introducing “praise and worship” services. To underscore the contrast between
the two denominations, she noted how God in the Bible is addressed both as
“my father” and “my friend” and that, although both describe an intimate, familiar relationship, she preferred the latter. Reminiscent of the desire for proximity and presence that underwrites the street pictures, Feby insisted that God
not be treated like something distant and intangible or, as she put it graphically,
“like a ghost.” As I proposed in the last chapter, one of the changes occasioned
by the war was that the Christian Ambonese subject began to imagine herself
emplaced within a larger visual field. What Feby’s comments reveal is how, at
the other end of what we might conceptualize as a larger process of refocalization, God undergoes a crucial change in which not only his presence but his
tangible presence and humanity is increasingly—in the case of the street art,
quite literally—drawn to the fore and made visible.49 Refocalization reveals that
what is at stake here is more than a perspective or particular way of seeing but
an ideologically inflected vantage that permits, in this case, the Christian God
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to come into vision and to cohere as a privileged object of attention.50 Refocalizations such as these take place especially in transitional historical moments
where what was previously seen one way may take on a radically different appearance, stand in a different relation to its general cultural surround, or disappear from view altogether.51
Feby described how she and her fellow church members rejected war fought
with “blood and body” as they also distanced themselves from the pictures set
up in the streets by GPM Protestants.52 She spoke of how she and others erected
a “Prayer Tower” when they deemed the situation in the city especially “hot.”53
And how the nonstop, serial praying went on without interruption twenty-four
hours a day in which so-called “intercessors” relieved each other at periodic
intervals in what was understood as spiritual warfare targeting the devil. Another aspect of this battle of cosmic proportions was a thoroughgoing “healing
of the land” carried out both on land and at sea. Teams of about five or six
people descended before daybreak upon appointed sites in the city where violence had occurred and that figured on maps that had been drawn up by the
church on the basis of research. Admittedly, as a hub of the international spice
trade from the early seventeenth century, Ambon’s history has been unusually
violent and bloody. According to the Pentecostals, blood spilled violently demands a response, but only Christ’s blood can eradicate violence’s traces from
contaminated, blood-soaked land. Feby described how she and her small
“team”—a term that, incidentally, betrays the long reach of state bureaucracy
into daily life—would set out before dawn armed with Jesus’s authority to pour
“the blood of Christ,” or consecrated wine, on sites polluted by the spirits of
murder, adultery, and prostitution. During lulls in the violence, ROCK’s teams
ventured out while the rest of the city slept to drench the doorways of gambling
dens, karaoke bars, and other infected loci with Christ’s purifying blood. When
I asked Feby why the Pentecostals took such precautions to remain unseen,
she mimicked the voice of a fellow urbanite reacting in colloquial Ambonese
Malay to encountering her team going about its purifying work: “Hey, are they
crazy or what?” Aside from being a comment that exposes the perception of
the close proximity of religious others in Ambon’s urban environment, this
anticipated reaction reveals how much Pentecostals tended to see themselves
on the defensive against not only or so much Muslims or Catholics but especially Protestants of other denominations, notably the GPM.
Another young woman, whom I met through her work with a local interfaith
group, related how in 2001 her family had left the GPM to join a Pentecostal
church. Previously, Rona had been active in a GPM youth group but also occasionally accompanied friends who belonged to one of the city’s Pentecostal
churches to attend services there. These churches made her feel different—a
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feeling, as she described it, that touched her profoundly—adding in English,
“There is more immersion in God.”54 Her parents, however, were adamantly
opposed to the charismatic churches, until a nephew died whose family happened to be Pentecostal and her father was quite moved or “struck” by the
service. Both Rona’s and her father’s acquaintance with Ambon’s Pentecostal
churches highlight the crucial influence of family and friends in introducing
religious alternatives and raising the possibility of choice for others. Since, as
recalled by Rona, her father did not want to divide his family between different
denominations, family members agreed collectively to convert to the new
church and were baptized on the beach in 2001, a good two years into the war.
Quite consciously, the family chose not to join one of the city’s larger Pentecostal churches but opted for a smaller one that Rona described enthusiastically
for the sense of community, small-scale intimacy, and freedom of emotional
expression it allowed. Besides the less “general” or abstract language of its services, what she repeatedly emphasized was that “there is no feeling of embarrassment if you want to cry and this provides relief—even my father cries if
there is something going on at the office.”55 Throughout Rona’s account of her
family’s conversion, any mention of the war going on at the time was significant
for its absence. Yet the characteristics singled out by Rona as exemplary of her
church establish an implicit contrast with the GPM. They are also those that
came to be valorized during the war—namely, community, intimacy, and
emotional expression.
While not always articulated, the sense of how much the GPM had fallen
short comes across in the stories of those Ambonese who, in retrospect at least,
made clean breaks with the church by converting and radically reforming their
lives. In these instances, they described the desperate circumstances that had
driven them to convert. By focusing on these different conversion stories, I
have aimed to situate the competition that in part describes the relations among
the city’s Protestants and, in particular, the challenge that Ambon’s charismatic
churches pose for the GPM. While competition, including invidious comparison, may be a common feature of religiously mixed settings, the intensity of
the rivalry, the way it is dealt with by religious leaders and managed by state
authorities, the relative porosity or firmness of religious boundaries, and the
fluidity or strain in mutual relations all contribute to the great variety of inter-
as well as intrareligious relations across place and time. Along with significant
developments at the national level and the impact of globalizing trends and
forces—not the least the rise of Pentecostalism—the war in Ambon had dramatic effects on the place of religion in the city, on its everyday practice and
manner of integration into social life, and on its public presence. Besides the
delineation of stark religious boundaries or “simplification”—stiff versus more
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relaxed liturgical practice, religious services characterized by restrained or
more open expression, Christ up close as a friend or distant as a paternal
authority—transformation and fluidity also describe and helped to reconfigure
Ambon’s complicated religious terrain.
Although never static, religious difference within these charged circumstances was exceptionally dynamic, being negotiated again and again on war’s
unfolding terrain. War, more generally, is a context not always best described
as simply one of taking sides.56 It can help to promote cosmopolitan identities
by bringing together people of different ethnicities and religions (often against
their coreligionists) and engendering new patterns of circulation.57 Along these
lines and notwithstanding the fears of a traditional Protestantism under storm,
a pragmatic if tentative ecumenicalism also began to take root in the city
during the conflict. Such rapprochement, encouraged by an acute awareness
of commonality forged under fire in a “Christian” versus “Muslim” war, involved a détente not only between different Protestant denominations but also
between them and the Catholics, marking a revolution in relations among
different Christians in Maluku. It also glossed over the fears of Ambon’s traditional Protestants regarding the serious competition posed by the newer charismatic churches.
For much of Malukan history, both under the Dutch and thereafter, relations
between Muslims and Christians were unequal. Less acknowledged is the fact
that relations between Protestants and Catholics were especially marked by
rivalry and mutual suspicion. Undoubtedly, there was some mimicry of the
Dutch colonizers in this. But at stake, too, were the considerable numbers of
as yet unconverted peoples to be fought over in large parts of Central Maluku
like Seram and Buru and in the Southeast Malukan islands. To manage this
competition, the Dutch maintained the historical dominance of Protestants
in Central Maluku, while allowing Catholics to missionize only in Southeast
Maluku beginning in the late nineteenth century.58 Historically, in some respects then, the Christians had always kept more of an eye on each other than
on the Muslims, something that seems exemplified by the spatial location of
Ambon’s main religious institutions. Today, as in the past, the central artery
of Pattimura Avenue, which began to regain its prewar elegance a decade or
so after the official peace, boasts at one end the new and older Catholic cathedral and bishopric offices and, at the other, the GPM’s head Maranatha church
and synod headquarters. As elsewhere in Indonesia, the city’s main mosques,
the historic Jamu Masjid and the Al Fatah, are located in the area along the
coast or the traditional place of Muslim settlement around the archipelago,
while Ambon’s newer churches are scattered throughout the city in its predominantly Christian areas (Figure 32). This long-standing settlement pattern explains
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Figure 32. Map of Ambon indicating the location of important mosques and churches and the
city’s main “Gaza Strip” on A.M. Sangaji Street. From top left to bottom right: Jami Mosque,
Al-Fatah Great Mosque, An-Nur Great Mosque of Batu Merah, Silo Church under repair in
2003, Maranatha church, statue of Saint Francis Xavier in front of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Ambon. Map by Marie de Lutz. Photo of the An-Nur Great Mosque of Batu Merah by
Ratih Prebatasari, Ambon, 2020. All other photos by the author, Ambon, 2003 and 2016.

why, in Ambon, the Christians are commonly designated as “those who live
landside” or “those who live up above [in the hills]” versus the Muslims who
“live seaside.”59
Against the historical background of rivalry between Protestants and Catholics and the more recent interdenominational competition among the former,
the unprecedented sense of Christian fraternity, the idea that “we are all Christians,” is evidenced, for instance, in the inclusive statement of a GPM church
council member who commended the Christian street pictures for showing
that “Jesus is . . . here [and] he gives strength to all Christians—not just Protestants, but also Catholics, Adventists, Pentecostals, Assembly of God,”60 in the
practice of “pulpit exchange,” following which a Protestant minister would lead
a service in a Catholic church and vice versa, and most strikingly in the image
of Christ clasping the sacred heart to his chest in some of the city’s new
Protestant-produced pictures. Also important was the public display of Christian solidarity and show of numbers. In a spectacular demonstration of unity,
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denominations of Protestants joined Catholics in Ambon’s streets, totaling
about five hundred church leaders in all, in a December 23, 2000, protest against
the forced conversion to Islam of Christians at the hands of jihadis in the
Southeast Malukan islands of Kesui and Teor.61 Once the war was over, Protestants marched behind the Catholics in the latter’s Easter Passion parade and
the GPM appointed a church representative whose task it was to promote ecumenical relations.62 This novel fraternity was not without friction. While
lamenting, with obvious amusement, how difficult it is to “organize priests,”
one Malukan priest recalled the displeasure of the Protestants when a group
of Catholic clergymen showed up in their lay clothes for one such joint procession to march alongside Protestant ministers and council members fully
arrayed in black.63
By 2011, a new portrait of Jesus surfaced on city walls depicting Jesus as a
King or Jesus of the Second Coming at a time when most other Christian pictures had faded into the texture of city walls (Figure 33). Personally, for the painter
Jhon, these portraits confirmed his stabilized identification with the Pentecostal
church ROCK. Emergent at this time, almost a decade after the city’s official
peace, this mural publicly and graphically confirmed the intense religious
mobility of Ambon’s Protestants, especially the move of sizeable numbers of
GPMers away from the city’s oldest church. But the image may also be seen as
yet another form of simplification, gesturing toward the GPM’s quiet transformation from within. This process comprised deliberate innovations, like a
praise and worship service, but also the exorcisms organized by a handful of
GPM ministers to liberate afflicted congregationalists—due to their reliance
on magical agency, sorcery attacks from envious neighbors, or the mere presence of a bloodthirsty ancestor in their family background. To be sure, the
GPM’s Pentecostalization is slow, contested, and its outcome uncertain. As
one of the GPM ministers at the forefront of this movement told me, exorcisms,
not being traditional to Ambon’s Calvinist church, remain vigorously opposed
by a majority of GPM ministers. In his view, they are not sufficiently aware of
just how widespread the dark forces besetting Christians are or, indeed, how
best to combat them.64

Symptomatology: Treacherous Things
Objects, object worlds, and the natural and the built environment are implicated in violence—unmoored, displaced, revalued, disfigured, destroyed, or
redrawn by its traces, signs, or denial. They help to delineate the lines of battle
and act as crucial media of communication and conveyers of friendship or
hostility. They have tangible, at times even disastrous, effects, like the tiny stone

Figure 33. Images of Christ of the Second Coming on two painted murals and,
between these, a third painting of Christ of the Second Coming on the interior wall
of a church, Ambon, 2005. Photos by the author.

178

Religion under the Sign of Crisis

transacted between a Muslim and a Christian woman, or they may stand in
for commensurability or its rupture. Some authors propose that material objects
assume special salience in situations of religious plurality, as in this quotation
that resonates uncannily with Ambon during the war: “Whether Muslims and
Christians are protecting or building one another’s sacred places or burning
them, or sharing a meal or handshake or refusing to do so, it is in material
things that the plural is realized.”65 Approaching things as symptoms, this section explores some of the ways in which objects were revamped in style, scale,
and import, technologically reproduced, and deployed differently, as well as
attacked and destroyed—in short, put to work in war in various ways. I pay
special attention to how objects were marshaled and mobilized within the
augmented, quickened traffic that both trespassed and redrew religious boundaries articulating anew Christian red versus Muslim white opponents and realigning relations among coreligionists.
If, following the minister, Muslims and Christians resembled each other in
their wartime reliance on magic, it was the Protestants who initially turned to
the Catholics for protection of a more conventional religious kind. At the outset
of the conflict, when Catholics had not yet been implicated in the fighting and
the city’s bishop profiled himself as a mediator between the warring parties,66
Protestants visited priests, requesting rosaries to help them “pass” as Catholics.
As the war went on and Catholics were drawn into the conflict, the nature of
such requests changed. Over time, things produced by the Catholics and initially sought as aids in the dissimulation of religious identity became increasingly coveted for their ascribed protective powers. To meet this demand, several
nuns set up a small industry in Ambon that relied on the easy availability of
the photocopy machines whose ubiquity attests to the Indonesian state’s enormous bureaucracy and the incessant demands it makes on its citizenry. The
nuns turned out photocopied, stapled, pocket-size prayer booklets in large
numbers, which were worn on the body as protective devices in battle. Muslims, for their part, carried pocket-size Qur’ans and tiny flasks of holy water to
be sprinkled over them should they succumb in the fighting.
Recourse to the readily available infrastructure of technological reproducibility, coupled with the need for protective props, also underwrites the account
of a Chinese Indonesian refugee from North Maluku, who spoke to me of the
extensive use her future assailants had made of the photocopy machine in her
Tobelo store.67 Only later had she realized the significance of the multiple
sheets that several Muslims commissioned only a day or so before the onslaught
upon her town began. Only later, too, did she recognize the crossed swords
supporting an open book as the insignia of the Laskar Jihad movement that
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the jihadis who drove her from her home wore folded in neat little packets
within their robes.68
The protective qualities of such things were often celebrated in stories that
circulated on both sides during the war. Take, for instance, this account of a
young refugee who spoke of how, upon fleeing an attack by Muslims, she left
her father with a “pocket bible, to protect him” as he remained behind to guard
the village church. “He put it in his shirt pocket. Later he was hit by a bullet
that remained stuck in the bible. That saved his life.” In an interview with a
Dutch documentary filmmaker, the girl’s father confirmed her story: “I survived
that shot in my chest because of that little bible,” as he showed her the bible
with the bullet hole.69 While miniature bibles and Qur’ans nestled close to
bodies, other personalized religious tokens were more public, some even growing in size, like the bling crosses that young Protestant men, often the same
persons who helped put into place the monumental Christian murals, took to
wearing around their necks. Besides T-shirts and crosses, the colored head ties
worn by Christians and Muslims, and the amulets and religious artifacts they
carried into battle, jihadist propaganda DVDs display a fantastic array of Islamic
calligraphy inscribed on headbands and across shirts in a revival of an older
wartime practice.70
Things also stood at the center of delicate and aggressive realignments in
the relations between coreligionists. As the war dragged on, I heard how some
local Muslim leaders began to cautiously complain about the exacting demands
of the Laskar Jihad, whose arrival in the city early on in the war they had initially welcomed with open arms. The complaints were articulated across a
widening rift in which Muslim Ambonese detailed the jihadis’ inherent difference from themselves in primarily material terms—singling out their untrimmed beards, cropped trousers, and robes and the long, black attire of their
women. Other border skirmishes include two iconoclastic events—one among
coreligionists, the other pitting Muslim against Christian. The first involved
Pak Nus Tamaela, one of the indigenous Christ painters, who at the behest of
several Pentecostal ministers destroyed, in what his son called a “crisis of faith,”
the cement statues and paintings of ancestral Malukan war leaders that he had
produced over the years.71 A second event, related by Ambon’s former bishop
Monseigneur Andreas Sol, involved a saint’s portrait whose painted eyes somewhat unsettlingly pursued the viewer. When Muslims occupied the general
area in which the church with the saint’s portrait was located, it so unnerved
them that they rapidly provided the saint with a pair of painted dark glasses.
There is much to say about these episodes, in particular the potential for animacy that haunts them both and that was implicitly acknowledged in the first
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instance in the destruction of the headhunter effigies and, in the second, the
defacement of the saint’s portrait, but I discuss them elsewhere.72
Through the untoward behavior of things and the ways in which both objects in motion and those serving as community signposts delineated, undermined, and repeatedly reinscribed this Malukan field of urban religion, religion’s
salience as an important legacy of the long Suharto era also comes to the fore.
Center stage in such a field—indeed, the very starting point of this treacherous
affair—is not simply matter out of place but a multitude of shape-shifting,
death-dealing things whose power to harm is only revealed after the fact, once
it is too late, through their affective and material consequences in the world.
Much like acts of terrorism, the effects of such things make tangible and visible
what hitherto had been present, yet unseen.73 It is telling, in this regard, that
the voice of Salma, increasingly anguished, reportedly cried out in church for
the small stone of which she had been bereft and that, fetishistically, held sway
over her, “Stone, stone, stone, where are you?” The power of things and the deceptive nature of appearance in Ambon’s wartime was further disclosed not only
through alterations in the shape of objects, including the impact of dramatically
varying scale, but in the discourse surrounding the fugitive identities of persons
in the conflict’s thick, murky reality.

Symptomatology: Treacherous Persons
Haunting by an Other can also gesture elsewhere—not only to displacement,
annihilation, and the forging of hard-edged, simplified identities but to the
inability to foreclose the other. Haunting is a disturbed acknowledgment,
however tenuous and oblique, of an ethical claim of an Other upon the self.
This means foregrounding in the scene of possession the sense of being
overtaken by force, or summoned by a call or demand that cannot be refused—
an agency, in other words, that has everything to do with haunting. This, I
propose, is what Ambon’s scene of possession also has to offer. I am encouraged to take this route rather than one that leads only to entrenchment and
violence by cues from Ambonese Christians themselves. Many, to be sure,
insist that their own faces are illuminated as opposed to what they describe
as the dark illegibility of the Muslim, or what is also spoken of as the latter’s
inherent lack of aura. Allowing the illuminated Christian face to triumph—
whether in the miracle of the Lord’s appearance to a Muslim convert confirming her “possession” by the Christian spirit or in everyday invidious
comparisons from which Christians, in their own view, emerge shining—
challenges the Christian eclipse by potent Muslim agency in the GPM minister’s account.
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Famously, Emmanuel Lévinas singles out the face of the Other as the site
of a particular ethical injunction, as bearing within it an infinite demand.74
The sign of a radical, inassimilable alterity, the face signals an interruption. It
conveys “a demand that I become dispossessed in a relationality that always
puts the other first.”75 It also assumes that this other is inassimilable, something
that interrupts my own continuity, thereby making impossible an “autonomous”
self at some distance from an “autonomous” other.76 This ontology of the self
constituted via a prior eruption at the core of the self entails a critique of the
autonomous subject, one that also undermines a view of cultures or, for that
matter, religions as autonomous domains among which dialogue should be
established.77 It evokes instead a much more complicated, entangled sense of
plurality and cohabitation.
This disavowal of the possibility to constitute fixed and stable identitarian
positions is characteristic of work in political theory and political philosophy
that, while drawing on Carl Schmitt’s political theology with its emphasis on
the friend/enemy distinction, attempts to move beyond its totalizing implications. Such work highlights the possibilities of semantic slippage and reversal
in Schmittian perspectives—underscoring how the enemy can be a friend, the
friend is sometimes an enemy, how the border between them is fragile, porous,
and contestable.78 This slippage can open the way to a political theology of the
neighbor, a third position alongside that of friend and enemy, an exception to
the exception of sovereignty to which I will return.79 But it can also describe a
scene of terror like that of Ambon during the war.
On the ground in Ambon, things were often no clearer, facilitating their
own hazardous slippages. If Christian Ambonese tended to assert a clear difference between their own faces and those of Muslims, many also maintained
that this difference is immediately apparent. At least in a pronounced sense,
this seems a recent development in the relations between Christians and Muslims in Ambon. A journalist friend who called the conflict a monster described
how, before it, the city’s Christians and Muslims would often be invoked in a
single breath as “Salam-Serani” or a conjoined “Muslim-Christian” pair. As a
child, he recalled, he could tell the difference between Muslim and Christian,
but only during the war did such difference become something truly to be
seen, as it also spawned a slew of new terms like red and white, Acang and Obet,
or Islam and Kristen that marked the rift of enmity that had become consolidated between former neighbors.80 Running through a list of distinctions of
dress, religious symbols, and dialectical variation, my journalist friend confided,
lowering his voice, that “our faces are more illuminated.”81 Similarly, and with
equal circumspection, one of Ambon’s young painters explained, while speculating that God may have bestowed such signs to distinguish Christians from
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Muslims, that the difference between them came down to illumination: Christians bathe in divine light, while Muslims lack aura.
Remarkably, this certainty glosses—if barely—a radical uncertainty. While
prepared especially during the Islamicization of the late Suharto years, uncertainty became aggravated during the conflict. It pertains in particular to the
identities of friend and enemy, to the positioning, more broadly, of Muslim
and Christian with respect to each other, and, most poignantly for Protestants,
to the status and location—indeed, even physical presence and futurity—of
Christians in Ambon and in Indonesia generally today. Excerpts from an interview with a civil servant from the city’s provincial forestry department, who
I will call Hengky, demonstrate how the assertion of a radical, discernible
difference between Muslim and Christian dissolves, again and again, into
uncertainty. Quite canonically, the topic was spies who had infiltrated his
majority-Christian neighborhood during the war and had been discovered and
brutally killed. Such talk is an instance of the larger discourse distinguished
by what I call an aesthetics of depth, since it revolves around the disguises,
dissimulations, and deceptive identities held to be prevalent during the war
and the countermoves these provoked to penetrate the treacherous appearances
of persons and things, the dense, layered reality described in Chapter 1. What
this discourse makes clear is that while difference may be something one can
see, what one sees cannot necessarily be trusted. This fine line can make all
the difference—indeed, even between life and death. Of particular concern
were fake national armed forces soldiers who turned out, the man claimed, to
be spies, an identity that recalls the army uniform in a stringer’s clip that the
camera repeatedly circles over as if to summon forth another reality beneath
its khaki surface (see Chapter 1). When I asked how he knew they were Muslims, he explained:
Because you know. There is a difference between Muslims and
Christians—they are different. You can see it . . . We have been
associating with them for a long time so we can tell, “Oh, that’s a
Muslim.” It’s like that for Christians down in the city, they know, too,
“Oh, that’s a Christian.” You can tell right away because it has been
a long time that we have been living together.
But once in a while, there’s a Christian who looks to us like a Muslim.
Like our people from Toraja. Torajans have traits like Buginese, right?
[Designating members of the Muslim diaspora from South Sulawesi,
many of whom have been present in Maluku for centuries, including
in Ambon.] Just like Buginese. “Wah, that’s a Muslim!” If you ask him,
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[he’ll say] “No, I’m a Christian,” but he would not be believed. And if at
some time, there is an armed crowd, a Christian crowd, and he panics
because there’s a really large mob—with machetes, all kinds of weapons—and they want to kill him, he panics! But if someone comes along
and asks him really calmly, and there is someone who knows him who
can say, “Oh yes, it’s true! He’s from Batugajah, he’s a Christian,” then
it’s safe, just like that. But if no one knows him, that’s it, it’s over right
then and there.82
While indigenous Christian and Muslim Ambonese would recognize each
other spontaneously, he claimed, these other cases had to do with “people from
elsewhere, Christians from outside, for instance, like the ones who look like
Buginese that I mentioned before. That was sadistic—because we thought they
were Muslim.”
It took little, apparently, for confusion between Christians and Muslims to
set in, for the adamant assertion of certainty to unravel, even if here such confusion is projected onto Christians from outside Maluku. Besides the occasional
“Judas” or Christian who, for payment, would set fire to Christian property,
another topic that came up in the conversation brought such uncertainty even
closer to home. During the war, among the array of signals they used to communicate with each other, Christians deployed secret passwords as a means of
recognizing each other and sorting friend from foe. Although Hengky mentioned it was commonly after nightfall when such codes were used—implying
that in daylight one would know a fellow Christian by their face—this example
suggests that spotting a Christian or, for that matter, a Muslim is less straightforward than many claim. Within the exceptions raised to the immediate
recognition of Christian versus Muslim, the password counts as yet another
sign of uncertainty that surfaced in our conversation to undermine the certainty
with which it began. Even as this uncertainty was displaced into the darkness
of night or onto non-Ambonese, it hinted at the enormous fears and risks of
slippage and reversal—how the enemy may be a friend, the friend sometimes
an enemy. More urgently, the border between them—patrolled by the anticipatory practices of an aesthetics of depth, by passwords to secure identity, and
by the other tactics and symptoms of war—is fragile, porous, and dangerous.
Like that of the possessed Javanese convert, this example exemplifies the extent
to which an aesthetics of depth haunted war’s terrain as surface manifestations
became suspect and treachery lurked behind the most banal appearances. It
also confirms, as the epithet to this book asserts, how the true mystery of the
world is not the invisible but the visible.

184

Religion under the Sign of Crisis

Neighbors and Neighborhoods
The moving stone that set off Ambon’s possession captures the necessary dynamism at the heart of cohabitation, a relationality that, admittedly, only in the
best of possible worlds amounts to a dispossession that always puts the other first.
This is clearly not the situation in Ambon, nor, of course, has it ever been, but
we may catch a glimmer of this possibility—admittedly, oblique and tenuous—in
the Javanese convert’s dramatic possession that frames this chapter: “The principle of conversion, of one person insinuating his or her mode of interpretation
in the mind of another, informs all dialogue.”83 Street names, family names,
and conventional ways of designating neighborhoods and areas in Ambon
intimate a story of such mutual “insinuation” in the astonishing admixture
and long-standing side-by-side living that these document. Family names like
Gasperz, de Lima, Bahaweres, van Blauw, van Heling, van Houten, de Fretes,
de Queljoe, Basalama, Alkatiri, Alhabsi, Veerman, Camerling, Kastanya, Alfons,
Rugebrek, de Jong, van Room, van Broudhorst, Van Harleem, Muskita, da
Costa, Engels, van Hof, Bremer, Parera, Payer, Seslovski, Olchevski, de Sousa,
Noya, van Delsen, van Bergen, Souisa, de Keizer, Roehoebrek, Hamdan, Waas,
Mendoza, Alhamid, Alatas, Alhadar, Bachmid, Atamimi, and no doubt others
attest to the long history of trade and colonialism—including that of the Dutch
East India Company, designated in the Netherlands as the world’s first multinational company—and to the presence of Portuguese, Arabs, Spaniards,
English, and others, many of whom preceded the Dutch in Maluku. Add to
this list the names of Indonesians from elsewhere, today and in the past, Javanese, Buginese, and Makassarese, Malukans from Ambon-Lease and from the
islands to the north and south, not to mention the many slaves and the colonial
and postcolonial government employees, naturalists, and adventurers who
visited the city through the years. Street and alley names show how this diversity
inscribed itself in Ambon’s formal and informal infrastructure: a casual survey
of gang, or urban alleys, yielding Gang Violeta, Gang Yosef Kam, and Gang
da Silva; jalan, or street, offering Jalan Valentijn, Jalan Franciskus Xaverius,
and Jalan Anthoni Reebok; with the areas of Tantui (Tan Hui), Menerlim—
from the Dutch “Meneer Lim” for “Mr. Lim” or, as my journalist friend Novi
Pinontoan corrected, “actually Tuan Lim”—and Hongko Liong evidencing
the important Chinese presence; and, finally, OSM, an acronym for the Dutch
Opleiding School Maritiem, standing in for the neighborhood where the colony’s Maritime Training School once stood.84 Today, all of these historic names
blend with those bestowed under the Indonesian Republic, commemorating
its many heroes and replicated across the country in the nomenclature of its
cities and towns. In addition to these examples, there are all those groups and
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persons who, in myriad ways, also left their marks by passing through or settling
in the city, but whose names do not appear in its official topography. Although
the old names endure, at least in memory, this palimpsestic urban space was
written over and partially erased as the war’s violence zoned the city into red
and white neighborhoods—the territories, respectively, of Acang and Obet—
identified several Malukan Gaza Strips to publicize this difference, and as
some streets were renamed in Muslim areas to reflect the successes of jihad,
like Martyr Street.
Under what conditions does ideological clarity become urgent, necessary,
or unavoidable? When is it more compelling to stake out hard-edged, simplified
positions—socially, spatially, and representationally—than to leave things flexible and fuzzy at the edges? This chapter documents the story of religion under
the sign of crisis, a story of a dramatically shifting terrain in which the Christian
Javanese refugee possessed by Muslim spirits is not alone in her fraught, layered
subjectivity but surfaces within a cluster of similarly complicated if less problematically crossed figures. Recall from the previous chapter Minister Mohammed, who baptized the self-described former worshipper of statues and Chinese
Indonesian convert to militant Christianity, or the avid fan of Seram’s allegedly
bellicose ancient headhunting culture and father of ministers from competing
Christianities, or the painter of Ambon’s apocalypse who embraced Pentecostalism following his narrow escape from death. Far from forgettable instances
of religion on the fringe, these persons and others like them occupied the very
center of an urban environment in the grips of diabolical crisis, one that exposed its fractures, imbalances, and points of tension—with all the distress,
upheaval, and terror that accompanied that. Beyond simple exposure, the fault
lines these people exemplify point to deep seismic shifts in Ambon’s social,
religious, political, and, crucially, aesthetic terrain, contributing over time to
transformations in the distribution of the sensible in the city and beyond.
Emerging side by side in Ambon’s postwar environment, its scenes of possession and proliferating Jesus faces seem to pull in opposite directions. If the
possessions intimate the possibility of an ethical injunction, of the Christian
inability to cancel or close out the Muslim, the gigantic Jesus pictures appear
to accomplish just that. Monumentalizing the Christian face on the ruins of
the recent war appears to proclaim at one and the same time the facelessness
of the Muslim. In light of the uncertainty that undermines Christian assertions
of a clear-cut distinction between their illuminated faces and the auraless ones
of Muslims, the Jesus pictures seem to protest too much. This protest both
realizes itself and dissipates in the drive to monumentalize Christian community icons, in the repaintings and refreshings to which the paintings were
periodically subject, and in the reiteration of Christ’s portrait again and again.
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Much as their gigantic scale, the refreshings have the effect of enhancing the
pictures—with brighter colors and clearer outlines, they stand out better in
public space. In the immediate postwar, it was as if Ambon’s Christians could
not do enough to proclaim the pictures’ presence. All of these efforts imply
that a single picture or even multiples did not suffice to carry out the work for
which they were intended. Precisely the pictures’ huge, multiplying status hints
that even infinite reproductions might be unable to achieve the demands made
of them, while also highlighting the dubious grounds on which the identitarian
claims they portray were constructed. The pictures disclose the inability—no
matter how many are put in place or how big they might be—to foreclose the
Muslims who live with and alongside the Christians, making Ambon the fascinating, complicated, multireligious, and multiethnic urban reality that it is.
From this perspective, Christ’s painted face, much like possession, if more
obliquely, is haunted—by the Muslim who hedges and delimits the Christian
like some energetic dark shadow.
Barring some exceptions, like Silale with its many migrants, most of Ambon’s
neighborhoods were not only traditionally segregated on the basis of religion
and ethnicity, following colonial policy, but also tightly knit. Certainly, this
was and continues to be the case for those neighborhoods that are traditional
GPM strongholds. This is also where women come into the picture. Recall
that among the five members of the GPM prayer group where the possessions
took place, four were women. In Ambon, as in many parts of the world, women
guarantee the everyday fabric of the religious lifeworld—as the crucial nodes
of Christian neighborhood and congregational sector networks and by ensuring
the weekly cycle of domestic and neighborhood prayers, organizing life cycle
events, producing the food served on these and other occasions, and running
the numerous church drives and collections. Within the congregation they
occupy important positions; indeed, Ambon boasts many women ministers.
As scholars note, for Ambon and other parts of Indonesia that have witnessed
religious violence, government institutions and offices, local political economy,
and social life tend generally to be organized along religious lines. Religion in
such places is not limited to the church but defines the very structure of society.85 That the large majority of those possessed in the minister’s account were
women therefore points to something else—namely, the anxiety among Protestants that the very fabric of their lifeworld was under siege, one held and
woven together in significant, religiously defined ways by women. If the possessions struck at the intimate core of the GPM’s wartime congregational
life—the tiny prayer groups set up during the conflict—so, too, does the
predominance of women protagonists in this event underscore how invasive
the city’s diabolical crisis was. In singling out women, the demonic possession
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attacked the gendered lineaments that sustain the network of sector and subsector organization binding neighbors and neighborhoods, bringing them
together regularly in a range of religiously defined constellations, all mobilized
by and dependent on women. Besides the daily flow of gossip, mutual assistance, and common need or interest that characterize neighborhoods almost
everywhere, the weekly cycles of prayer, along with the socializing and food
sharing that accompany them, tightly structure the space and time of Ambon’s
Christian neighborhoods along gender-and age-based lines—with, for instance,
an all-male prayer group scheduled on Tuesday evenings, that of women on
Wednesdays, adolescents on yet another day, and so on—that crosscut wider
family and extended kin ties. More generally, the New Order and post–New
Order state have relied on women’s labor to produce key political and economic
orders in the name of neighborliness through national organizations like the
one for female civil servants and civil servants’ wives.86 From the time of the
Japanese occupation of Indonesia during World War II, neighborhoods have
also been key building blocks of state control and monitoring of the population,
a form of governmentality that was ideologically reinforced by terms that codified the alleged traditional values of neighborly cooperation and mutual
assistance.87
If the production of a neighborhood, under any conditions, can itself be
understood as the exercise of power over some form of recalcitrant environment,
then the Christian neighborhood, with its tight skein of crosscutting relations
and weekly and annual Christian rhythms, exemplifies this kind of production.88
This explains why such neighborhoods so readily became the rallying point
for collective, religiously defined action in wartime. But other stories also
emerged during the conflict, notably from religiously mixed neighborhoods—
stories of people protecting and harboring their neighbors from “the other side”
against attacks from their coreligionists, often at risk to their own lives. Nor
were all the displacements that resulted in the religious purification of the city’s
neighborhoods solely motivated by aggression. A moving collection of accounts
of nonviolent resistance at the grassroots level from different parts of Indonesia,
including Maluku, where violence occurred during the unraveling of Suharto’s
regime offers countless examples of people standing up to defend their neighbors, combatting prejudice and rumors.89
At times, this meant escorting them out of their neighborhood to a place of
greater safety where they could live alongside people of their own religion.
Other stories celebrate soccer’s diplomacy or small, courageous gestures, like
making token purchases at the Christian kiosk across the road from a Muslim
neighborhood, a public performance meant to be seen by others. When neighbors did turn on each other, they often, apparently, relied on others, coreligionists
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from elsewhere, to do the dirty work vis-à-vis their immediate neighbors. Apart
from neighbors, schoolmates and officemates of different religions would meet
each other, when possible, at the barricades set up in the city center, at military
checkpoints, or on payday in the case of civil servants. Cellphone text messaging offered another means of connection. To be sure, such contact was limited,
often impossible, and came with considerable risk, especially from coreligionists. In the public service announcement featuring the Muslim Acang and the
Christian Obet, this kind of contact is sentimentalized in the boys’ prearranged,
clandestine encounter (see Chapter 1). The fate of this PSA, however, which
provided the conflict’s most popular names of enmity, suggests how dangerous
and contested such contact must have been.
Until now, I have written of literal neighbors, of peoples who have lived side
by side for a long time, have shared with or shunned each other, have exchanged
and communicated, positively and negatively, in myriad ways and in shifting
historical and political circumstances. To restrict this account, however, to a
pair of two, the encounter of the neighbor and the self, is to forego the possibility of conceiving of the third or the mediation and symbolic representation
on which any politics is based.90 An ethics of two inevitably involves a choice—
one chooses this neighbor over that—and thus ends up dividing the world into
friends and enemies. By contrast, politics moves beyond the face-to-face relation to open out onto an infinite series of potential encounters, “without
limit and without totalization, a field without the stability of the margins.”91
Seen in this light, the neighbor would coincide with the stranger—not just
the faceless one but the faceless many otherwise left in the shadow in the
privileging of the one.92
With this in mind, it is worth looking again at Ambon’s Christian billboards
and especially how they are positioned in urban space. With few exceptions,
the billboards and murals face outward, turning away from what, for all practical purposes, became gated communities to confront whoever passes them
by. Commonly, they stand at Christian neighborhood entrances on curbs and
sidewalks at the edge of public streets and on land usually owned by the city.
Yet, if these pictures gate and brand the community, they also seem to extend
an invitation outward—to others and to strangers to look back. If this appears
too outrageous a claim, think then of the advertisements whose location the
Christian pictures often usurp or recall the gigantic suffering Jesus faces that
dot the highway and greet the visitor on her way from Pattimura Airport into
Ambon—whether she is a fellow Malukan or Indonesian from elsewhere, a
government or business envoy from Jakarta, a national or international NGO
activist or humanitarian aid worker, a returning migrant, a vacationing Dutch
Malukan, a journalist, a tourist, a stranger.
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A Muslim woman who was active in a local NGO that worked closely in
some of the city’s refugee camps with a partner Christian organization identified the addressee of the Christian pictures as the stranger or persons from
elsewhere who, predominantly as part of the transnational humanitarian aid
industry,93 flocked to Ambon during the war and the years immediately thereafter. In her view, the pictures were not aimed at enemies or ill-intended
strangers but served as helpful signposts assisting those unfamiliar with the
city to navigate its treacherous georeligious patchwork of segregated space, no-
go areas, and friendly versus hostile terrain.94 The broader conditions of the
postwar city—especially its displaced and refugee populations, returning migrants, densely packed neighborhoods, and urban crowds, not to mention its
recent history of a city “possessed,” along with the sheer pragmatics of living
with religious and other pluralities—are relevant to any thinking about neighbors and neighborhoods. While neither the possibility of violence nor the desire
for the other’s elimination have been exorcised from the postwar city, I close
this chapter by suggesting how the scene of Ambon’s possession hints at something else—namely, the possibility of a resignification of the friend/enemy
contrast, which would open out onto the social bond that moves one away from
intractability and the hard terms of stark oppositions. Considering spirit possession and the city’s Christian pictures in the same frame positions these two
sites in the postwar city that—however strangely and obliquely—open the
possibility of a distinct political theology of the neighbor. Taken together, they
intimate a way where haunting signals cohabitation, the possibility of a generosity toward one’s others and toward strangers.

Figure 34. Alleyway
with faded murals of
Christ overlooking the
city of Ambon exploding with violence,
Ambon, 2005. Photos
by the author.
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Provoking Peace

The image of peace and reconciliation that cropped up insistently during Ambon’s conflict and following February 2002’s peace agreement focused on the
child. Across different media, ranging from signage and drawings to photographic
portraits, short films, and public service announcements on radio and television,
the child’s face, voice, and bodily presence were repeatedly invoked to depict
and affectively charge the peaceful cohabitation of Muslims and Christians in
the postwar city. Besides productions featuring single or, more often, paired
children, drawings and signs produced by them—in refugee camps, NGO-
sponsored posttraumatic healing programs, and schools—that evoked the child
indexically via her handwritten slogans and colorful scenes of visual equality
between Muslim and Christian were especially popular. To introduce the genre,
consider an example from a contest organized in 2003 for Muslim and Christian
boys by the Peace and Love Forum of the Jesuit Refugee Service, one among
many organizations running reconciliation-themed activities in the period after
Ambon’s official peace. Awarded first prize, the drawing is exemplary of what
postwar reconciliation is supposed to look like (Figure 35). A Muslim imam and
a Protestant minister monumentalized and cut off at the waist hover like huge,
heroic busts over a cityscape; behind them, an enlarged church and mosque
frame an Indonesian flag showing the overlapping hearts of the JRS Peace and
Love Forum. A handshake joining the two men mimics the official handshakes
of the Malino II Peace Agreement so often profiled in print media and on television, while it visualizes the diffuse influence of Indonesia’s state apparatus
and bureaucratic rituals within the everyday imagination of the country’s citizens.1 Besides the emblematic handshake bolstered by sentiment in the form
of two conjoined hearts, the picture exhibits other features that recur in the
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Figure 35. Prize-winning drawing from the Forum for Love and Peace contest sponsored by the
Jesuit Refugee Service, Ambon, 2003. Photo by the author.

city’s reconciliation genre, especially the church-mosque pair, but also the Indonesian flag and modern Malukan cityscape dominated by skyscrapers. Such
images operated within a limited repertoire where the majority echoed and
resonated closely with each other. Compositionally, almost all such drawings
staged a balance between Muslim and Christian picture halves evident in the
image’s formal symmetry and the agreement—a handshake, twinned hearts, a
pair of doves or white cockatoos—portrayed at its center.
This striking, emblematic picture sets the scene for an exploration of reconciliation and peace initiatives that are the focus of this chapter. Following a
discussion of the discourse and practice of reconciliation that framed such initiatives, especially though not exclusively in Ambon, which establishes the main
parameters within which such initiatives occurred, I closely follow four of them.
They include the ideologically heavy-handed “child in the picture” genre, exemplified by the JRS drawing, and the peace journalism promoted under the
auspices of international organizations like USAID, the British Council, and
Deutsche Welle as an important part of the wider transformation of media practice within Indonesia’s democratic transition. Aiming for balanced coverage, this
peace journalism—according to journalists I spoke with in North Sulawesi—advocated a reporting that, with the best intentions, excised and obfuscated many
of the explanatory circumstances of the war. By omitting key information, the
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journalists aimed to scale the warring parties down to equal size and avoid privileging one over the other, something that, in their view, risked further exacerbating the conflict. If this practice recalls the studied symmetry of the JRS
reconciliation drawing, albeit in a different register, I show how a foundational
sense of inequality underwrote their peace journalism. I then turn to two other
peace initiatives that were less concerned with representing and enabling reconciliation than with preventing violence by promoting positive images of religious plurality in postwar Ambon. The first are the self-styled Peace Provocateurs,
a loose network of Muslims and Christians who work together to prevent incidents
and reports of violence (often false or aggravated) from spreading and escalating
in the city by countering provocative information with evidence circulated as
text messages and photographs that rely on the widespread use of cellphones in
Indonesia, including Maluku. The second are image-activist collectives, again,
with Muslim and Christian members, who were troubled by the ongoing presence of online photographs showing Ambon at war several years after peace had
been concluded. To change the appearance of the place in accordance with what
they envisioned as its postwar reality, these young women and men shot sunsets
and other attractive scenes and then posted their photographs online. Another
group that emerged partly out of the earlier photography club is that of Maluku
Sketch Walkers, in solidarity and association with similar sketch groups around
Indonesia and in other parts of the world. These image-makers tour Ambon and
the neighboring islands, sketchbooks in hand, stopping to commit historical sites,
breathtaking scenery, customary performances, and typical Malukan food to
paper. When they upload these sketches on Instagram and, to a lesser extent,
Facebook, their images of compelling localized scenes displace the negative
depictions of Ambon as these are scrolled out of sight.

Spectacles of Reconciliation
When I first visited Ambon after the war in 2003, a sense of the importance of
spectacle already suffused the city. Several factors, both long term and more
recent, fed into the privileging of spectacle as an appealing and dramatic public
display to the aftermath of conflict. First, government officials, along with
community and religious leaders, repeatedly emphasized the entertainment
value of public celebration as a welcome distraction in a city that was still
haunted by the destruction, personal losses, and distress of the war and confronted with numerous problems thereafter. Many ordinary Ambonese seemed
to agree, anticipating in animated conversation the first national Independence
Day celebration on August 17 since the onset of the war, followed closely by the
September 7 commemoration of the city’s 428th birthday. Already in early August, at market stalls, coffee shops, and on minibuses, I heard people discussing
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Figure 36. Collage of photographs from the installation of a raja in Ambon’s Batu Merah that
was attended by the Muslim neighborhood’s blood brothers or pela partners from the Christian mountain village of Ema, Ambon, 2006. Photos by the author.

the upcoming events, commenting on the large number of groups that had
registered to march on Independence Day. Sitting in front of my hotel on Pattimura Avenue after nightfall, I welcomed the cool evening air as I watched
young men and women march back and forth to the tune of whistles and
harmonica, interrupted only by their group leader’s sharp commands. During
the day, the city’s larger avenues were cordoned off for public events, especially
competitions like a rickshaw race sponsored by a political party or a motorcycle
rally, while colorful parades regularly inundated the streets, displacing traffic.
Especially memorable were a carnival parade held in anticipation of the Calvinist GPM church’s September anniversary and a boisterous procession of
truckloads of children arrayed in glittery costumes representing the nation’s
cultural and regional diversity. Reminiscent of the culture of contests promoted
under Suharto to encourage popular participation in state programs or events
organized by nonstate agencies but beholden to the regime’s discourses and
policies, these postwar displays similarly aimed to entice people into committing themselves to a sense of urban and national pride—but also possibility and
futurity—in the nervous environment that prevailed after the official peace.2
Secondly, apart from the perceived need for entertainment, the implementation of the country’s regional autonomy program offered in Ambon, as it did
around the archipelago, ample opportunity for public rituals and events. Prominent among these were the installations of community leaders under the rein
stated Malukan system of government, displaced in 1979 under the New Order
by the widely despised model centered on villages.3 Commonly, such installments
were double in the case of Christians, with the first carried out in accordance
with customary law and the second civil bureaucratic. For Muslims, there might
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be as many as three ceremonies—customary, civil bureaucratic, and religious—if
the leader was also appointed head imam of the village or neighborhood mosque.
Another highly visible aspect of authority’s decentralization to regions beyond
Java was the construction of brand-new government buildings, along with the
rituals that marked stages of their completion and inauguration.4 Alongside the
construction boom materializing Maluku’s expanding, regional infrastructure,
the rehabilitation and reconstruction of churches, mosques, and public offices in
the city and around the island that had been damaged or destroyed during the
conflict offered other occasions for people to come together and were a punctuation for the process of recovery through fundraising events, foundation-laying
ceremonies, and other social gatherings. Custom’s valorization and revival,
stimulated by regional autonomy and the special role assigned to it, emphasized
custom as a widely proclaimed instrument of peace, while providing another
source of public spectacle that helped to overshadow the recent trauma and
divisiveness of the war (Figure 36).5
Among the many events held in custom’s name, most visible were the highly
ritualized, emotionally charged blood-brother renewal ceremonies that could
last several days and involve numerous participants, even from as far away as
Jakarta. These especially attracted media attention and were publicized long
before they occurred (Figure 37). Under the broad umbrella of reconciliation,
the symbolism of blood brotherhood, especially the white cloth of kinship and
embodied connection, was extended to myriad ritualized encounters between
Muslims and Christians that were unconnected to any alliance relation. Although never realized, the most dramatic example of a ritual involving the
popular white cloth was a fantasy shared with me by a GPM minister who had
studied entertainment in addition to theology in Jakarta. A major figure in the
city’s peace and reconciliation activities, he imagined an eye-catching spectacle

Figure 37. A blood-brother renewal or “warming” ceremony (A.M. panas pela) between the host
village of Ouw on Saparua Island and their Muslim pela partners from Seith on Ambon Island.
The photograph on the bottom left shows boys from Ouw welcoming their guests with a performance of the cakalele war dance. Ouw, 2005. Photos by the author.
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involving a helicopter that would carry men and women dressed in customary
clothing dangling on cords beneath it as an enormous white cloth unfurled in
the skies over Ambon behind. Should this plan prove too costly, he had thought
of an alternative in which an immense one-thousand-meter white cloth, which
he claimed could be purchased in Surabaya, would be extended from Latuhalat
Cape to Ambon City as the commingled sounds of church bells and mosque
drums filled the air.
Thirdly, in Indonesia generally, a recurrent feature of the post-Suharto era
has been the pronounced publicity—often highly theatrical—of a panoply of
political, religious, and artistic forms and performative styles that claim the
nation’s streets as their stage. Reformasi and its fallout unfolded as multiple
demonstrations in streets across the nation. While most of these demonstrations
occurred after Reformasi was the norm, in Ambon they took place during the
war. Especially notable was the mass procession of Christian clergy against
forced conversion to Islam, mentioned in the previous chapter, another involving Christians who sang religious songs and carried fake coffins in protest of
the city’s civil emergency, that of Muslim refugees who marched against the
civil emergency’s closure of the Laskar Jihad radio station, and an antiviolence
protest by women affiliated with a national organization that originated in
Jakarta in the months preceding Suharto’s fall.6 Early in the conflict, as mentioned in Chapter 1, Protestants filled the streets with their ambulatory prayer
sessions.
Apart from official activities held under the banner of peace and reconciliation, many smaller events that claimed reconciliation as their rationale took
place around the city. Often, on such occasions, whether more official or not,
what reconciliation meant was not well understood or, for that matter, seriously
engaged. Nor was it often clear who or what was allegedly being reconciled. Two
examples from my fieldwork stand out. The first an “Evening of Re-encounter”
in early September 2003, organized at what before the war had been a luxury
hotel up the coast from the city but looked shabby in its wake, notwithstanding
the efforts that had been made to lend it a festive appearance. Organized to
raise funds for the reconstruction of a GPM church that had been burned
down during the conflict, the evening began with a buffet meal, followed by
a benefit concert featuring some of Maluku’s most renowned singers that was
repeatedly interrupted by prominent Protestant Ambonese making fundraising
pitches and promising cash contributions.7 If the majority of the guests present,
including the singers, were Christian, the evening’s professed aim of “Re-
encounter” (or, in Ambonese Malay, baku dapa) and the invitation to the
event—showing a huge handshake between two male hands protruding from
white shirtsleeves and jackets flanked by a heart, two cockatoos, and palm
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fronds—recalled the Malino II Peace Agreement and, with it, Christian-Muslim
reconciliation but also the Malukan phrase baku baik. Translated as “being on
good terms or at peace with each other,” the phrase served occasionally as a
substitute for the Indonesianized version of reconciliation. Yet, despite the
surplus of such interfaith symbolism, the only re-encounter taking place was
one between Christians. Christians were hardly alone in the exclusivity of their
reconciliation events. For instance, I attended a children’s “reconciliation party”
on Haruku Island off of Ambon where the majority of the participants were
Muslim, even if the representatives of the sponsoring organization included
both young Christian and Muslim men and women.
My second example is a GPM Protestant women’s group who put out a VCD
titled Muslim-Christian Reconciliation. The footage records a ceremony, sponsored by the city government, that brought Muslim and Christian community
representatives together in what had been a major Christian wartime stronghold.
With the sale of the VCD, the women hoped to fund a trip to the city of Surabaya in East Java to meet with another women’s organization that had sent
clothing to be distributed to displaced Christians during the war. Using an
Ambonese Malay expression that combines a sense of enjoyment with casual
social visiting, the group’s spokeswoman confirmed my impression that the
women had, more than anything else, a pleasure trip in mind. Perhaps reading
my thoughts, she volunteered that the group might support, at some future date,
the construction of a reconciliation monument.8 She also claimed that although
the GPM women had advocated for a women’s part in the reconciliation ceremony, following the event, a delegation from their organization had visited the
village of the Muslims where they met functionaries but no women residents.
Once the more formal part of the evening’s meeting was over, including prayers,
the conversation turned to household items like brooms that the women also
planned to sell to collect the money for their trip—and to Muslims. Although
by that time I had often heard vicious remarks and complaints voiced by Christians about Muslims, I was still shocked to hear the women speak so openly and
disparagingly about them—some three and a half years after the conflict ended.
One woman insisted, for instance, that “an atmosphere of peace” could only
be achieved by Christians, another that the Muslims would have all women
wearing headscarves instead of crosses, still another that “God is just since many
of them were killed.”9 Such uncensored comments were all the more remarkable
given that they had just spent time talking to me, not without pride, about the
efforts they had made in the name of reconciliation.
These examples give a sense of just how elusive, misunderstood, and out
of touch with postwar realities—especially the lingering fear, resentment,
and prejudice on the part of many in the city, and not just Christians—the
reconciliation discourse promoted by the city government, international
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organizations, and most NGOs was.10 Abstract, seemingly omnipresent after
the conflict, and experienced by many as external—which the foreign-sounding
word rekonsiliasi only confirmed—many of these initiatives did offer some
distraction, as authorities hoped—or a snack or simple meal. Apart from the
more official events, small acts, tokens of generosity and mutual recognition
between neighbors, and, as time went on, everyday interactions between Muslims and Christians also occurred, and these may have done more to gradually
restore a sense of normalcy in the city even if they were not cast as reconciliation. Besides the ordinary exchanges of everyday urban life, there were grassroots
as well as more top-down reconciliation initiatives. Exemplary of the former
are the Peace Provocateurs and image-activists who responded, respectively,
to incidents that threatened to provoke interreligious violence and to the realization that stubborn, inaccurate perceptions of Ambon needed to be addressed.
Yet, notwithstanding such examples, the majority of peace and reconciliation
initiatives in the city fell somewhere near the middle of a spectrum between
the more official, top-down ceremonies, on the one hand, and grassroots action
and organization, on the other. This is not surprising. If we consider only the
countless handshakes embellishing reconciliation media on television, in
newspapers, and in children’s drawings, or the ubiquitous white cloth, borrowed
from blood-brother ceremonies, then it becomes apparent how artificial—for
the most part—binaries between state and civil society, official and grassroots
initiatives are. This observation is not meant to detract from the criticisms
voiced by many Ambonese regarding the Malino II Peace Agreement’s elite
character or to devalue the efforts of cultural activists, religious and community
leaders, NGO workers, and ordinary Ambonese who worked to move the city
beyond war. It is to recognize, instead, how officialdom and the people often
share certain references, not the least a certain conception of the aesthetics
and stylistics of power, the way it works and expands.11 In a place like Indonesia,
emerging in the early 2000s from decades of authoritarian rule, and in Ambon,
specifically, where officialdom in the form of the city’s large civil bureaucracy
and the people were highly interconnected, the aesthetics and stylistics of
power they shared was, not surprisingly, considerable.

The Child in the Picture
As I suggested in the Introduction, the 2001 film Viva Indonesia! An Anthology
of Letters to God, along with myriad other child-centered productions, visualized and helped to consolidate a pervasive sense of the nation’s orphaning after
Suharto. Like the forlorn figure of a child against a sea of flames on my airplane
ticket flyer in 2003, such images circulated widely in Indonesia in the early
2000s as part of a genre that foregrounded children at risk, amid war’s ruins,
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or afflicted by violence. While indebted to this genre and to its localized versions like the Acang and Obet television ad, children’s reconciliation drawings
converged around the city’s most urgent postwar problem—that of ensuring
sustainable peace and the cohabitation of Christians and Muslims. With few
exceptions, the reconciliation drawings double the lone child depicted in violence to accommodate a Muslim-Christian pair in variations on the imam and
Protestant minister couple in the JRS prize-winning picture. Radio and television ads achieved the requisite doubling by juxtaposing two children whose
faces, bodies, and/or voices stood in for the two religions.
Together the genealogically prior image of the child in violence that surfaced
during the New Order’s unraveling and the child who endorsed Maluku’s
reconciliation belong to a genre or “a historically accreted way of seeing that
both enables and constrains new possibilities for vision, and casts a selective
frame and focus on the world that comes with its own characteristic blindnesses
and visibilities.”12 I call this the “child in the picture” genre so as to capture
the crucial indexicality that sutures the child’s productions to her body and
her visual currency as the protoplasmic potential of the Indonesian nation,
generally, and the compromised if still hopeful future of the Central Malukan
capital, specifically.13 In what follows, I examine children’s drawings and posters, along with radio and television PSAs, the latter highlighting some of the
challenges children faced after the war, while countering these with scenes of
young people’s natural exuberance and expression. I also analyze a children’s
fashion show, titled “Happy Stage,” in which children performed the nation,
in ways that they had under Suharto but with a telltale difference after the war.
Besides being an especially clear and well-executed example of the genre,
the JRS picture with which I began this chapter does not differ much from
others in the contest. For the most part, the children’s drawings produced in
this setting and in other reconciliation programs represent variations on the
same basic scheme that reiterate, above all, the mosque and church pair while
portraying their formal equivalence. Less grandly, for instance, in other drawings from the contest, a Muslim-Christian couple holds hands on a road that
bifurcates behind them in the parallel directions of a church and a mosque
(Figure 38); a minister and imam shake hands in the middle of a road as a
soldier approaches them from behind (Figure 39); and a woman wearing a
small cross and another with a headscarf stand to either side of a field of flowers
(Figure 40). Occasionally, the Christian-Muslim equivalence comes more
explicitly framed by the Indonesian state, as in another drawing where precautions seem to have been taken to guarantee its presence: the Garuda bird of
Hindu mythology but also of state insignia stands with outspread wings on a
plaque inscribed with the national “Unity in Diversity” motto above the canonical church-mosque pair mediated by the Indonesian flag between them
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(Figure 41). A number of the drawings feature no people at all, although they
show signs of human presence, such as one that provides an aerial view of the
city with a soccer field flanked by a church and mosque on one side of a modern highway and a blue sea edged by a beach complete with lounge chairs,
umbrellas, and a swimming pool, on the other (Figure 42). Another shows a
church and mosque pair with a cross and crescent moon enclosed in a heart
(Figure 43). Several drawings emphasize the importance of education through
the portrayal of a lively schoolyard or schoolchildren carrying books or depict
the postwar city in the midst of energetic reconstruction or its outcome—a
busy market, a bank rising among a cluster of high buildings, a crowded street
with cars, pedestrians, and a bright yellow bus. Others reiterate the handshake
of reconciliation and mosque and church pair (Figures 44–49).
Two years before I saw the pictures from the JRS contest, I was shown strikingly similar drawings made by children enrolled in trauma counseling and
healing programs in refugee camps in Manado and the neighboring port town
of Bitung in North Sulawesi. These, too, portrayed adjacent churches and
mosques—a few boasting parallel smiles—and interreligious couples.14 In July
2013, a Facebook post of a Malukan journalist described the entry that had
been awarded first prize in a GPM–sponsored contest: “There is a church next
to a mosque. A Muslim and a Christian meet at the point of intersection between the church and mosque on a flowering lawn with blossoming trees. Even
the sky is filled with flowers. Drawing by Rusli Mewar, a child from Batu Nega
Negeri Waai, elementary school Negeri 5 Waai, 6th grade.”15 Although he did
not upload the drawing, it is evident from this brief description how much it
recapitulates the key elements of earlier ones, including many from the JRS
contest some ten years before. Apparently, between 2003 and 2013, the aesthetic
and ideological criteria for showcasing Muslim and Christian cohabitation, at
least in children’s drawings, had not changed. Divided in equal halves, the
picture remains centered on a church-mosque pair or persons emblematic of
the two religions surrounded by a surplus of signs that convey what keeps the
imagined, bifurcated world together—whether the flowers and natural exuberance of the Facebook post, the twinned hearts and doves sentimentalizing
connection, or the state-backed bureaucratic handshake. Children themselves
continue to be brought in to suffuse their productions with the pure sentiment
they allegedly embody, untainted by politics or other factors of adult derivation or design, echoing the Acang and Obet PSA, as I elaborate below. Missing
from the Facebook post is any mention of the Indonesian flag or other national
symbols. However, a minority of the pictures from the JRS contest or those
from refugee camps and reconciliation programs, whether in Ambon or North
Sulawesi, include such explicit signs of the state like the flag, its red and white
colors, the Garuda bird, or the “Unity in Diversity” motto. When the state does
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Figures 38–49. Children’s drawings from the Jesuit Refugee Service Forum for Love and Peace contest,
Ambon, 2003. Photos by the author.
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appear in postwar productions, it does so less through such conventional symbols than in the guise of the national army soldier, as I explain below.
Much like the drawings, public service announcements aired on radio and
television during and after the conflict exhibit a persistent concern with demonstrating symmetry and balance between Christian and Muslim manifest in
the allocation of equal screen time or airtime and in their religiously marked
paralleled voices and bodies. Radio PSAs often took the form of successive
Q&A sessions between an imam and Muslim child and a Protestant minister
and Christian child that simultaneously performed the innocence of the child
witnessing violence and her dependency on adults. Occasionally, a more in-
the-know child ventriloquizes the pedagogical role of the adult, as in one ad
in which a child wonders why so much of the city lies in ruins and another
volunteers that “it was torched by people.” Excerpts from interviews I conducted
in 2003 with journalists from some of Ambon’s newer radio stations established
toward the end of the war underscore the powerful ideological role of the child
and the compelling, affective power of her voice: “Things are more emotionally
touching when voiced by children, they express themselves directly without
guile,” one journalist asserted.16 “Children suffered more during the conflict,”
another offered. “They could not go to school or play with each other. . . . Their
character is straightforward, ‘natural’ [in English].” “Anything involving children is of interest,” yet another claimed, summing up the conversation.17
Somewhat differently, another journalist recalled how the many banners hung
over Ambon’s streets after the peace interpellating passersby with slogans like
“Our peace must recall the future of our children” had influenced their radio
PSAs.18 Such injunctions inevitably have a top-down feel to them not only because they were put there by the city government, the authorities in charge of
the civil emergency, or the national army or police but because they were written
in the formal Indonesian of state administration or, occasionally, an odd blend
of it and vernacular Ambonese Malay.19 Quite a number explicitly invoke the
state or army, such as “With the red and white [flag] planted in your chest we
will rebuild Maluku” and “Once Ambon is peaceful we [the armed forces] will
also be happy to return home.” But such slogans also made their way onto the
peace posters and banners made by children in reconciliation programs where
they remediated the language and tone of the official pronouncements and radio
PSAs. Statements like “We want to study in peace” or “Do not ignore our future”
are typical. Even when confronted with the sheer redundancy of tropes and visual
forms across reconciliation media, almost all of the schoolteachers, religious
instructors, and NGO and humanitarian organization representatives with whom
I spoke in Ambon or, for that matter, elsewhere in Indonesia insisted on the
spontaneous nature of the child, their innate creativity and unmediated expression and, crucially, too, how they cannot be manipulated.
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Marginal images occasionally disturbed the narrow conventions of the
reconciliation genre, such as one that mixed English words and slogans with
Ambonese Malay and graphically departed from the monochrome block letters
and straight lines favored by most. This poster was altogether more decorative,
employing a cursive letter type that combined capitals with small-case letters,
alternating blue and green ink, and rendering slogans as discrete shapes across
the page: “Peace forever” laid out in the form of an arc echoes in English a
block in Ambonese Malay that reads “Peace in my heart, in your heart, in
Ambon,” while “love,” again in English, runs up the poster’s left side. Graphically and linguistically, the poster contrasts with others where the formal Indonesian jars with the vernacular Ambonese spoken in the city by both adults
and children. At the office of a local NGO, children were given free rein to
design their own peace messages on a large banner, with several drawing on
the partisan language of war in phrases like “A message from Obet” or “We
Obets want peace to return” (Figure 50). While organizations involved in reconciliation commonly regarded the elimination of the conflict’s incendiary
terminology as a crucial step in promoting peace, the name Obet for Christians

Figure 50. Messages scrawled by children on a banner suggesting a range of graphic and linguistic references—from the freer style of the top left incorporating English expressions to the formal Indonesian next to it that reads: “Do not destroy our future.” The two photographs on the
bottom display an assortment of statements and desires, including “We refugees from Wisma
want to return home to Batu Merah,” “We want to meet the soccer players from Holland,” “We
Obet(s) want peace again,” or simply “Haleluyah [sic],” Ambon, 2003. Photos by the author.
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that crops up here serves as a signature but also suggests how much terms of
enmity became assimilated during the conflict. It also reveals what happens
when children rely on their own preferred media examples rather than being
instructed to reproduce the preferred models of peace and reconciliation.20
Children’s drawings are especially telling. Children in refugee camps around
Ambon were regularly invited to sketch as part of various NGO projects. Women
from a mixed religious NGO were especially committed to inspiring children
to imagine their futures through art. A standard question asked, “What are my
aspirations?” Drawings that stand out as different include several I saw in refugee camps around Ambon that depicted soldiers rather than “doctor” or
notably frequent “president,” the more common responses to this standard
exercise in national pedagogy (Figure 51). Women from the NGO who worked
as a team—dividing their time, not incidentally, between two Muslim and two
Christian camps—believed that such drawings spoke less to the ongoing visible
presence of national army troops in Ambon under civil emergency than to the
persistent sense of vulnerability among children and the security represented
by the national army soldier wielding a gun.21 One woman speculated further
that the soldier’s popularity among the camp children may be because they
“think soldiers are more likely to survive,”22 a statement that summoned the
horrors many of the children had been subject to or witnessed. But like the
English words and phrases that surfaced in some peace messages, the pervasive
influence of media representations is undoubtedly also at work here. Besides
what children heard and saw on television, the army put up large promotional
signs and banners profiling itself as safeguarding the common good and future
of the city but also as uniquely capable of securing the relative peace imposed
by the civil emergency.
Elsewhere in Indonesia, soldiers appear in children’s drawings, as in a
“Reformasi through Our Eyes” contest held in Yogyakarta where some images
portrayed “smiling round-faced soldiers pointing at smiling demonstrators, and
demonstrators who smile as they set fire to cars or even lie dead on the ground.”23
In contrast to Java, where these images focus on violence, such explicit images
of violence are notably absent in children’s drawings from Ambon or those
made by Malukan children in refugee camps in North Sulawesi. In Java, the
contexts mediating the production of these drawings included not only the
culture of contests mentioned above and the pedagogical strategies encouraging
children to witness and visualize history but also anxieties about the impact
that media images of Reformasi violence might have on them.24 In Ambon,
however, children saw violence mediated in images of their city and, occasionally, even neighborhood at war on television and in print media. These mediations intersected with their own lived experience, as they were exposed directly
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Figure 51. Children’s drawings on the walls of a refugee camp outside of Ambon City depicting
national army soldiers, including a female soldier, and policemen, Ambon, 2005. Photos by the
author.

as participants, bystanders, and victims. This may explain all the more why
energy seems to have been invested in visually erasing the violence. From this
perspective, depictions of smiling mosques next to smiling churches drawn by
children sheltering in North Sulawesi refugee camps are especially unsettling,
even repressive. Most of the people I met there in 2000 and 2001 in barracks
run by Catholic nuns and in a school auditorium and factory complex made
to accommodate refugees spoke openly about the violence and terror that had
forced them to leave Maluku and, in more than one instance, about their desire
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for revenge.25 In the camp where children drew smiling mosques and churches
and where many of the IDPs were either civil servants or Protestant ministers
of different denominations, my experience was no different. Given how traumatic the flight of many of these people had been and how recent, for many,
their arrival in Sulawesi, not to mention the hardship of life in the camps,
admitting any sign of violence or physical or emotional trauma would have
immediately disabled the pedagogical and political strategies for which the
children’s drawings had been designed.26
Ensuring that these strategies remained in place had several implications.
The production of PSAs in 2006 advocating against violence directed at children
reveals the efforts made to ensure that the child’s expression, on which the efficacy of the genre depends, appeared natural and authentic. On those few
occasions when violence did appear, it did so, consistently, in the form of the
national army soldier enforcing religious diversity from the sidelines. Or, in
other words, as an image of violence that reveals its presence only to disavow it,
since the soldier surfaces as the safeguard of religious cohabitation, as an agent
preventing violence rather than one who wields it, as in the drawings from Java.
Under Suharto, national integrity was often condensed into the dense but concise concept of “Unity in Diversity” or a visually embellished map of Indonesia.
In postwar Ambon, by contrast, the occasional appearance of the armed forces
soldier in reconciliation media exposed the state violence that always kept the
country together. Now it appears with a new sense of fragility with respect to
religious plurality and cohabitation, and it does so even if this token of state
violence hovers, as in some drawings, discreetly in the background. In what
follows, I turn first to a children’s fashion show where the telltale soldier’s significance emerged especially clearly and then to the antiviolence television ads.
A “Happy Stage” performance organized by the GPM in 2005 for kindergarten children featured a fashion show in which children dressed in clothing
“from Sabang to Merauke,” the conventional linguistic trope for the expanse
of national territory in official propaganda but also in popular forms like television shows and songs. To the sound of cheers and laughter accompanying the
high point in the daylong event, children arrayed as bridal couples from different
Indonesian provinces and instantiating its “Unity in Diversity” motto lined up
on the stage. During the day, ample attention was given to the celebration of
Malukan custom—little girls appeared timidly in the woven sarong and crescent-
shaped headdress of Southeast Maluku and a group of boys demonstrated a
local tug-of-war game, while another shook small shields and shouted at the
audience in an especially noisy rendition of the cakalele war dance. Children
entertained their parents, teachers, and a handful of civil servants as butterflies,
flowers, frogs, and, with another nod to Southeast Maluku, even cassowaries.
There was a procession of white rabbits in long gowns with droopy ears that,
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unfortunately, called to mind the signature appearance of the Laskar Jihad—at
least for me. Boys and girls representing Indonesia’s standard occupational
groups like farmers, fishermen, civil servants, TNI soldiers, naval officers, and
police trooped across the stage. Especially serendipitous was a trio of children—
dressed as an imam, priest, and Protestant minister—arrayed on stage in an
image of religious equivalence with, tellingly, a small soldier in army fatigues
positioned to one side of the trio as if to secure their unity (Figure 52).

Figure 52. Children’s “Happy Stage” performance. The photograph at bottom shows children
dressed as an imam, a Protestant minister, and a Catholic priest with a soldier positioned at
their side, Ambon, 2005. Photos by the author.
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A “Unity in Diversity” poster that was sold in stores on the West Papuan
island of Biak in the 1990s featured a map of the nation and three rows of couples wearing their province’s traditional dress, visualizing diversity as a function
of variation across set categories. Schoolchildren in Papua and across the nation
learned from such representations that Indonesia’s regions were separate but
culturally equivalent, each province having its own traditional wedding costume, house, and dance.27 If these earlier representations showcased the cultural
equivalence of state-endorsed forms like marriage or house styles, framed by
a map of the archipelago or national “Unity in Diversity” motto, what is remarkable about Ambon’s reconciliation media is the persistence of the principle
of equivalence divested of any obvious national framework. If we consider,
against the backdrop of the 1990s “Unity in Diversity” poster, the bifurcated
portraits of Muslim and Christian or the audible ones allocating equal airtime
to their religiously marked voices, then it would appear that, with reconciliation, equivalence itself became a fetish or something that needed to be reiterated compulsively, again and again.28 Echoing the equal picture halves of the
reconciliation drawings and the equal airtime and screen time of the PSAs, a
precise balance between Christian and Muslim participants was also sought—
and publicized—in reconciliation programs and activities, generally. Across
the numerous NGOs and organizations engaged in reconciliation around the
city, care was inevitably taken to ensure that the number of participating Muslim children was precisely matched by that of Christians and that resources
and attention, whether in camps or neighborhoods, were equally divided between Muslims and Christians. The postwar practice of drawing political
candidates like the city’s mayor and vice mayor from both religious communities, and the huge faces of Muslim and Christian leaders on billboards congratulating each other on the occasion of their respective holidays, are another
medium where the all-important religious equivalence appeared.
My last example focuses on the production of a number of PSAs by a reputable, international child-focused organization in collaboration with a Java-
based film crew and facilitator that were broadcast on television in connection
with Indonesia’s National Children’s Day celebration on July 23, 2005. I followed
the production from the tryouts of Muslim and Christian children for a part
in the ads and the making of storyboards to shooting on location in early July
and the discussion several days later that accompanied the screening of the
first cuts. These PSAs were ideologically complex productions. The producers
and people from the international organization were fully aware of the prevalent stereotypes of children, deployed a participatory mode of work that valued
children’s input, and aimed to present a less artificial, less tutored, and, in the
Indonesian setting, less Java-centric image of the child in their ads. Yet, in spite
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of these intentions, the PSAs ended up confirming rather than complicating
the stereotype of the spontaneous, natural child, even if she appeared more
Malukan than Javanese.
To achieve this result and evidence the child’s expressiveness—the title, not
incidentally, of one of the ads—meant screening out the mass-mediated experience that surfaced in the children’s tryouts and screening in the visual signs
of authenticity and lack of adult mediation.29 When the children, ranging in
age from around six to sixteen, were asked to enact in succession a happy and
a sad scene, the results varied from the touching to the hilarious. In acting out
scenes that often underscored the importance of education—as well as “the
culture of contests”—in Indonesia, many of the children drew not surprisingly
on the popular televisual examples around them, especially the equally melodramatic Indonesian soap operas and South American telenovelas that enjoyed
great success in Indonesia and other parts of Southeast Asia at the time.30
Striking, too, was the use of national language as Ambonese children abandoned local speech patterns and tried to use words and expressions they had
heard on television and been taught in school.
Three of the final ads promoted the children’s need for “freedom of expression” against an educational and wider cultural environment where children
were held to be silenced and subjected to different forms of violence. To portray
this difference, no less than three of the four ads turned on a contrast between
a first part that established the particular source or site of violence and a second
part that affirmed the free spirit and natural expressiveness of children. One
simply titled “To Express Oneself” opens with a close-up of three children who
each depict the consequences of school violence differently—one covers his
eyes with his hands, another her mouth, a third his ears—followed by the shot
of a group of children mimicking these actions that dissolves into a final redemptive scene where children make goofy faces and horse around. A film
camera and lamp visible in the last shot are meant, the producer told me, to
suggest that children have “their own media through which to express themselves.”31 Another ad opened with a tolling bell and a closing school gate, followed by the shot of an empty classroom with math equations scrawled on a
blackboard. This image gave way to scenes of boy-girl pairs, dressed in the
national uniform of Indonesia’s elementary, junior, and senior high schools,
studying with books under trees in a natural, noncoercive environment beyond
the disciplinary classroom. A third ad continues in the same vein, with the first
part focused on three dejected-looking children—victims of the three kinds of
violence highlighted in the ad through statistical charts documenting incidents of violence at school, in the home, and in society—followed by an image
of children grouped together and smiling on a pristine Malukan beach with a
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pink sunset behind them. With even their own media at their disposal, the
children’s worlds depicted in these ads feel authentic to adults, precisely because
adults are not depicted (Figure 53). Much like the infamous Acang and Obet
ad, adult visions of past violence and future peace had to be interpolated through
children’s eyes.
If not every picture or every PSA is equally indebted to the child in the
picture genre, it is striking how much even these more self-aware productions
end up reaffirming the same stereotypes that underwrite the children’s bifurcated reconciliation drawings, the slogans on banners and posters, and the
parallel dialogues of the radio PSAs. It is only by safeguarding the child’s authentic expressiveness and showcasing Muslim-Christian equivalence that any
of these reconciliation media help to sustain the aesthetic and ideological
purposes for which they were conceived. Still, it would be a mistake to assume
that the mediation of the nation or peace in Maluku by these aesthetic productions proceeds easily or effectively.32 Under any circumstance, the constant
slippage and uncertainty in the idea of the nation and, here, especially that of
religious identity and cohabitation ensures that mediation happens without
any guarantee of return or complete fidelity.33 Moreover, the incompleteness
and loss that inevitably accompanies any iterative process is bound to be more
pronounced in a situation where the connection between affect, aesthetics,
religious plurality, and nation is especially compromised.
Although I have focused in the preceding pages on the spectacles and
aesthetic artifacts of reconciliation, these examples ask us to also recall their
limits. Most strikingly, the contrast between the sheer weight of the ideology
with which these artifacts are invested and the lack of social and political
resonance with the realities of the postwar situation in Ambon and North
Sulawesi refugee camps demand that we recognize how much they were asked
to achieve. Given that the connection between representations and their
uptake is always unforeseeable, the child in the picture productions must have
often misfired and been dismissed in milder versions of the fate that befell
the Acang and Obet ad.34 Some, however, were clearly compelling enough to
scrutinize more closely. What especially comes to mind are depictions of
religious difference that include a novel graphic element in the form of a
national army soldier, introduced apparently to make the religious cohabitation in the picture more plausible. If, in such examples, a long-standing
conception of the aesthetics and stylistics of power remains, the ground on
which such power stood both after Suharto and following peace in Maluku
was less firm than it had been before, necessitating a visual representation
of state power.

Figure 53. Children performing scenes for antiviolence
public service announcements produced for television by
an international child-focused organization, Ambon, 2005.
Photos by the author.
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Peace Journalism
In his dedication to the ordinary man at the beginning of The Practice of Everyday Life, Michel de Certeau describes a shift in anthropological and sociological attention corresponding to the advent of the number, along with
democracy, the large city, and administrations. With this shift comes the waning
of the name, the previous mode symbolizing families, groups, and orders, as
their representatives disappear from the academic and historical stage they had
previously dominated. De Certeau’s language illuminates the theater and
spectacle of new sensations: “Floodlights move away from actors possessing
proper names and social blazons to settle on the mass of the audience, a multitude of quantified heroes lose names and faces as they become the ciphered
river of the streets, a mobile language of computations and rationalities that
belong to no one.”35
I draw loosely on Certeau’s distinction between name and number to explore
another dynamic of Ambon’s reconciliation media—namely, the tension between historical and sociological specificity, on the one hand, and a generalizing
language that belongs to no one, on the other. A recurrent feature of these
media is an insistence on displaying a marked equivalence in pattern, spatial
and temporal distribution, and number that would scale the enemies of the
conflict down to equal size. Such a move entails bypassing or glossing over all
the particularities that can be subsumed by a name, including, most relevant
here, those of social location, regional difference, and political positioning,
and the considerable heterogeneity within and among different religions. In
the case of Muslims and Christians in Maluku, it sidesteps the history of their
distinct relations and attitudes vis-à-vis state authorities, both colonial and
Indonesian, the differential access they have enjoyed with respect to resources—
local, regional, and national—and the longue durée of their interactions under
the Dutch colonizers. Yet, as we have seen, in the large majority of reconciliation
media, historical specificity and contextualization are frequently replaced by
myth and transcendence.36 By and large, these media are spectacular and
monumental or scaled-up in other ways—busts of religious leaders float over
skyscrapers in children’s drawings, lengths of white cloth dance in the sky above
Ambon or extend from cape to city in a Protestant minister’s fertile imagination, the sounds of church bells and mosque drums drown out difference while
huge bureaucratic handshakes emerge everywhere. As with the fetishized
equivalence of the reconciliation media, peace journalists reporting on Maluku’s conflict focused on numbers, conferring added significance to number
as a category. In their writings, number displaced the specificity conveyed by
a name and the contextualized descriptions of the interreligious conflict that
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name could convey. Yet, if the example of peace journalism helps to bring out
the contrast between name and number as distinct representational strategies,
the contrast between name and number in the journalists’ reporting is in some
respects more apparent than real.
From any perspective, the politics of numbers in wartime is complicated.
Scholars, humanitarian activists, peace journalists, and NGO workers often
comment how charged and contested the reporting of the numbers killed in
conflict is, whether during wartime or in the postwar accounting that follows.
If never neutral or inert, the numbers of the dead in conflict situations often
assume immense importance since they have the capacity to stand in for the
victimization or devastation of the community; can magnify or minimize the
harm done, including the manner and objectives with which the violence was
carried out; may help to distinguish perpetrators from victims, which, at times,
is deduced from the sheer magnitude or atrocity of the deaths suffered on either
side; and, crucially, serve as evidence in calls for justice. Numbers of victims
are exceedingly difficult to obtain and determine with accuracy, while large
numbers of dead are difficult to comprehend. In addition to the difficulty of
obtaining accurate numbers of the dead, the political weight they carry and
the stakes and claims made through them—as when parties clash in their view
of the numerical representation of an event—have crucial implications for the
analysis of atrocity and exercise of social justice. In any context, there will also
be considerations regarding the timing of the release of important numbers
and concerns about how and where they should circulate. Apart from these
issues, there is the excess that no numbers can contain—whether the unfathomability of a million versus two million deaths or the incalculability of the
acute singularity of a life lost.37 In tense situations, like that of Ambon’s postwar,
numbers will be used strategically, as when the equal numbers of Muslim and
Christian children who benefit from a posttrauma or reconciliation program
are publicized. Along similar lines, the material presence of single-family homes
in the massive posttsunami reconstruction in North Sumatra served as a visual
accounting of the relative success of rival NGOs.38 Nor is the reckoning of
numbers linked to violence all that different from the tallying that takes place
after democratic elections—indeed, when the numbers are contested, elections
may result in violence, as they often do.39 Whether made explicit or not, what
underwrites the reckoning of the dead, participation by Muslims and Christians
in reconciliation programs, or the results of democratic elections is the urgent
question of who counts or who counts most and who, by contrast, does not.40
From the early 2000s, numbers played a crucial role in a handful of self-
styled peace journalists’ reporting on the violence unfolding in Maluku—
whether on Ambon, in the North Malukan sultanates of Ternate and Tidore,
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or on the island of Halmahera—where they were used to deflect attention from
the main protagonists and events of the war. The aim in so doing was to prevent
print journalism from contributing to and further aggravating the violence.
Echoing the fetishized equivalence of the reconciliation media that visually
neutralize the charged contrast of Christian and Muslim, the peace journalists
deliberately excised the religious identities of the war’s protagonists from their
reporting. In the place of these identities, a torrent of numbers, among other
obfuscating strategies, systematically elided the supposedly more incendiary
names and religiously marked institutions that circulated in the conflict.41 At
issue was less the charged vocabulary of enmity like red versus white or Acang
and Obet than the previously commonplace designations of Muslim and
Christian or nouns like church and mosque. The problem of such terms for the
journalists is that by definition they name and identify religious difference as
the origin of the conflict. By contrast, peace journalism aimed to displace the
volatile religious nomenclature by wrapping it in the allegedly objective language of numbers. While the strategies of Ambon’s reconciliation media and
peace journalism are not identical, since the first neutralizes difference through
the depiction of radical equivalence while the second erases it altogether, the
impulse behind them and assumptions regarding the difference between name
and number are.
In May 2000, during a brief visit to Manado, I spoke with several journalists
who had been involved in the project of a new daily newspaper that was initially
called Radar Ternate but was quickly given the more geopolitically comprehensive name of Radar Kieraha in honor of the four historic North Malukan sultanates Ternate, Tidore, Bacan, and Jailolo.42 As a member of the editorial team
of the Manado Pos that produced the paper, Pak Agil had supervised the new
daily from the distance of Manado. Pak Zamzam, in charge of reporting on
events in Ternate City, including the sessions of the regional parliament and
activities of the police or, as he put it, matters of government, had been based
in Ternate from September 1999 until December 28 of that year when violence
in the city forced the paper to halt its production. A third journalist, who reported
on economics and development, had also been based in Ternate.
Besides reasons of business, the idea behind launching Radar Kieraha had
been twofold: to offer a gift to the new province of North Maluku established
under regional autonomy laws and to provide people in an area where they
“do not yet understand the role of the press” with their own newspaper.43 The
ideological underpinning of this move—indebted to the numerous journalist
training sessions and crash courses in peace journalism that mushroomed with
the massive international investment in Indonesia’s transition to democracy—
was that in the era of Reformasi the role of the people would be articulated
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through a media controlled by the people who were entrusted with “exercising
supervision over [the actions of the] government” and “criticizing things that
are wrong.”44 But already in September 1999 when Pak Zamzam arrived in
Ternate, a succession of political problems and conflicts conspired to undermine this ideal view of the bond between people and press in the recently
proclaimed democracy.
Under increasingly tense circumstances, the newspaper appealed to the
Ternatan population to be vigilant regarding the negative influence that events
in the unfolding conflict in Ternate City might have and how together—people
and paper—they should do everything to deescalate the situation. In spite of
this appeal, the different parties in Ternate’s conflict accused the paper of partisanship. Radar Kieraha went to press for the last time on December 27, and
during the heat of the confrontation between enemy forces that night, Pak
Zamzam escaped to the police station. Shortly thereafter, the newspaper’s office
was vandalized, phone lines in the city were dead, and large parts of it had been
burned to the ground. By May 2000 when I spoke with the two journalists,
refugees from Halmahera had occupied the newspaper’s Ternate office.
Both men were highly engaged with and troubled by the violence in Maluku
and the larger crises afflicting their country; both struggled to find a way to
translate their concerns into a proactive form of reporting that they called peace
journalism. And both were certainly right in recognizing the potential role of
print and other media in the production of events and in their acute awareness
of how the news, say, of a mosque or church burned down (whether true or
false) could trigger violent events. Indeed, in Chapter 1, we saw how hearsay
or rumors that something bad had happened often preceded, made possible,
and could even predict the outbreak of violence. Yet both men also recognized
the limitations of the peace journalism they preached. Pak Agil mentioned,
for instance, the wider reach of television and especially radio in a part of Indonesia where newspaper circulation was limited and, as he put it, the economic
and intellectual level of the population was “lower than the prevailing one,”
so that even if “we publish a news item to cool down the atmosphere, it is not
sure they will read it, even if they know how to read. Maybe their region cannot
be reached.” Even with these misgivings and reservations regarding reception,
the journalists considered it their responsibility to do their utmost in covering
Maluku to diminish the possibility of more violence.
We make comparative news like here, it’s like this, life in Manado
is like this. The newspaper is sent there, like this, so that whatever
thing happens there, we just obliterate it. What I mean is just let
it be since they are already so violently implicated, we shouldn’t
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articulate anything . . . just hush it up, to prevent the Muslim community from killing Christians or the Christian community from
killing Muslims, but that should not be [in the newspaper]. . . . But
once a violent outbreak happens which causes so many dead, so
many dead, so many dead, it should not be said who did it. Only
that there was a violent outbreak here, don’t say Christians died,
don’t, just say how many died, directly, the number of dead.45
If the presentation of numbers instead of names happens here in the service
of hushing things up, the repetition of the phrase “so many dead” no less than
three times suggests how difficult it is to circumscribe such excess. When
names surface in such accounts, they do so as a kind of nonname, under cover
of the elusive categories of “provocateur,” “certain parties,” and “political elite”
or other glosses that similarly obscure the identities of the protagonists through
a process that unnames the combatants.46 Pak Agil continued:
The idea is to give information about current events but not in a transparent manner. If, for instance, there is a conflict between the inhabitants of a place, between people, between members of a different
ethnic group or religion, it is not necessary to mention the ethnic group
or religion, so that this does not cause injury or provoke revenge from
either side. So yes, there were people killed, yes there was an incident,
OK, but who was behind this, who caused this incident does not have
to be written so that the information does not spread to the other side.47
Pak Zamzam broke in with an example:
For instance, where, let’s see, between Malifut and Kao, we report that
there was a clash between the people of Malifut and those of Kao in
which five people were killed, that’s it, enough said. There was a house
of worship burned down, don’t say it was a mosque, don’t say it was a
church. In this way, we take a kind of action that is objective yet constructive, the end all of it is constructive. If we want to be objective in
a transparent manner, then this will in fact be destructive because it
will trigger conflicts. If that is the case, then it would be better not to
report at all. So we have two alternatives: either not to report at all or to
report in a way that is objective and constructive.48
I cite these journalists at length not only to give an impression of their discourse and the difficulties they encountered in their wartime reporting. These
passages show the degree of care and reflexivity with which they assumed their
self-proclaimed role of peace journalists. This care and professional dedication
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are important to emphasize because they became compromised during a second conversation I had with the two men on the evening of the day of the
interview when they showed up unannounced at my hotel, as I discuss below.
Noteworthy is how the journalists negatively invoked the notion of transparency, a potent concept that circulated during the Reformasi movement
describing the allure of bringing to light political events and New Order crimes.
According to these journalists, not everyone could handle knowing all the
details about violent events. For them, the relationship between what should
be exposed or made transparent and what withheld from public view was reversed. Their understanding of peace journalism demanded that they excise
much of what makes violence somewhat locatable, perhaps even comprehensible. In fact, this view contrasts with common understandings of peace journalism that entail an explicit rejection “of the minimalist reporting model
favored by some media outlets . . . [that is] ineffectual and corrosive of professional norms.”49 With respect to the minimalist reporting on violence widespread in Indonesia after the New Order’s collapse, an Indonesian journalist
admonished his colleagues: “Don’t bury the facts that are so sacred to journalistic reporting. Peace journalism is a method of reporting the human side of
warfare, but it is not a license to delete the facts that arise in a war. It used to
be said not to report blood and bombs, but these things are certain to appear
in reports.”50
In the minimalist reporting of the Manado journalists, only the starkest
outlines of a violent occurrence make it into the paper and, by extension, public
view—the mere fact of a clash or conflict, the number of dead or wounded,
the amount of property destroyed. Left out are the grievances and resentments,
the historical relations and connections pertaining between the enemies, and
the ascribed and self-ascribed identities of the persons and collectivities involved—such things as their ethnicity, religion, race, and class or the potentially
politicized differences subsumed by the Suharto regime under the acronym
SARA—as well as the causes, triggers, background, and dynamics of the violence. In other words, precisely the kind of information that is needed to fill
in the picture, to identify the stakes in a conflict, delineate the range of issues,
prejudices, and imaginations that motivate and divide the opposing parties
or, more complexly, begin to unravel what makes people recognize their identities in moments of crisis in terms of religion, ethnicity, or other sociological
designations, along with the forms and modalities through which they do so.
What is lacking in minimal reporting is, in short, any contextualization that
would form the starting point of an attempt to come to grips with the complex
ways in which otherwise ordinary people are drawn into and engage in extraordinary violence.
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Whether practiced by those who called themselves peace journalists or
those who did not, the Manado journalists were not alone in their minimalist
reporting. A study of Indonesia’s two largest metropolitan dailies, the modernist
Muslim Republika and the originally Catholic Kompas, reveals the extent to
which these quite different newspapers adopted the same obscurantist approach
as practiced by the journalists of the short-lived Radar Kieraha.51 Focused on
news reporting around major events and developments during an eleven-month
period from late July 1999, when violence surged for a second time in Ambon,
to June 2000, when a state of emergency was imposed in Central and North
Maluku provinces, the quantitative survey distinguishes between the use of
generic and nongeneric descriptors to designate the warring parties. An example of the first, for instance, would be “the two warring groups” where group
affliliation remains unidentified versus the second where it is explicitly named,
as in “Christian mob.”
Results from an analysis of the survey reveal, for instance, that notwithstanding Kompas’s much larger avoidance of terms or phrases that would enable its
readers to identify the combatants’ religious affiliation or the violence as religious, and Republika’s tendency to privilege Muslim viewpoints—especially
when Muslim casualties were on the rise and the paper began to distinguish
these “victims” from their “Christian assailants”—an overall assessment of
generic versus nongeneric descriptors for combatants reveals how even Republika’s tally for the latter is high, amounting to 59 percent, compared to Kompas’s
remarkable 81 percent. Also, that notwithstanding the journalistic practice,
prevalent at the time in Indonesia, of providing information “but not in a
transparent manner”—a holdover, no doubt, from the Suharto era—readers
could often read between the lines, recognizing or, when they did not, presumably guessing at the identities behind the generic language. Equally importantly, as journalists deployed obfuscating terms like “the warring parties,”
“political elite,” or “house of worship” in their reporting, they simultaneously
found ways to encourage reader recognition of group identity.52 This suggests
how conflicted many journalists must have felt between their desire to act
professionally and their at times partisan feelings with respect to one or another
party engaged in the fighting.
Much like war watched from the sidelines, the black-and-white language of
this minimalist reporting—bereft of the liquid, incandescent colors, shadows,
messy contingencies, and horrific contexts that describe the experience of those
actually in war—facilitates a reading of the conflict in the starkest of terms.53 In
Maluku, it provided the language and means for glossing over a fraught, mobile
terrain made up of histories, grievances, friendships, alliances, long-standing
rivalries, customs of trust and accountability, power structures, and political
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economy, not to mention the legacies of New Order politics and violence. Even
when mentioned, descriptions like “Christian mob” and “Muslim mob” or
“Christian attackers” and “Muslim victims” are no better than types, far from
the historical actors and social determinations involved in the conflict.
In the conversation at my hotel, the journalists provided in some sense
the proper names and situated histories that had been substituted in their
reporting by the conflict’s quantified heroes and abstract numbers. This was
a conversation that long thereafter baffled me since it seemed an odd, unsolicited digression into Malukan history that I could not place at the time.
Unannounced and with some urgency, the two journalists appeared at my
hotel after nightfall, insisting that they had more to tell me about peace journalism. Since I had thanked them after the interview and left without any
further agreement to meet, their visit was not only unexpected but somewhat
unusual. As we sat over tea and they reiterated the same information and
opinions they had shared earlier, I wondered why they had come. What was
different, however, and significant, as I realized later, was that this time it
was followed by a long account detailing the antiquity and former grandeur
of the four Malukan sultanates for which, not coincidentally, the Ternatan
weekly had been named.
The gist of Pak Agil and Pak Zamzam’s afterward to their account of peace
journalism’s balanced reporting was a comparison between unequals—specifically, the early presence of civilization among Malukan Muslims exemplified
by their courtly tradition and luxurious attire, including shoes, at a time when
the region’s Christians went around barefoot, ignorant, and in loincloths. It
dawned on me in retrospect that what the two had done that evening is fill in
what they saw—though not, I believe, in a manner clear to themselves—as the
necessary backdrop to their peace journalism, reintroducing, as it were, into
its erasures and equalizing impetus the stark foundational asymmetry between
Muslim civilization and Christian barbarism. Introduced after the fact, this
history nonetheless prefaced and complicated the men’s story about their peace
reporting. Beyond superficial forms of generic equivalence or “the mobile
language of computations and rationalities that belong to no one,” the journalists seemed to be saying that a foundational asymmetry between Muslims
and Christians is nonetheless operative. Their digression into North Malukan
history did, in addition to setting the historical record straight for themselves,
put a stereotypical face on the collectivized actors involved in the conflict. If
their peace journalism seemed to solicit the ad hoc insertion of meaningful
difference into their balanced reporting, such difference came not in the form
of contextualized description subsumed under a name. What I belatedly realized
was that the affectively charged preface to their peace journalism was rooted
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in partisan stereotypes pieced together from mythologized tales that glorify
Muslims while disparaging Christians.
If Certeau’s floodlights had panned across Ambon City in war’s wake, they
would have picked up an analogous response, albeit from the opposite direction, to the perceived equalization of Christians and Muslims in Maluku—
namely, the huge Christian billboards whose emergence and adamant presence
I have tracked in this book. One way of understanding the street paintings’
gigantic scale, as I have emphasized earlier, is as a response to the scaling down
of Protestant elite privilege. Put otherwise, it is another way of setting the historical record straight, but for Protestants rather than Muslims. Like the backstory to peace journalism, told to me with some urgency by the Manado
journalists, the immense billboards and murals can also be seen as a backdrop
that, with equal urgency, demanded public attention.

Scrolling for Peace
Let me fast-forward to September 11, 2011, when violence broke out again in
Ambon, sparked by the death of a Muslim motorbike-taxi driver in a Christian
neighborhood. Simply put, Christians claimed it was an accident, Muslims
that the man had been murdered. Text messages circulated stating that he had
been tortured and killed by Christians, and cell phone photographs of his
wounds spread rapidly among Muslims and on Muslim websites. By the time
the man was buried around noon on September 11, hundreds of mourners had
gathered. Violence broke out as they left the cemetery, continuing in two parts
of the city until nine p.m., leaving three people dead and dozens wounded.
Close to one hundred homes, mostly Muslim but some Christian, were burned.
A confrontation the following day claimed four more shooting victims, left
fifty Christian homes burned, and displaced about four thousand persons,
some having lost their home for the fourth time in twelve years.
In the context of the September 11 violence, an interreligious group of activist
journalists, religious leaders, students, and others with strong ties across the
religious divide contacted each other and set up a network that aimed, as they
put it, to “provoke peace” by deploying a number of simple, low-cost, and
frankly quite effective strategies. Two of the main leaders were Jacky Manuputty, an activist GPM minister, and Abidin Wakano, a lecturer at the State
Islamic University who had long worked actively to promote peace in the city.
Calling themselves Peace Provocateurs, the network of Muslims and Christians recalls the shadowy provocateur or insidious actor that was sometimes
identified with the state but, more commonly, with unnamed elite interests,
certain parties, and other potent if unidentifiable agencies. These fugitive actors
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proliferated in the reporting of the Manado peace journalists but also in the
conspiracy theories rampant in Indonesia, including that of the homegrown
puppeteer manipulating events from behind the scenes. In some respects, if
differently, this is what the Peace Provocateurs do: they work behind the scenes,
intervening in circulation to stop the spread of rumors and false information
capable of setting off violence. The tactics and interventions of the Peace
Provocateurs rely on the speed and avid use of social media among Ambon’s
population, something that was not available during the war. Text messaging
is especially popular, as elsewhere in Indonesia, but also Facebook, Instagram,
and Twitter, the latter used by the Provocateurs to relay interactive news programs to local and national television to counter and prevent inaccurate and
sensationalist reporting.54 As the activist minister Jacky Manuputty put it, “If
provocateurs could use the new technology to incite violence, we could use it
to undermine their incitement.”55 They formed a core group of about ten people,
each with a dozen or so contacts around the city, notably in sensitive, conflict-
prone areas. They also identified people they called strategic partners in border
neighborhoods and put them in touch with each other to monitor and coordinate information.56 The members of the network were in constant communication with each other in the chaos following the events of September 11 as
they focused on cross-checking, collecting, verifying, and producing evidence—
commonly relying on mobile telephony—that confirmed attacks, the massing
of crowds, and incidents of violence or, equally importantly, demonstrated
these to be false or distorted. For instance, when a member of the network in
one part of Ambon heard that the GPM Silo Church had been damaged, he
immediately contacted another member of the network stationed at the church
who photographed it with his phone, circulated the photo, and proved the
rumor untrue. Similarly, if a person was said to have been wounded or killed,
a Peace Provocateur would post a cellphone photograph on social media showing the person alive and unharmed. In sum, the main strategies of the Peace
Provocateur network were the deployment of persons armed with cell phones
to strategic sites and trouble spots around the city to check on rumors, the relaying of information back to a person who acted as editor, and frequent updates
sent out via text, Facebook, and Twitter.57 Since 2011, the local government has
become much more aware of the need to work with the telephone company
to get mass text messages out when trouble occurs.58
While the interventions of the Peace Provocateurs have been crucial in
helping to prevent the escalation and spread of violence, they have focused
especially on flash points—moments when danger flares up, starting rumors
and feeding what, in war’s context, I call the infrastructure of imagination (Chapter 1). By interrupting circulation with counterinformation, their work undermines
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the kind of spiraling out of control triggered by hearsay, false accusations, and
fantasy that helps to create a sense of threat and immanent danger and foster
the fearful unknowing that, over time, cloaks the city in what the Prussian
general Carl von Clausewitz calls the fog of war. In light of how I proposed that
Ambon’s conflict began, it is striking that cell phone technology should be the
central feature of the Peace Provocateurs’ mode of operation. In Chapter 1, I
detailed how the walkie-talkies and land lines set up to connect Muslim and
Christian leaders to their respective communities in response to religious violence in Jakarta became mobilized in January 1999 in ways that transformed
an ordinary fight between a Muslim and a Christian into citywide violence
and allowed each side to accuse the other of starting it. With their ability to
respond at immediate notice, the Provocateurs prevent precisely such unremarkable, everyday occurrences from escalating. “It is not the big, predictable
events we have to worry about most,” the city’s bishop, Monseigneur Mandagi,
commented, recognizing the activists’ work, “It’s the ordinary days, when the
security services will be off guard, and a small incident could blow up quickly.”59
If the Provocateurs’ most celebrated actions have been their ad hoc responses
to some rumor or incident, in less volatile times they circulate texts and tweets
about cross-community events and post photographs of normality, such as a
Muslim trader plying his wares in a predominantly Christian area, to demonstrate that the vast majority of people in Ambon get along and have no interest
in the violence that some try to provoke.
Other activist collectives also avail themselves of the possibilities afforded
by social media—especially Facebook and Instagram—and the specific power
of images to transform negative perceptions of the city, both inside and outside of Ambon. They work, in other words, deliberately on appearances—
specifically the images of the provincial capital that continued to circulate
online after the official peace and portrayed the city devastated by war. In
contrast to the Provocateurs’ circulation of images to confirm the return of
a previously taken-for-g ranted normality, the image-activists upload their
photographs and sketches to show Ambon’s natural beauty, the presence of
its many historic sites and artifacts, and cultural performances. The first
group arose in 2007 as a photography club. Such clubs have a long history in
Indonesia but this one was different.60 Its members—young women and men,
Muslims and Christians—set off on photo hunting exhibitions, often around
twilight after getting out from work or school, at a time when most Ambonese
were hurrying home to their religiously enclaved neighborhoods. Besides
taking photographs, the expeditions were meant to leave an impression of
interreligious friendship and camaraderie, as well as the sense that after
nightfall Muslims could venture safely into Christian areas and vice versa. In
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Figure 54. Sketch of Ambon’s Pattimura Statue and Maranatha church by Linley Jerry
Pattinama of the Maluku Sketch Walkers collective, Ambon, 2017. Photo by the author.

seeking out especially scenic and beautiful locations, the young photographers also aimed to show Ambon at its best and bereft of any traces of violence
(Figure 54).
As one of the photographers explained, the group formed after discovering
that, as late as 2006 and 2007, barricaded streets, bloody scenes, damaged
buildings, and dead people still filled the screen when one googled or searched
online for Ambon.61 In acts that constitute deliberate work on appearances, the
photographers screened away the out-of-date, offending images by substituting
them with peaceful, compelling scenes. Sunsets, not surprisingly, were popular.
Not only because Ambon’s are quite spectacular but since they presented a
ready-made photo opportunity during the club’s late afternoon excursions. The
Maluku Sketch Walkers collective, some of whose members belonged to the
earlier photography club that is now largely defunct, concentrate similarly on
producing appealing images of Ambon that they consider important in light
of the long-standing damage to the city’s reputation caused by the war. A look
at the calendar the group put out in 2017 yields sketches of codified sites of
local history and religion and urban markets and Malukan foods, each foreseen
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with a short, handwritten explanation. They range from the calendar’s cover
showing a paintbrush and handful of brushes alongside a sketch of Ambon’s
colonial era Victoria Fort to images of Maluku’s “crazy bamboo” performance,
the city’s crowded Mardika market, a dish of colo-colo sauce, two featuring local
desserts and two of Dutch forts, another a tuna fish boat, still another a beach,
and, in an echo of the children’s reconciliation drawings, the Jame Mosque and
the Saint Franciscus cathedral, albeit allocated to separate pages. Although there
is much I could say about the codification of the local here or about how the
Maluku Sketch Walkers’ style reproduces that of a wider international sketchers’
aesthetic, I will not do so here.
Instead, I would like to reflect, briefly, on how the sketches may be seen as
part of the larger, diffuse work on appearances that continues after the war and
hopefully contributes to the city’s recovery, however modestly. Formally, the
sketches are small vignettes, encapsulated scenes snatched from the flow of
everyday life that appear to float on the white page on which they are rendered.
While such vignettes distinguish the genre everywhere, in Maluku they might
appear especially disconnected from the complex realities that continue to mark
life in the city almost two decades after the peace and that do not figure in the
image-activists drawings. But such fields without borders can also have the effect
of engaging the viewer in the world seen on the page, of drawing her in.62 From
this perspective, the Maluku sketches would differ from the children’s reconciliation drawings that jar with the circumstances around them. Even when the
sketches render, for instance, centuries-old forts or sago cakes in watercolor,
they promote recognizable, even reassuring artifacts and locally authorized
scenes within the general surrounds familiar to Ambonese and to which they
have, moreover, been made attuned by local historiography, the celebration of
Malukan custom, and other processes of canonization, whether state-or popularly driven. Precisely because the sites and scenes they portray are so codified—“tourist objects and scenic views” as in the photographs of the club that
preceded them—they may help to confirm and reinstate more comforting appearances of a city still emerging, in some respects, from a devastating war.
More concretely, the online scrolling on which both of Ambon’s image-activist
collectives rely assumes a guerilla archival function in their work. To some
extent, “the physical act of scrolling can be regarded as a digital counterpart to
turning the page in a print novel, and the scroll ‘up’ or ‘down’ resembles flipping
back and forth between a book.”63 On Instagram and Facebook, moving forward
in this fashion happens automatically. Every time images are uploaded, they
take precedence over earlier ones as these are scrolled away and out of sight.
Scrolling, from this perspective, has both material and digital dimensions, an
intimate relationship between the two meanings of scroll that draws attention
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to the way in which textual meaning is shaped not only through the text’s content but also through its form in space and time, present in this case in an online
context.64 Bent on altering the negative online portrayal of Ambon by working
on appearances, the image-activists of the photography club and Maluku Sketch
Walkers deployed both senses of scroll effectively as they uploaded positive images of Ambon, ensuring in so doing that negative depictions disappeared from
view. To be sure, these ephemeral mediations are not seen by everyone. But
they reinscribe, however faintly, the familiar contours of life in Ambon City
even as, presumably, they begin to trace out some new ones.

Conclusion
Ephemeral Mediations

How do we gauge the impact of the street art that gave expression, in so many
ways, to the restless uncertainties that haunted the postwar city? Beyond the
comfort they offered Protestants, alienated from their past and affected by war,
how do we evaluate their broader effects, given that a mere decade or so after
official peace the paintings had largely disappeared from view and, perhaps,
memory? Whatever power these ephemeral mediations of religion, masculinity,
Christian privilege, and subjectivity once exercised in the urban environment,
for the most part, is no longer there. For even if I saw a new Christ of the Second
Coming on a few scant walls in Ambon’s center and in the hills above it in
2011, and Christian and Christmas scenes continued to be painted here and
there around the city through my last visit in 2017, none of these had been put
in place with the same urgency or desperation as those that surfaced in the
war and immediately after. Unlike their predecessors, these street paintings no
longer call out stridently to passersby, and even as the city remains largely
segregated along religious lines, the overall situation is far from the battlefield
in which Muslims and Christians enclaved themselves in vigorously defended
territories. The energies that infused them then have long since dissipated as
the pictures themselves have faded from view, leaving behind smudged surfaces, flecks of paint, and the occasional dim contour. Much, in other words,
has changed, which means that the pictures are less the poignant, affective
presences they once were and emerge today predominantly as views to be seen.
In this book, I have stuck close to the Christian pictures, allowing them
to ethnographically ground and guide my narrative while telling one version
of a story, among other possible versions, of a Malukan city at war from the
vantage point of some of its main protagonists. But it is also an account of an
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unprecedented turn to the visual and the corresponding valuation and thematization of visual media and experience within the specific circumstances of
an Indonesian city ravaged by conflict and crisis in today’s visually attuned
world. Their monumentality, their defiant presence in the urban environment,
and, when freshly rendered, their sharp contours and vibrant colors demanded
that they be taken seriously and not casually dismissed. My reading of these
images suggests that the street art paralleled and most probably abetted the
significant realignments in urban religion, especially among the Protestants.
Yet, how closely knit in actuality was this street art, the work of young motorbike-
taxi drivers who are usually not the most avid churchgoers or dutiful of Christians, to religion? Earlier in this book, I addressed this question by complicating
it, suggesting how religion in the streets, performed through the production and
engagement with painted Christian billboards and murals, falls within the
undisciplined rather than the official, institutionalized forms of religion, something that does not diminish their importance.1 It is my other question regarding
the overall impact and significance of the street art, beyond the predicament
of Ambonese Christians, that requires some final consideration, both because
it is more complex and because I see it as a main contribution of the book.
This is also where the ephemeral mediations come in that give this conclusion its title. Ephemeral mediations do not just designate the street pictures
that have been my recurrent focus, allowing a dispersed picture gallery to come
into view across different chapters. Although they did not receive the same
attention I gave to the Christian paintings, countless other strikingly ephemeral
mediations, intimately connected to the production of violence and the delicate
peace that followed, to figuration within the terrifying, disfiguring momentum
of an embattled city, and to world-making and -unmaking, also appeared in
Ambon, and in my analysis. These include hearsay and gossip, provocative
pamphlets and VCDs, and public service announcements circulated in violence
and reconciliation initiatives, aired briefly on television and radio. I paid close
attention to children’s drawings, some of which, fortunately for me, had only
been recently made when I encountered them, or saved by NGOs, or, more
rarely, collected in a book. Many more, no doubt, did not survive the particular
event or contest for which they were done. Children’s parades and performances
were one-off occasions. War’s unmistakable soundtrack and incendiary terminology, street banners supporting the presence of civil emergency and armed
forces, the text messages and photographs of cell phone telephony, transmitting
crucial information at a moment’s notice, and sketches of the city posted on
Instagram and Facebook, scrolled from view almost as quickly as they appeared
onscreen, are some of the other ephemeral mediations I considered. With
respect to all of these relatively fleeting phenomena, I have aimed to describe
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and analyze their impact and effects within the evolving circumstances of the
wartime and postwar city. Even more fugitive and challenging to catch hold
of was war’s fog or the elusive appearances, on the very threshold of perceptibility, unleashed by the uncertainties and terror that overtook Ambon City at
the turn of the century.
Notwithstanding the disciplinary commitment to understanding everyday
life in all its diversity, from banal to extraordinary manifestations, anthropologists have tended to shy away from difficult to grasp if palpable phenomena
like ambiance, climate, and atmospherics. One way of getting at such phenomena, as I have tried to do here, is by showing how these fugitive forces suffused
and oriented the actions and experience of wartime, giving rise to novel formations of sociality and the sensible, from anticipatory practices meant to ward
off danger to a pervasive aesthetics of depth, as in a camera’s slow pan of army
fatigues as if such scrutiny might summon to the surface undisclosed truths.
Somewhat differently, I explored how the newly assertive, yet in the end equally
ephemeral, Christian street art helped to materialize and bring about a new
relation to the Christian divine—something I became aware of because the
appearance of street paintings coincided with the momentous shifts in religiosity and religious affiliation occurring in the urban context. I hope to have
conveyed a general sense of how more elusive and ephemeral aspects of social
life, perhaps especially in situations of profound sociopolitical upheaval and
change, deserve our acute attention. For even as they come and go, they can
have lasting impact. Depositing their traces in an assortment of practices and
forms, they bring about new distributions of the sensible, altered landscapes
of living and cohabitation and subtly different ways of seeing, dwelling, and
engaging the world.
The reproduction of Ambon’s ephemeral street art and its offshoots in the
preceding pages bears material testimony to a particular infrastructure of the
imagination, one that fed the momentum and unfolding dynamics of the city’s
interreligious war and related realignment of religion. But the archive collected
here—images that are largely absent today in situ—is also a material tribute to
the creativity of a generation of Malukan street painters and a reminder of the
energy and resilience with which they sought recognition for their place in the
city, as citizens of Indonesia and as Christians.
By alternating full-page, saturated reproductions of billboards and murals
with clusters of topographically related paintings and thematically connected
assemblages, like the regal Christ behind church altars or conventional Christ
portraits in domestic interiors, and close-ups with distanced views of pictures
in their urban surrounds, I have tried to highlight the myriad ways in which
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such images arose and occupied the space of the city from aggressive proclamations of Christianity to unassuming decorative features in Protestant homes
and stores. In dispersing the images across and between chapters, I aimed to
convey how these visual forms echo each other, hinting at their repetition and
sheer redundancy around Ambon.
But nothing, and certainly not the flat surfaces in this book, can come close
to the experience of encountering these enormous blowups in city streets, of
being assailed by their rich, affective force. Nor can it convey the sense of shock
that their appearance must have occasioned among Protestants and others,
including myself, in their resistance to conventional ways of seeing. In captioning the images reproduced in this book and situating them socially, politically,
religiously, and aesthetically in relation to Ambon’s conflict and its aftermath,
I have tried to walk a fine line between delineating the shock and dispelling
it. For this reason, I have not offered additional commentary or guidelines on
what contribution they are supposed to make or how a reader of this book might
engage them.
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14. Some of these projects involved children writing short poems in addition to
drawing. See, for instance, Kisah di Balik Kehidupan: Anak Pengungsi Maluku
Utara di Manado dalam Gambar dan Puisi (Manado, Indonesia: Yayasan Pelita
Kasih Abadi/Catholic Relief Services Indonesia, 2001); Hasil Puisi Yayasan Pelita
Kasih Abadi/Catholic Relief Services Jakarta, Manado, “Program Therapi
Emosional Pengungsi Anak di Manado” (unpublished manuscript, January–March
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Kerusuhan”/Een Huis Zonder Deur: Molukse Kinderen: “Slachtoffers van Geweld”
(Utrecht, Netherlands: Stichting TitanE, 2001); and on such projects, see “Ambon
Children Express Trauma through Art,” Jakarta Post, May 10, 2002. I would like to
thank Katinka van Heeren for bringing the last article to my attention.
15. The Women and Children Exchange drawing competition was held by the
implementing team of the GPM on July 20, 2013. The Indonesian original, posted
July 20, 2013, on Facebook by Rudy Fofid, reads: “Ada gereja di dekat masjid.
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16. Notes from author’s interview with journalists from Radio Pelangi, Ambon,
Indonesia, September 2, 2003.
17. Notes from author’s interview with journalists from Radio Jalinan Nuansa
Seni, Ambon, Indonesia, September 2, 2003.
18. Notes from author’s interview with journalists from Radio Jalinan Nuansa
Seni, Ambon, Indonesia, September 2, 2003.
19. An example would be “Mari katong membangun Maluku kembali” (Let us
rebuild Maluku again) in which the juxtaposition of the Ambonese Malay katong
with the more formal membangun kembali is especially jarring.
20. Although such terminology is not mentioned in the Malino II Peace
Agreement, it features as Article 9, for instance, in the Peace Declaration of
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the Tobelo Adat Community (North Maluku): “Both parties agree to stop using
the term red for Christians and white for Muslims, and to not use the term or
phrase Christian troops for Christians or Jihad troops for Muslims, or Acang for
Muslims or Obet Christians.” See the English translation of “Peace Declaration
of the Tobelo Adat Community, Thursday 19 April, 2001, Hibua Lama Field in
Tobelo,” in Duncan, Violence and Vengeance, 195. For a copy of the Malino II
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29. I borrow Karen Strassler’s adaptation of Marita Sturken’s contrast here.
Strassler uses it to describe what she calls the “innocenting” of images produced by
children. Strassler, “Reformasi through Our Eyes.”
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Images That Move, ed. Patricia Spyer and Mary Margaret Steedly (Santa Fe: School
for Advanced Research Press, 2013).
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F. Rendall (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).
36. Strassler writes how, in post-Suharto Indonesia, “the figure of the child
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they also felt supported in their endeavor by the creation of the new province of
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